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This dissertation is the outcome of the 
pressing need felt by the writer in the course of the 
pastoral ministry to try to relate the challenges and insights 
of the contemporary theological ferment to the heart of the 
Christian message, the word of the Cross. Such is the pace 
of theological development that the teaching received less than 
tmenty years ago, (teaching that mas then abreast of the times 
and by no means obscurantist), has proved to be inadequate 
both mith regard to one's own gromth in experience and under­
standing, and to the need for a relevant preaching of the Cross 
at a time mhen many are perplexed by some of the catch-phrases 
of mhat is coming to be knomn as the 'nem theology' and the 
spread of secularist attitudes into all areas of life. The 
study and reflection involved in the preparation of the dissert­
ation have provided an opportunity for the mriter, so to speak, 
to pause for breath and to take stock of the situation.
That the exercise has been found to be so 
valuable and personally remarding is due in large measure to 
the friendly encouragement and the mise and scholarly guidance 
of his supervisor, Professor R.Gregor Smith, to mhom the 
mriter mishes to express his enduring sense of gratitude.
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IDLIRo d u c i i o n
When Joseph of Arimathaea "rolled a stone against the 
door of the tomb" (Mark 15:46), it must have seemed that another 
episode in the tragic story of man's cruelty and corruption, his 
perversity and pride, his folly and his fear, had come to an end. 
Yet mithin a fern meeks the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth, 
"crucified under Pontius Pilate", mere openly proclaiming that 
God had "raised him to life again, setting him free from the 
pangs of death". (Acts 2:24, N.E.B.). Associated mith this 
affirmation mas the call to "repent and be baptized, every one 
of you, in the name of Jesus the Messiah for the forgiveness of 
your sins; and you mill receive the gift of the Holy Spirit"
(Acts 2:38, N.E.B.). Clearly it mas the unshakable conviction of 
St. Peter that the happenings in Jerusalem at the time of the 
recent Passover festival, involving Jesus of Nazareth, mere of no 
ordinary significance. Although every historical event is in a 
real sense unique in its relation to all other events, the 
disciples of Jesus mere utterly convinced that mhat had taken 
place could only be rightly understood as a decisive 
manifestation of God's love and pomer mhich radically changed 
the situation of every man. The "Easter-Event" of Crucifixion 
and Resurrection marks the birth of the Christian Church, mhich 
has constantly acknomledged the decisive, normative significance
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Of the Event for its existence and its mission*
It is to this particular, contingent happening 
that the whole New Testament bears witness. Ebeling writes, 
"lilhen Christian faith speaks about its basis, it points with 
monotonous regularity to the crucified Jesus, of whom it is 
known that he is risen." (l). Every New Testament author 
would undoubtedly confirm St. Paul's understanding of the 
kerygma as centred on the proclamation of Christ "nailed to 
the Cross", (l Cor. 1:22, N.E.B.). "First and foremost, I 
handed on to you the facts which had been imparted to me: 
that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures 
that he was buried; that he was raised to life on the third 
day, according to the Scriptures; and that he appeared to 
Cephas, and afterwards to the Twelve", (l Cor. 15:3-5, N.E.B.).
(NOTE. Vincent Taylor observes in "The Cross of
Christ" (2), that "St. Paul alone uses the phrase 'the death
of Christ' or 'His death1, and, apart from 
'the Cross' in Heb.l2:2, he is the only 
New Testament writer to speak of 'the Cross 
of Christ.' ".
This fact has sometimes been taken to imply that the emphasis 
on the death of Jesus is peculiarly Pauline,- that the 
'theoloqia crucis' is a Pauline invention. Some scholars lay 
considerable stress upon the differences between the Pauline
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and the Johannine interpretations of the Christ-event.
R.Bultmann, for example, writes:-
"Though for Paul the incarnation of Christ is a part 
of the total salvation-occurrence, for 3ohn it is the 
decisive salvation-event. While for Paul the incarnation 
is secondary to his death in importance, one might 
say that the reverse is true of John: the death is 
subordinate to the incarnation. But on closer 
inspection it turns out that incarnation and death 
constitute a unity as the coming (incarnation) and 
the going (death) of the Son of God. But within 
that unity the centre of gravity is not the death, 
as it is in Paul. In Bohn, Jesus' death has no 
pre-eminent importance for salvation". (3).
Nevertheless, Bultmann himself tends to reduce the real
significance of the differences which exist between Paul and
John when he goes on to say, "John's passion narrative shows
us Jesus as not really suffering death but choosing it - not as
the passive victim but as the active conqueror." ( op.cit. p.53).
The theme of active obedience by which Jesus overcame the
forces of evil is not lacking in Paul: cf. Phil. 2:8, Col. 2:15.
And on the basis of such words as "... the blood of Jesus Christ
his Son cleanses us from all sin", (l John 1:7), and "Look,...
there is the Lamb of God; it is he who takes away the sin of
the world" (John 1:29 N.E.B.), it is not unreasonable to claim
that for John the supreme manifestation of the divine love is
the Cross. T.UJ.lYlanson is probably nearer the truth when he
regards the differences between Paul and John as mainly
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differences of "selection and emphasis" rather than as a 
difference of "centre of gravity". (4) ).
But not only luas the Event proclaimed as the heart
and centre of the Church's message: it uias also remembered in
the worship of the Church in the celebration of the Lord's
Supper. The occasion has always been "in remembrance of Him".
(NOTE. Considerable research, both historical and
theological, has been given in recent times to the origins of
the Lord's Supper and its meaning in the life of the primitive
Church. In "Essays on the Lord's 5upper"(5), Cullraann notes
the duality which has long been observed in primitive conceptions
of the Eucharist. He writes,
"On the one hand there is the idea of a meal
celebrated in the happy and joyful expectation 
of the return of Christ, without any reference
whatsoever to his death; and on the other there
is the Lord's Supper, in the form commended by
St. Paul which was destined in the course of time 
to prevail, i.e. a meal concerned above all to 
proclaim the Lord's death in remembrance of the 
Last Supper and of the words that Jesus uttered 
on that occasion." ( op. cit. p.6).
Cullmann relates the Eucharist more particularly to the joyful 
recollection of the Resurrection appearances, and argues that 
St. Paul established the connection between the Lord's Supper
and the death of Christ. ( op. cit. pp. 17-20). He concludes
"...the new elements introduced by St. Paul were so 
exclusively emphasized that the connection with
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the Eucharist of the early Christians 'breaking 
bread' mas lost* The Lord's Supper mas thus 
deprived of certain religious meanings of the 
greatest importance. The idea of the joyful 
communion of the faithful u/ith the Risen Christ, 
and through Him, u/ith the others around the table 
mas someiuhat relegated to the background as a 
consequence of too exclusive an attachment of 
Christ's presence to the 'elements' of bread and 
mine offered for the remission of sins." (op.cit.
£.22.)
Whatever one's judgment of this viem may be, it is 
easy to understand that the Supper may at some place and time 
have had each of these meanings because of the intimate 
connection betmeen the Crucifixion and the Resurrection.
As the central act of the Church's u/orship it u/as inevitable 
that it should embody a recognition of both elements in the 
Church's gospel.
E.Kasemann in his essay on the Pauline doctrine of 
the Lord's Supper in "Essays on Nem Testament Themes"(6). finds 
little justification for regarding the Lord's Supper as a 
memorial meal, emphasizing that the Pauline doctrine " must 
be interpreted in the light of his dominant theme- the Body 
of Christ", and the believer's incorporation into that Body 
through the gift of the pneuma. (op. cit. p.Ill) • UJith 
reference to the UJords of Institution he mrites,
"•••the command to repeat the actions does not 
merely bind the community to celebrate the Lord's 
Supper regularly and thus to keep alive in a
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literalistic may the meaning of the death of 
3esus, but places upon it at the same time the 
obligation to proclaim the redemptive meaning of 
this death." (op.cit. p.121).
Kasemann finds historical and theological
significance in the disparity betmeen the Uiords of Institution
over the bread and those over the cup.
"It is not merely a question of a different form 
of mords. According to the first formula, the 
sacramental gift is participation in the death of 
3esus, that is, in his crucified body; according 
to the second formula the sacramental gift is 
participation in the nem diatheke."(op. cit.p.130). 
Kasemann goes on to say, "The nem diatheke is 
certainly grounded in the death of 3esus; but as 
its content is the lordship of the Christ, he mho 
partakes of the diatheke partakes at the same time 
of the Kyrios. that is of 3esus in his exalted state. 
The disparity betmeen the tmo formulae of Institution 
thus consists in the fact that the sacramental gift 
is described in the first as participation in the 
crucified body, that is, in the death of 3esus; in 
the second as participation in the kingdom of the 
exalted Lord. These are not mutually contradictory, 
for Paul never separates the Cross of 3esus from his 
exaltation and presents the death of 3esus as the 
foundation of his lordship." (op.cit. p.131).
Kasemann clearly understands the Lord's Supper as a
participation in both the death and the exaltation of the Christ.
It mas thus from the beginning an occasion for recalling 3esus. ).
This, of course, does not reduce the Lord's Supper to 
a simple meal in memory of an heroic and exemplary leader. Yet 
in any participation in the Eucharist there is the devoted 
remembrance of the crucified Christ as mell as the joyous
experience of the exalted Kyrios. And through the centuries
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th8 Lord’s Suppsr has linked believers in an unbroken chain 
of celebration with those who first saw the Lord. Whether 
before the magnificent high altar of a cathedral, or in the 
midst of a clandestine gathering of persecuted Christians 
celebrating the sacrament deep in the country with a rude 
stone as a table; whether in the company of the high born and 
educated or with the lowly and illiterate, the perceptive 
believer has in the eucharistic worship of the Church, 
"discerned the Lord's Body".
In the course of the history of Christian era the 
Cross itself has become the sign of Christianity. Although 
it has been ridiculed as a symbol of pathological infantilism, 
debased into a symbol of racial prejudice and corrupted to 
inspire deeds of violence and cruelty, it still remains as a 
unique symbol of love and sacrifice. Futhermore, the Passion 
and Crucifixion have inspired some of the most sensitive works 
of art and literature.
Notwithstanding, however, the centrality of the 
"word of the Cross" in the Christian proclamation; the 
prominent place of the Lord's Supper with its undeniable 
association with the death of Jesus, in the liturgical 
tradition of the Church; and in spite of the devotion which 
the Crucifixion has inspired in individual believers, there is a
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remarkable diversity of theological interpretation concerning 
the meaning of the death of Jesus. Although the Cross has 
become the universal symbol of the Christian faith, the length 
and breadth and height and depth of what it actually symbolises 
still eludes agreed theological definition. When the questions 
are pressed; How was the death of Jesus related to the human 
situation? Hom could a single event in history affect the 
universal life of mankind? What happened between God and man 
on the Cross?, then conflicting voices are heard and controversy 
may become intense. And after tu/enty centuries of Christian 
preaching, teaching, worship and life, we seem to be no nearer 
to reaching a resolution of the diverse shades of theological 
emphasis. Before dismissing this fact as a sign of theological 
ineptitude we may well give deeper consideration to the 
phenomenon, Might it not be that the absence of a firm 
doctrinal formulation of the significance of the Cross serves 
to reveal its meaning more profoundly than a well-defined 
theological statement?. Does it not suggest that here we are 
inescapably confronted with something which concerns man's 
relation to God at the deepest levels of his existence?. In 
the Christ-event man finds himself at the point where his 
understanding of God and his self-understanding interlock. At 
this ultimately undefinable point no externally authoritative
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intellectual statements can serve to express a reality which 
totally involves the whole individual. The absence of an 
agreed formula of belief constantly reminds us that Christ­
ianity has at its heart a Person rather than a creed or a code. 
Referring to the subjective element in atonement, Tillich 
writes,
"This is why the Church instinctively refused to 
state the doctrine of atonement in definite, 
dogmatic terms, as in the case of the Christo- 
logical dogma". (7)
John Knox speaks of the death of Christ
"as a moment of strange and awful pregnancy, sign­
ificant beyond our understanding, pointing us 
towards heights incalculably beyond our reach and 
making us aware of depths in our existence which we 
know we shall never sound or probe". (8).
Has theology then nothing to say on the death of
Christ?. Must we be content to leave the atonement as an
infinite mystery beyond the power of thought to comprehend?.
Should the preaching on Good Friday be confined to a simple
repetition of the gospel passion-narratives?. Must we leave the
individual believer to a mystical contemplation of a crucifix or
a cross?* These questions admit of no simple answer. In fact it
may well be that the sound of theological disputation about the
death of Jesus has drowned the inner witness of the Holy Spirit
in the minds of many. The conflict of theories of the Atonement,
giving rise to innumerable questions, may hide the truth that at
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the heart of the Christ-event is One who asks a question of us.
It was, however, Jesus himself who commanded us to love the 
Lord our God with our minds, and no premium is placed on 
ignorance in the kingdom of God, In fulfilling its appointed 
task to preach the gospel to every creature the early Church was 
compelled to find the terms and symbols which would most 
effectively assist both the proclaiming and the hearing of the 
"word of the Cross".
(NOTE. IL/e have already noted the difference in 
emphasis and selection between the theology of Paul and that 
of John. This cannot be accounted for simply by referring to a 
difference in individual insight into the meaning of the Christ- 
event. Both men were attempting to relate the significance of 
the Christ to the existence of their readers, which is of the 
essence of genuine preaching. It is therefore somewhat mis­
leading for T.F.Torrance to write,
"In Jesus Christ the Truth of God has already been 
made relevant to man and his need, and therefore does c
not need to be made relevant by us". (9).
UJe may agree that God has acted in Jesus Christ in a way
relevant to the human predicament. But this action cannot be
proclaimed in isolation from the religious, cultural and social
situation of the particular age in which the gospel is being
preached. In this sense, the gospel must still be made relevant.
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Unless this is done theology becomes petrified into a mass of 
dogmas to which intellectual assent is required as the basis 
of salvation. ).
The task of theology remains one of interpretation 
and mediation.
"The task of theology is mediation, mediation between 
the eternal criterion of truth as it is manifest in 
the picture of Jesus as the Christ and the changing 
experiences of individuals and groups, their varying 
questions and their categories of perceiving reality". 
(10).
It is neither honest nor just to dismiss the questions 
as symptoms of the depravity of man, seeking ever and again to 
hide himself from the UJord of God which would demolish "the 
intellectual and moral pride of reason". (11). The Cross will 
no doubt remain a stumbling block to man’s confidence in his 
ability to unravel all mysteries and to solve all problems. 
Theology has no cause to reduce the gospel to a comfortable 
and inoffensive platitude. Yet theology must always be concerned 
to show where the scandal of the Cross really lies.
This task of interpretation and mediation is one of 
the most urgent theological burdens of the present time, when 
the attitude of doubt or opposition to Christianity is widespread. 
The discontent with traditional religious idiom and imagery is 
not confined to those who aggressively oppose the Christian 
faith. It must surely be recognised as a genuine expression
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of an ultimate concern among many mho are searching for a vital
faith, but mho are convinced that submission to authoritarian
dogmas offers no ansmer to their predicament. There is the
danger that in attempting to fulfil a mediating function
theology mill become guilty of a self-surrendering adaptation
to the idolatries of the age. A similarly disastrous reaction
to the demands of the historical situation mould be to endeavour
to re-assert an external religious orthodoxy. There are those
mho find in confident dogmatic assertions a secure foundation
for their lives, but it is a foundation gained at the price of a
neurotic flight from reality.
"Only a courageous participation in the 'situation*, 
that is, in all the various cultural forms mhich 
express modern man's interpretation of his existence, 
can overcome the present oscillation of kerygmatic 
theology betmeen the freedom implied in the genuine 
kerygma and its orthodox fixation. In other mords, 
kerygmatic theology needs apologetic theology for its 
completion". (12)
It is no longer possible, for example, for theologians to
regard the morld knomn in experience as merely a veil for deeper
realities 'beyond' or 'behind* it, or to treat the created
universe as if it mere only a stage for the drama of redemption.
Christ is then inevitably portrayed as a divine intruder from
another morld,
"mhose brief and sudden appearance in this morld
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confers upon it what little significance its
history may have". (13).
UJhat are the meaningful concepts mith which we may 
communicate the word of the Cross to this generation?. UJe must 
inquire whether the traditional concepts, rooted in an ancient 
sacrificial system, a society in which slavery was an accepted 
institution, and a world view which incorporated unquestioning 
belief in a spiritual realm of evil forces which held man 
captive, can serve to confront men existentially with the 
challenge and the promise of the Cross. Paul Tillich declares 
that in Protestantism the doctrine of atonement in terms of 
substitutional suffering is more or less dead. He did not 
develop a new doctrine of the Atonement in his * Systematic 
Theology1 because he believed that we are in a transition 
period concerning a symbol which has almost died and probably 
cannot be restored in the original sense. (14).
It is the purpose of this dissertation to consider 
some recent developments in theological thought and to examine 
their bearing upon our understanding of the Cross. UJe begin 
by referring to some contemporary writing on the fundamental 
theological question, the question of God.
-14-
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ON THE BEING AND NATURE OF GOD 
A, The Challenge of Empirical Science and Linguistic Analysis.
"The basic theological question", writes Paul Tillich, "is the 
question of God", (l). "Uie are standing", says Oohn Wlacquarrie, 
"only at the beginning of the revolution in the idea of God." (2). 
These two statements clearly indicate a salient feature of 
contemporary theological and philosophical discussion. The 
question of God refuses to be ignored, but has become increasingly 
problematical. A contributing factor is the breakdown of trad­
itional God-language. Basic presuppositions and ideas are no 
longer shared to allow intelligible discourse. In the confused, 
revolutionary situation, Christian theologians are accused of 
atheism and atheists are being pronounced essentially religious 
persons. On the one hand the school of analytic philosophers 
have subjected theological assertions to the cold light of 
linguistic analysis and have dismissed them as nonsensical.
On the other hand, theologians wrestling with the problem of 
using the term 'God' meaningfully, have shown that the plain 
man's idea of God is primitive and inadequate. It is even 
possible for some theological writers to speak with assurance 
about the 'death of God', - a term which has given its name to a 
contemporary movement in Protestant theology.(3).
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The deepest roots of linguistic analysis lie in the 
tradition of British empirical philosophy, itself influenced by 
empirical science, with its established procedures of observation, 
experiment and verification. To assert that something exists 
is to affirm that it is empirically observable, or that its 
existence has empirically observable consequences. The existence 
of the planet Pluto, for example, was predicted on the basis of 
observable variations in the motion of the outer planets. It 
has come to be accepted that the reliability of belief can be 
determined only by an appeal to evidence which is in principle 
at least, open to all observers. This immediately raises 
considerable difficulties for those who affirm belief in the 
existence of God, for there is no empirical evidence to be had 
to support it. The religious person may well feel disturbed.
He lives his life in an environment which is dominated by the 
attitudes and the consequences of empirical science. How can 
his religious beliefs be related to the attitude and outlook 
which dominates his life for six days of the week?. The men 
who really inspire his awe and wonder are the scientists and 
technologists, the builders of tomorrow's world. They are looked 
to for help in time of need, they are the 'powers' to whom he 
looks for the control of nature, the conquest of poverty and 
hunger, the cure of disease and the amelioration of distress.
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They commend themselves to him by the signs they gave wrought, 
and the fulfilment of predictions makes them worthy of his 
dependence. Referring to our faith in science, H. Richard 
Niebuhr writes,
"Our beliefs about atoms and their nuclei, about 
electrons, protons, and stranger particles, about 
fusion and fission, viruses and macroraolecules, 
the galaxies and the speed of light, the curvature 
of space and gamma-rays, hormones and vitamins, the 
localization of functions in the brain and the 
presence of complexes in the sub-conscious, the 
functions of the liver and the activities of the 
ductless glands- these seem to excel in variety, 
complexity, and remoteness from either personal 
experience or ratiocination all that earlier man 
believed about angels, demons, miracles, saints, 
sacraments, relics, hell and heaven." (4).
Seeing signs and wonders on every hand, modern man 
places his confidence in those who perform them, and, as of old, 
he is much more stimulated by the wonder-worker than he is by the 
seer and the prophet. Nevertheless, according to surveys of 
mass opinion, the majority of people, at least in England, 
affirm a belief in God. The content of that belief, however, 
appears to be meagre and nebulous, indicating rather a nostalgic 
religiosity than a living, articulate faith.
Yet in spite of the advances and undoubted benefits 
of empirical science, man remains subject to irrational fears, 
and continues to be motivated by inchoate and contradictory 
beliefs. UJe may observe a revival of supernaturalism in popular
-18-
religion, the fascination of the occult, and the emergence of 
an ambivalent attitude toward science.
The thoughtful religious person may be well aware 
of the idolatrous admiration which science tends to inspire, 
and he may continue to affirm his belief in God, but he is at 
the same time conscious that for some reason the word 'God' tends 
to arouse in his mind the image of a crumbling idol. Without 
perhaps having heard of linguistic analysis he is nonetheless 
painfully aware of his uncertainty in using the term 'God'. UJe 
must now proceed to inquire into the method of linguistic 
analysis and try to evaluate its significance with reference to 
religious language.
An admirable attempt to understand the Gospel in the 
light of linguistic analysis has been made by Paul van Buren in 
"The Secular Meaning of the Gospel" (5). He writes,
"The problem of the Gospel in a secular age is a problem 
of the logic of its apparently meaningless language, 
and linguistic analysis will give us help in 
clarifying it." (op.cit. p.84).
He rejects the attempt of existential theologians to reach a
solution by a non-objective use of the word 'God1. This is no
help at all since their use of the word allows of no verification
and therefore remains meaningless.
"The empiricist in us finds the heart of the difficulty 
not in what is said about God, but in the very
-19-
talking about God at all." (op.cit. p.84). "The 
problem now is that the word 'God' is dead".
(op.cit. p.103).
If the key word of theology is now a valueless coin, 
then what is left?, van Buren turns first of all to a suggestion 
of R.IYl.Hare that everyone has a set of basic presuppositions 
about himself and his world, a 'blik', which has not been 
gained by a process of logical deduction. The Christian's 'blik' 
is
"an orientation, a commitment, to see the world in 
a certain way, and a way of life following 
inevitably upon this orientation." (op.cit. p 87).
Thus it is possible, on Hare's suggestion, for a Christian to
live meaningfully without the support of a theistic faith. The
Christian is one whose 'blik' finds its definition in Jesus of
Nazareth.
van Buren discusses other attempts to analyse the 
language of faith without recourse to the word 'God'. R.B. 
Braithwaite, for example, finds the significance of religious 
assertions in their use as guides to conduct. (6). As guides 
they may be supported by a doctrinal story which could help 
the Christian live according to Christian moral principles.
The stories need not correspond to empirical fact, but since 
behaviour is determined not only by intellectual considerations 
but also by emotional factors, the stories may strengthen and
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confirm the intention in the mind of the believer to act in 
accord with his moral principles.
Although van Buren is certain that "a straight­
forward use of the word 'God' must be abandoned", (op.cit.p.100), 
the language of faith still has meaning as the language of one 
whose behaviour is dominated by the Christian 'blik1. The 
language refers not to a transcendent Being, whether or not 
conceived as an object, but to the way of life or the authentic 
existence of one for whom "Jesus has become his point of 
orientation", (op.cit.p.142). It is language which is 
appropriate to situations in which the individual is gripped 
by new insights which involve commitment and action. He sums 
up his argument in these words;
"Statements of faith are to be interpreted by means of 
the modified verification principle, as statements 
which express, describe, or command a particular 
way of seeing the world, other men and oneself, and 
the way of life appropriate to such a perspective." 
(op.cit. p.156). The norm is "the series of events 
to which the New Testament documents testify 
centering in the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus of Nazareth." (ibid.)
Such statements are validated by the conduct of the one who
makes the statements. Christian faith, then, consists of a
single, complete orientation to the whole world and this
orientation is that of a life lived in freedom and love for men,
which has its norm in the history of Jesus of Nazareth.
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Noai this freedom of Jesus, and his love for men is 
shouin by the Easter faith to be contagious. Hence the Christian 
is one who has become free with a measure of the freedom tuhich 
had been Jesus' during his life. And
"... for those for tuhom the freedom of Jesus is 
contagious, who have been so touched and claimed by 
him, that he has become the criterion of their under­
standing of themselves, other men, and the world, 
there is but one ’Lord1: Jesus of Nazareth. Since 
there is no 'Father' to be found apart from him, and 
since his 'Father' can only be found in him, the New 
Testament... gives its answer to the question of God 
by pointing to the man Jesus. Whatever men were 
looking for in looking for 'God' is to be found by 
finding Jesus of Nazareth", (op.cit.p.147).
van Buren recognises that Christianity is here 
reduced to "a historical, intentional, and ethical dimension", 
(op.cit.p.197). But he argues that in a secular age dominated
by the empirical outlook, nothing beyond this makes any sense.
"Although we have admitted that our interpretation 
represents a reduction of Christian faith to its 
historical and ethical dimensions, we would also 
claim that we have left nothing essential behind", 
(op.cit. pp.199-200).
UJe cannot but be impressed by the brilliance and 
the force with which van Buren develops his argument. Yet for 
a number of reasons it must be judged inadequate. In the first 
place, we are, in the end, back with a liberal nineteenth 
century picture of Jesus as the ideal man, but understood now
in terms of the current conception of the ideal, namely, "the
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genuinely free man", "the man for others", van Buren no
doubt intends to avoid the pitfall of regarding 3esus as a
mere example by speaking of the contagion of his freedom and 
love. But it is not at all clear in what may this really alters 
the situation. The saints and martyrs of the Church have 
indeed been inspiring examples of faith, love and courage and 
me may quite properly speak of the contagion of these qualities.
So contagious have these qualities been that on occasion men
have emulated them even to the point of death. Yet me are 
immediately amare that the impact of Jesus' life is of a quite 
different order. The disciples did not simply "tell the story 
of a free man mho had set them free", (op. cit.p.!34)i they 
morshipped him. Not only had they seen Jesus in a nem may- they 
had also seen God in a nem may. And their morship mas an ack- 
nomledgement that Jesus-' life and the decision concerning their 
omn lives to mhich Jesus had led them, mas somehom grounded in f 
the reality of God.
Secondly, the reduction of the Christian faith to its 
historical and ethical dimensions leaves us mith no more than a 
Christian humanism, mith the emphasis on the humanism, van Buren 
has avoided the kerygma, mith its eschatological demand for 
decision betmeen faith and unbelief. The historical and 
ethical elements in the primitive Christian preaching mere
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secondary to the proclamation of a kairos. Kasemann writes,
"The significance of Jesus for faith u/as so profound that 
even in the very earliest days it almost entirely 
swallowed up his earthly history". (7)
Now, of course, the question remains whether it is necessary to 
speak of God even in this kairos-situation. Yet it is not un­
important that in attempting to express the Gospel entirely 
within the limits prescribed by an empirical approach, van Buren 
ignores what is in fact the dominant feature of the kerygma, 
namely, its eschatological questioning of our existence and its 
call to decision. There is something more here than the resolve 
to accept Jesus of Nazareth as the supreme ethical example.
Hie turn now to consider the question of objectivity 
in relation to both science and theology, taking as examples 
of opposing points of view some recent writing of the scientist, 
John UJren-Lewis, and of T.F.Torrance,
Torrance vigorously argues for the "implacable 
objectivity" of God over against "our own subjective states and 
self-expressions" in the collection of papers and essays 
published under the title, "Theology in Reconstruction". (8).
"The basic problem that has been raised again in 
our time is the relation of language to being".
(op.cit. p.18).
In the realm of science the question concerns the relationship 
between nature itself and our understanding of nature gained
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from observation and experiment. Torrance takes issue uiith Mr 
John Ulren-Lewis who dismisses as a paranoid fantasy the notion 
that the world known in experience is only a veil for deeper 
realities beyond or behind it, and that the object of all human 
efforts, whether scientific, artistic or religious, is to penetrate 
beyond the veil as far as possible. According to UJren-Lewis, the 
technologist, concerned with science as a tool for the transform­
ation of nature for the enrichment of human experience, is the 
purest example of scientific activity- in fact is the fulfilment 
of the scientific revolution. UJren-Lewis writes,
"... the classical* approach to the teaching of science 
allows even some scientists- and at least one 
distinguished philosopher of science, Professor K.R. 
Popper- to go on thinking of scientific theories 
as 'explanations of phenomena1 in which the gods and 
spiritual forces of occult tradition are simply 
replaced by quanta, force-fields and the like, whereas 
a proper emphasis on method would make it clear that 
the modern theories are never more than models to 
suggest new lines of practical action, and therefore 
capable of being discarded at any time in favour of 
radically new models in a way which would be impossible 
if they were attempts to express the hidden truth 
behind phenomena. Experimental science succeeds by 
finding truth in experience, in action, and this is 
utterly incompatible with the traditional outlook on 
the world, both logically and psychologically"• (9).
Speaking of Eeud's diagnosis of religion as "the universal 
neurosis of humanity", UJren-Lewis writes,
"He (Freud) was referring to the practical discovery, 
verified again and again in actual psychological 
analysis, that when people try to order their lives
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by constant reference to hidden realities beyond 
experience or by fitting into some supposed general 
pattern of things, they are always in fact trying to 
escape from the full impact of experience itself and 
from the responsibility of taking a definite, creative 
stand of their own." (op.cit.p.28).
UJren-Lewis discerns a close kinship between the prophetic 
insights of the Old Testament and the new outlook of experi­
mental science.
"The whole biblical prophetic tradition was based upon 
the commandment forbidding 'graven images' of God.... 
This makes sense only if the purpose of the command­
ment was to prevent the idea of God, and any descriptive 
images associated with it, from being referred to 
hypothetical occult realities. An idol is an image 
or an idea to which people are compulsively attached, 
and such compulsion comes about as soon as the image
or the idea is regarded as the only way we have of
knowing a supreme reality beyond experience. The 
prophets could use their anthropomorphic images freely 
without any such danger of taking them too seriously 
because, and only because, they used; them in the same 
.kind of way as the modern scientist uses his models, 
namely, to refer to reality that is directly access­
ible in common experience for the images to be 
checked against." (op.cit. p.34. Italics authors)
In this view, any order in nature is that imposed by the observer
or scientific experimenter who is concerned not to penetrate the
veil, but tri) discover the ways in which nature may serve the
needs of man. (cf. Genesis 1 :28, Psalm 8 :6).
Torrance argues the existence of an objective
reality which is fundamentally independent of the observer and
which cannot be grasped or understood in statements of human
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need or concern. The rigorous approach of pure science 
respects the nature of what it investigates. Scientific 
thinking is
"..•thinking that is obedient to its proper object, 
thinking which follows the clues supplied to it by 
the object itself, and therefore thinking which 
develops special modes of inquiry and proof 
appropriate to the nature of that object. Thus 
the scientist is not free to think what he likes.
He is bound to his proper object and compelled to 
think of it in accordance with its own nature as 
it becomes revealed under his questioning." (10)• 
Torrance recognises that "all human knowledge and 
not least scientific knowledge is reached through 
a compromise between thought and being", but denies 
that this "entitles us to draw the conclusion that 
it is we human beings who impart order to nature or 
rationality to the universe. There would be no 
science at all if we were not up against an 
implacably objective rationality in things independ­
ent of any and all of us." ( op.cit. p.276).
It is, however, with the theological conclusions which
Torrance draws that we are particularly concerned. He sees
in contemporary existentialism and anthropocentric theology a
retrograde movement which fails because it is unable to
distinguish objective realities from our own subjective
states, or to distinguish God from ourselves.
"Knowledge of God is in accordance with his nature, 
that is, in accordance with grace and therefore 
takes its rise from God's action in revealing 
himself and reconciling us to himself in Jesus 
Christ." ( op.cit.p.26. Italics author's).
Although we must recognise a measure of impropriety in all
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human language of God, and therefore must ever be ready to 
call a halt in our speaking of him, yet we must
"...be ready at the same time to let the human 
speech used by the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures 
point far beyond itself to the sheer reality and 
glory of God who alone can bear witness of himself 
and create in us, beyond any capacity of our own to 
achieve it, genuine knowledge of God." (op.cit.p.31).
Knowledge of God is possible only upon the basis of subjecting
ourselves to the pattern of his own self-communication to us,
namely in the Incarnation. Herein lies the logic of the
Nicaean formulation of the homoousion.
"Apart from the homoousion there is no real and 
objective connection between our human knowing and 
speaking of God, and God himself in his own reality 
and nature." (op.cit.p.39).
The final authority of the Apostles is categorically 
affirmed. "It is not given to anyone else to 
receive the Word directly from Christ and to 
translate it into Word about Christ in such a way 
that through their witness the whole historical 
Church may be directed and determined in knowledge 
of Christ and of God through him." (op.cit.p43).
The whole body of doctrine reposes upon "the 
foundation once and for all laid in the Apostles", 
and the understanding of the Church must develop 
under the power of "the objective rationality of the 
Truth that shines forth upon us from that foundation." 
(op.cit. p.45).
In a paper on the problem of theological statement 
today, Torrance refers to the paradeigmatic nature of theological 
statements. They employ images or representations (paradeigmata)
taken from the visible or tangible world to point out divine
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realities that cannot be simply reduced to words.
"The paradeigmata point ostensibly to divine 
realities beyond us, and necessarily fall far 
short of them. They are not for that reason false 
or invalid, provided that they are economically 
rooted in God’s own acts of self-communication and 
condescension and governed by them", (op.cit. p.51).
It is upon the basis of the Incarnation and the homoousion
that God has revealed himself and made possible true knowledge
on our part.
"Everything depends on the fact that the essential 
images of God which are mediated to us in and 
through Jesus Christ are the images of One who is 
consubstantial with the Godhead", (op.cit. p.51-2).
The paradeigmata are by no means to be identified with ontic
structures in the Being of God, but,
"they are the media through which we allow objective 
reality to impinge upon us and bring us under the 
command of its inherent rationality", (op.cit.p.54).
It is a radical mistake to fail to understand language as a 
transparent medium through which we allow the objective 
realities to show through, llie may admit, with Heidegger, a 
damaged relation of language to being. But this
"is no ground for some interpretation of language in 
detachment from its objective reference", (op.cit.p.57).
UJe cannot discard the objective framework of biblical and
theological statements as merely an objectifying form of
thought. Torrance detects in the problem of demythologising
and the validity of God-language a sinful attempt to transpose
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the difficulty in theological statements from the nature of 
the fact that confronts us in the Being and saving activities 
of God in Jesus Christ, to the words that are used to speak 
about it. These are subterfuges behind which man in his sin­
ful claim to autonomy seeks to hide himself from the objective 
Word of God.
"It is in him (Jesus Christ) that we are confronted 
with the ultimate and obdurate objectivity of the 
Uiord and Truth of God which refuses to be domestic­
ated to our subjectivity, or even our reason".
(op.cit. p.69)
Knowledge of God in accordance with his own essence 
is therefore possible only on his own terms, to which man must 
submit himself.
"Knowledge of God, like all true knowledge, is 
determined by the nature of what is known".
(op.cit. p.86)
God reveals himself in the Uiord, which reaches us from the 
other side of creaturely being, and proceeds out of the very 
essence of God.
"Uie do not cognize the Truth of God through our own 
artificial fabrications, that is, through images of 
our own forming, but only through modes of knowing 
imposed on us from the nature of God and from his 
own self-manifestation through the UJord". (op.cit.p.90)
It is the action of the Holy Spirit which enables
us effectively to relate our language to the divine Being.
"It is the Spirit who provides transparence in our
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knowledge and language of God." (op.cit. p.93).The 
Spirit "makes the content of what is revealed burst 
through the forms employed so that our acts of 
cognition are formed from beyond us by the reality 
disclosed in the very act of disclosure." (op.cit.p.94)
The Holy Spirit is the living divine action through
which our language forms and images, when appropriated for
reference to the UJord, are made transparent to the objective
reality of God. In this action our forms of thought and
speech are opened up and reshaped from an objective ground in
God.
"It is in and through this action of the Spirit of 
God that we learn to distinguish the objective 
Reality of God himself from our own subjective 
states and conditions." (op.cit.p. 96)
Torrance continues his attack on what he calls the
"revulsion from objectivity" in so much contemporary theology
in a final chapter entitled "A New Reformation?". It is seen as
"an alarming sign of irrational and indeed mental 
disorder in the life and soul of the Church", (op.cit. 
p.271).
Despite his repudiation of the theological attitude of such 
writers as Bultmann and Tillich, Torrance believes that a new 
Reformation is upon us through a revival of the "hard and 
scientific thinking of pure theology". Following Francis Bacon, 
Torrance affirms that,
"we have to give to nature what is nature's and to 
faith what is faith's: we study the books of nature
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in accordance u/ith the nature of nature, and the 
books of God in accordance with the nature of God 
who discloses himself to us through them Thus natural 
science is released from the domination of a rational 
theology and positive theology is released from 
distortion through a so-called natural theology". 
(op.cit. pp.273-4).
Pure science and pure theology have their differing 
frames of reference and only mischief can follow from confusing 
the two, but the same rigorous principles of objectivity apply 
to both. In the field of theology the way of understanding lies 
in a
"rigorous and disciplined obedience to the objective 
reality of the Word of God made flesh in Jesus 
Christ", (op.cit. p.283).
UJe may indeed wonder whether there is any possibility 
of reconciling the views of Wren-Lewis and T.F.Torrance. Are 
their approaches mutually exclusive? Do the doctrines of the 
Church express "objective reality", or is Christianity simply 
a way of life arising from a disclosure of the possibilities of 
existence in Jesus of Nazareth? In its extreme form the argument 
of Wren-Lewis ultimately reduces itself to an ethic or a 
religious atheism. He struggles to avoid this consequence by 
speaking of the Genesis-faith in man's ability to exercise 
dominion over nature as the basis for his continuing scientific 
and technological endeavour,
"for without it I think humanism will inevitably 
collapse in despair", (ll).
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UJe need a faith that God who is the "Ground of Love" has 
begun the work of "freeing mankind from bondage so that the 
whole universe may be raised into the kingdom of love", (op.cit. 
p.44). Me must ask why this notion of the "Ground of Love" is
c
accepted as the basis for a positive existence. Mren-Lewis has 
unwittingly recognised the reality of an unconditional claim 
which is not to be identified with the observed facts.
On the other hand, Torrance’s forthright defence of 
what he believes to be the essence of traditional dogma 
ignores the assured fruits of historical research. It will 
not do to infer that the work of scholars with the ability and 
integrity of Bultmann, for example, merely reflects the efforts 
of sinful man with his invincible self-assurance to close his 
ears to the objective UJord of God. Furthermore Torrance over­
looks the extent to which his justified admission that knowledge 
is a compromise between thought and being weakens the force of 
his assertions. It is simply not possible on this basis to be 
dogmatic with regard to the nature of objective reality. The 
subjective element in understanding carries with it a degree of 
uncertainty which cannot be hidden by a retreat to dependence c 
on the authority of the Apostles, the Fathers, or certain of 
the Reformers.
Any resolution of the conflicting views outlined above
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depends upon the recognition of the paradoxical character of 
religious language, which has at the same time both an onto­
logical and an existential reference. All serious speech about 
God expresses at the same time what Bultmann calls a self- 
understanding. In other words, the existential and the onto­
logical senses of religious language, and indeed of dogma, 
cannot be divorced. It is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the end result of Torrance’s understanding of the "pure 
science of theology" is anything more than a return to a 
rigid dogmatism stemming from the acceptance of a corpus of 
truth, and the consequent over-intellectualist interpretation 
of the meaning of faith.
ON THE BEING AND NATURE OF GOD 
(continued)
B. A Consideration of the Thought of Paul Tillich and of 
Helmut Gollmitzer.
Before proceeding to outline Tillich's discussion 
of the question of God, uie shall first of all refer to the 
amalgamation of an existential attitude mith an ontological 
metaphysic mhich forms the foundation of his theological 
system.
In "The Courage To Be", Tillich describes the 
existential attitude as "one of involvement in contrast to a 
merely theoretical or detached attitude". (12). This means that
the knomledge of that mhich concerns us infinitely is possible
only in an attitude of infinite concern. Norn the origin of an 
infinite or ultimate concern is man's predicament of estrangement 
from God, "the ground of his being". This estrangement manifests 
itself in anxiety concerning one's finitude, in conflict, 
despair and the dread of meaninglessness. The question of man's 
existence is therefore no speculative question mhich it is 
possible for him to consider in a detached, objective manner.
"The question, asked by man, is man himself. He asks 
it, mhether or not he is vocal about it. He cannot 
avoid asking it, because his very being is the 
question of his existence. He asks it 'out of the
depth', and this depth is he himself." (13).
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As an analysis of the human predicament, Existentialism high­
lights the question of man and his being. It also drams 
attention to the distinction betmeen mhat Tillich calls 
"controlling Knomledge" and "receiving knomledge". (14).
The former is the knomledge gained by objective observation 
in a situation in mhich the subject controls the object. 
"Receiving knomledge", on the other hand, includes an 
emotional element, in mhich there is a participation of the 
subject in the object. Without a recognition of this there 
can be no proper knomledge either of man or of God. Rian, 
therefore, can ask the question of his existence only insofar 
as it is for him a question mhich strikes at the roots of his 
being, and he can ask the question of God only because he 
participates in God, "the ground of being".
It is clear that for Tillich the question of man and 
the question of God are inseparable. The existential approach, 
homever, takes as its starting point the condition of man. In 
this sense, Tillich's theology is anthropocentric. The function 
of theology, therefore, is to help man to understand the 
question of his existence, to shed light on his situation and 
to analyse and explicate the amareness of an ultimate concern. 
Existential theology does not deal in intellectual abstractions, 
but almays relates itself to the concrete situation in mhich
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man finds himself, faced with the predicament of his existence 
and the question of his being* Tillich speaks of the 
correlation between the existential questions and the theo­
logical answers. This, of course, does not permit the theo­
logian to be arrogantly dogmatic. The method of correlation 
implies rather that the work of theology must be related to the 
real questions which man asks out of the infinite concern 
which his predicament forces upon him.
But man is able to ask the question of his being, 
in the condition of estrangement, only because he remains 
inescapably bound to that from which he is estranged.
"Estrangement always implies a fundamental belonging­
ness, and therefore an inner drive to reunion." (15)
The question of man's finitude can be asked and answered only
because the essential unity of man with the infinite survives
the condition of existential separation. Although estranged
from God, man can ask the question of God because an awareness
of God is present in the question itself.
"God is the presupposition of the question of God... 
God can never be reached if he is the object of a 
question and not its basis." (16).
Out of his awareness of finitude, his sense of the
duality of essential and existential being, man asks the basic
ontological question, the question of being-itself. He asks
it under the threat of non-being, which Tillich understands
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as the dialectical negation of being.
"...the dialectical problem of non-being is 
inescapable. It is the problem of finitude.
Finitude unites being mith dialectical non-being." 
(17).
Man's amareness of his finitude, mhich is possible only by 
the pomer of self-transcendence, is therefore an expression of 
his belonging to that mhich is beyond non-being, namely, 
being-itself. Yet this amareness carries mith it the 
experience of anxiety. In this sense, anxiety is not the 
product of any special object, but arises from the threat of 
non-being.
"Anxiety is almays present, although often it is 
latent. Therefore it can become manifest at any and 
every moment, even in situations mhere nothing is to 
be feared."(op.cit. p.213).
Tillich relates finitude to the categories of time, 
space, causality and substance, revealing the dialectical 
relation of being and non-being, of anxiety and courage.
"As experienced in immediate self-amareness, time 
unites the anxiety of transitoriness mith the 
courage of a self-affirming present." (op.cit. p.215).
In relation to space, finitude means having no definite place.
"To have no definite and no final space means ultimate 
insecurity... On the other hand, man's anxiety about 
having to lose his space is balanced by the courage 
mith mhich he affirms the present, and mith it, space." 
(op.cit. p.217).
Causality raises the question of "mhere from?" Man is not his
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own causa, and therefore the category of causality powerfully 
expresses the abyss of non-being in everything.
“The anxiety in which causality is experienced is that of 
not being in, of, and by one's self, of not having the 
'aseity' which theology traditionally attributes to 
God." (op.cit.p.218).
On the other hand, courage accepts this awareness of contingency.
The fourth category, substance, expresses itself in the threat
of change and the loss of self-identity.
"The human experience of having to die anticipates the 
complete loss of identity with one's self."(op.cit.p.219).
Finitude arouses tension and anxiety in relation to
what Tillich refers to as the ontological elements:
individualisation,and participation, dynamics and form,
freedom and destiny. There exists between each of these
elements a polarity which gives rise to anxiety, for in the
condition of finitude the one threatens to overcome the other.
(flan oscillates anxiously between the threat of complete
collectivisation and the threat of loneliness; between the
threat of rigidity in cultural patterns and the threat of
chaos; between the threat of freedom understood as
arbitrariness and the threat of destiny understood as meaningless
fate.
In his anxiety, in his sense of ultimate concern, 
man asks the question of being-itself, of the infinite from
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which he is estranged. He asks it because although belonging 
to being, he is aware of the threat of non-being. The 
theological answer to the question is God beyond being and 
non-being, and the affirmation of the possibility of courage 
even in finitude and under the threat of non-being.
How then, are we to understand the being of God?
Tillich makes his position perfectly plain.
"It would be a great victory for Christian apologetics 
if the words 'God' and 'existence' were very 
definitely separated except in the paradox of God 
becoming manifest under the conditions of existence, 
that is, in the Christological paradox. God does 
not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and 
existence. Therefore, to argue that God exists is to 
deny him", (op.cit. p.227).
Here we meet Tillich's well-known concept of "the God above God",
or "the God beyond theism". God is not a being, for he would
then be a being beside others, and as such a part of the whole
of reality. He would be bound to the subject-object structure
of reality, an object for us as subjects. And in relation to him
we would be objects. This is the God who must be killed, the
God whose death liberates man.
"The ultimate source of the courage to be is the 'God 
above God'.... Only if the God of theism is transcended 
can the anxiety of doubt and meaninglessness be taken 
into the courage to be". (18).
God, the power of being-itself, beyond the split between
essence and existence, accepts man in his finitude and gives
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the courage to be. The God beyond theism transcends both 
mysticism, which reaches out to the object of its longing, and 
the divine-human encounter. The paradoxical character of this 
•encounter1 is that God is experienced neither as object nor 
subject, but as the participation in the power of being-itself. 
It is a participation which transcends both subjectivity and 
objectivity.
Tillich goes on to speak of God as
"the name for that which concerns man ultimately. This 
does not mean that first there is a being called God 
and then the demand that man should be ultimately 
concerned about him. It means that whatever concerns 
a man ultimately becomes god for him, and, conversely, 
it means that a man can be concerned ultimately only 
about that which is god for him". (19).
Tillich does not mean that we can replace 'God' by 'ultimate
concern'. The term is intentionally ambiguous.
"It indicates on the one hand, our being ultimately 
concerned- the subjective side- and on the other hand, 
the object of our ultimate concern, for which, of 
course, there is no other word than 'ultimate'. Now, 
in this relationship, the history of religion can be 
described as the attempt to find what can with 
justification be called this object. And in all 
religions this object is called 'God1. Whether it is 
a little fetish... or the God of Israel... the object 
is always the same. The object of ultimate concern 
has many names". (20).
Now the worship of something finite as ultimate is idolatry.
Thus even monotheism can be idolatrous, the worship of an object.
God, as ultimate, is not an object, but being-itself.
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It is obvious that we are here using language in a 
highly symbolic manner, Tillich's whole theological doctrine of 
knowledge is centred in the concept of the symbol.
(NOTE. Religious symbols, says Tillich, are the 
language of religion and "the only way in which religion can 
express itself directly". (21). With reference to language, 
symbols use the ordinary meaning of the word in such a way that 
"it points to something which cannot be grasped directly but must 
be expressed indirectly".(op. cit. p.4). "A real symbol points 
to an object which can never become an object", (op.cit. p. 303).
A characteristic of a symbol is its power to open up 
dimensions of reality.
"Religious symbols mediate ultimate reality through 
things, persons, events, which because of their 
mediating functions receive the quality of 'holy'.
In the experience of holy places, times, books, words, 
images, and acts, synbols of the holy reveal something 
of the 'Holy-Itself' and produce the experience of 
holiness in persons and groups... Theological concepts 
are merely conceptualizations of original religious 
symbols", (op.cit. p.5.).
The fundamental question is whether religious symbols 
refer to anything that cannot be known except by symbols, that is 
in itself non-symbolic. Tillich approaches the problem from two 
angles, the phenomenological and the ontological.
"The phenomenological approach describes the holy as a 
quality of some encounters with reality. The holy is 
a 'quality in encounter', not an object among objects, 
and not an emotional response without a basis in the
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whole of objects. The experience of the holy 
transcends the subject-object structure of experience... 
An analysis of this experience shouis that wherever the 
holy appears it is a matter of ultimate concern both 
in attracting and in repelling, and of unconditional 
power, both in giving and demanding", (op. cit. p.6-7).
"The other way of reaching the referent 
of religious symbolism is the ontological one. It 
analyses the kind of being man is, in interdependence 
with his world. It analyses the finitude of the 
finite in different directions, it points to the 
anxiety which is connected with the awareness of 
one's finitude, and it raises the question of being- 
itself, the prius of everything that is... The onto­
logical method., does not argue for the existence of 
a being, about which religion makes symbolic statements, 
but it gives an analysis of the encountered world with 
respect to its finitude and finds through this analysis 
its self-transcending quality, its pointing beyond 
its finitude. That to which this analysis leads is the 
referent in all religious symbols. One can give it 
metaphoric names, like ’being-itself1 or 'power of 
being' or 'ultimate reality' or 'ultimate concern'... 
Such names are not names of a being but of a quality 
of being", (op.cit. p.7)
Tillich distinguishes primary from secondary religious 
symbolism. "The primary symbols point directly to the 
referent of all religious svnbolism".(op.cit. p.8 ).
In order to do so they speak of a highest being with 
qualities such as personality, love, power and justice. 
Yet we must always be aware that this is a symbolic 
way of referring to being-itself• At a second level
of primary symbolism,
"religion speaks of divine actions like creation,
providence, miracles, incarnation, consummation, etc.
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It is especially important to emphasize the symbolic 
character of these symbols, because they often are 
understood literally, with the consequence that they 
fall into insoluble conflict with the scientific 
interpretation of reality. In all these symbols the 
religious imagination subjects that which is ultimate 
reality to the categories of time, space, substance 
and causality", (op. cit. p.9.)
A third level of primary symbols is to 
be observed in "divine incarnations in holy things 
or objects", (op. cit. p. 9). In the higher religions 
this has been symbolized in the 'sacramental presence'.
Permeating these three levels of primary symbolism are the
secondary religious symbols like water, oil, light and the
metaphors of parable or poem.
The authenticity of religious symbols depends upon
their adequacy to the religious experience they express.
Religious symbols may lose their experiential basis and
survive only by tradition. They are then no longer authentic
and may well decay. Symbols associated with a pre-scientific
world view may be noted as examples.
Tillich defines the truth of a religious symbol as
"the degree to which it reaches the referent of all religious
symbols", (op. cit. p.10). The question may be approached
negatively and positively.
"The negative quality which determines the truth of a 
religious symbol is its self-negation and transparency 
to the referent for which it stands", (op. cit. p.10).
Thus religious symbols are true insofar as they do not elevate
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themselves to ultimacy in power and meaning, but point to the 
Holy-Itself, the ultimate power of being and meaning. 
Positively, the truth of a religious symbol is measured by 
the value of the symbolic material used. Symbolic material 
taken from human existence is manifestly of greater value than 
that taken from inanimate objects. )
The term 'God' is to be understood both symbolically and 
non-syipbolically. UJith reference to being-itself, beyond the 
split between essence and existence, the term 'God1 is used in 
a non-symbolic sense. But, beyond the statement that God is 
being-itself, "nothing else can be said about God as God which 
is not symbolic". (22). All language, therefore, by which we 
seek to comprehend and express God as being-itself is symbolic.
The danger that the finite symbols through which the Ultimate 
is expressed will themselves become objects of ultimate concern 
is a constant threat to all religion. Then God disappears and 
the demonic asserts itself. Yet even under an idolatrous and 
demonic worship of the symbol, being-itself remains, hidden yet 
present in the very experience of ultimate concern.
(flan is bound to the categories of finitude and must 
therefore make use of symbolic language. Even anthropomorphic 
language is legitimate if properly understood as symbolic.
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"The symbol 'personal God' is absolutely fundamental 
because an existential relation is a person-to-person 
relation, (flan cannot be ultimately concerned about 
anything that is less than personal". Yet, "'Personal 
God' does not mean that God is a person. It means that 
God is the ground of everything personal and that he 
carries within himself the ontological power of 
personality. He is not a person, but he is not less 
than personal", (op. cit. p.271)
Similarly, when we speak of God as 'King', 'Judge', 
'Creator', 'Saviour', 'Lord', 'Father', we must understand that 
we are speaking symbolically of the ego-thou character of a 
person-to-person relationship.
"While Lord is basically the expression of man's relation 
to the God who is holy power, Father is basically the 
expression of man's relation to God who is holy love.
The concept 'Lord' expresses the distance; the concept 
'Father', the unity", (op. cit.p. 319).
The symbol 'Lord' expresses the unapproachable majesty of God,
while the symbol 'Father' expresses the unity of man with the
creative ground of being.
In striving to comprehend the divine power of being
in relation to the creature we speak symbolically of God's
omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience. The divine
omnipotence does not mean that God is an all powerful being who
can do whatever he wants to do. Rather, it symbolizes the
divine power of being
"which resists non-being in all its expressions and 
which is manifest in the creative process in all its 
forms. Faith in the almighty God is the answer to the 
quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the
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anxiety of finitude... UJhen the invocation 'Almighty 
God' is seriously pronounced a victory over the threat 
of non-being is experienced, and an ultimate, 
courageous affirmation of existence is expressed".
(op. cit. p.303-4).
The divine omnipresence overcomes the anxiety of not 
having a space for oneself.
"In the certainty of the omnipresent God we are always 
in the sanctuary. We are in a holy place when we are 
in the most secular place, and the most holy place 
remains secular in comparison with our place in the 
ground of the divine life". (op.cit. p.309).
The symbol omniscience affirms the fragmentary
character of all finite knowledge, but removes the threat to our
genuine participation in truth.
"We experience the broken character of every finite 
meaning, but not as a cause for ultimate meaninglessness" 
(op. cit. p. 310).
In the light of the symbol of divine love, we 
experience the power of being which works toward the fulfilment 
of every creature and the healing and reunion of all that is 
broken and disrupted.
"The divine love is the final answer to the questions 
implied in human existence, including finitude, the 
threat of disruption and estrangement." (op.cit. p.317).
The divine love is experienced as grace, in the manifestation of
the divine love under the conditions of existence- namely, in
the Christ.
(NOTE. Discussing the question of God from an 
existentialist standpoint, John flflacquarrie speaks of God as
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"the religious word for Being, understood as gracious". 
(23), The significant question is not "Does God exist"?, but,
"Has Being such a character as will fulfil man's quest for grace?". 
Biblical faith asserts that Being reveals itself as gracious.
How is this to be understood?. Besides the subject-object and 
the I-Thou relationship, fflacquarrie refers to a third kind of 
relationship,
"in which there is presented to us Being-Itself. In 
this kind of relation, we do not have the other term 
of the relation at our disposal, nor do we stand to it in 
a relation of equality, but rather we are grasped by it, 
our eyes are opened to it, and we are brought into 
subjection to it, but in such a way that something of 
its character is disclosed to us, so that to some 
extent it becomes known to us", (op. cit. p.14).
Corresponding to the three forms of relation there are three
modes of thinking. UJe think of objects, we think of friends, and
"it is also possible to think of Being which though it 
towers above us, does not annihilate us but rather 
communicates itself and gives itself in the experience 
of grace", (op. cit. p. 14).
IKlacquarrie acknowledges that this does not exclude the possibility
that what we take to be an encounter with Being itself is an
illusion. But it does
"describe an area of experience in which the discourse 
about God is meaningful", and "brings us to the point 
where we see that this discourse about God has to do 
with the most radical and concrete matters in life, 
the point where, exercising our freedom in finitude 
in all the light that we can get, we decide to take 
either the risk of faith or the risk of unfaith".
(op. cit. pp.15, 16).
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The reactions to Tillich's exposition of the term 
'God' as 'the ground and power of being'; as 'being-itself’; as 
'the name for that which concerns us ultimately', have been 
widely varied and even contradictory. While some have hailed 
Tillich's work with joy as a liberating revelation, others have 
been irritated by what they regard as an unscholarly lack of 
definition and a horrifying imprecision in the use of language. 
One deeply annoyed critic writes,
"Until his Germanic superstructure gets washed in the 
detergent of plain statement we will remain 
bespattered with a kind of Hegeloid mud". (24).
Writing as a theological critic, Kenneth Hamilton judges
Tillich's system to be "incompatible with the Christian
Gospel". (25).
We turn now to a more recent contribution to the
discussion in the work of Helmut Gollwitzer. In "The
Existence of God as Confessed by Faith"(26). he offers a
positive critique of the thought of Bultmann, Herbert Braun,
Tillich and Gerhard Ebeling, together with an attempt to
expound the meaning of God-language with more direct reference
to the biblical proclamation. It will be sufficient for our
purpose to refer to Gollwitzer's comments on Tillich's thought
and his own contribution in Part 11 chapter 4, pp.202-245.
Taking his bearings from an interpretation of theism
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based upon encounter with the UJord of God, Gollwitzer 
challenges Tillich's "transcendence of theism".
"The 'God above God1 of whom Tillich speaks, can be 
meant as the living God of Christian faith before 
whom our existing theistic conceptions are shattered 
and whose relation to the theistic God of our own 
conceiving is that of the New and ever and again 
Wholly Other; he can be meant as that unity of deus 
revelatus and deus absconditus by which the 
sovereignty and indisposability of the deus revelatus 
remains assured, and 'absolute faith* can be meant 
as faith amid the darkness of tribulation proving 
itself in terms of 'nevertheless'. But then of course 
this would have to be said from the standpoint of the 
deus revelatus, of his Word of promise, not from a 
standpoint beyond that Word, where there is no 
promise and thus no faith either", (op. cit. p.47).
Apart from the Word, faith only too readily relapses 
into "the optimism of a wordless mysticism or into a 
heroic defiance in which man in his fear, without a 
word and without a light, and thus without hope, drives 
himself to live on and hope", (loc. cit.).
Such an existence is not beyond but this side of an encounter
with God through his Word of revelation and promise.
"...there can be no transcending of the divine-human 
encounter, but only a falling away from it", (op. cit. 
P.48).
Gollwitzer is sceptical concerning the value of the 
prohibition of objectification, since the inevitable consequence 
appears to be a denial of the independent reality of God. In 
these circumstances the relation between man and God is 
dissolved in the depths of man's subjectivity. And the end
result is an unavoidable, albeit unintentional, atheism.
He readily admits that language about God cannot 
escape an anthropomorphic reference, for God enters into the 
conditions under which particular being is expressed. It 
becomes possible to speak of God in human language, but not 
in the form of a description of his being, but in the form of 
witnessing to his acts and in proclaiming and worshipping his 
will. Anthropomorphic language is not transcended by abstraction, 
for even here we have not gone beyond the limits of the human.
"What the Bible says of God applies to One who is not 
attainable by any possible method of transcendence or 
abstraction, but who in a special act of approach 
enters transcendently into the world as the One who 
does not belong to the world", (op. cit. pp.150-1).
With reference to divine revelation, "particular and 
concrete ways of speaking have the preference over 
general and abstract ones, and personal ways of 
speaking have preference over impersonal, neuter ones", 
(op. cit. p.153).
This means not that the latter are ruled out, but that they
must submit to the standard and content of the former.
Gollwitzer quotes the Old Testament scholar Ludwig Kohler, who
writes in his theology of the Old Testament,
"To describe God in human terms of human characteristics 
is not to humanize Him... Rather the purpose of 
anthropomorphisms is to make God accessible to man.
They hold open the door for encounter and contrbversy 
between God's will and man's will". (27).
And in the relation of hearing, obeying, believing, loving and
thanking, for example, man encounters God,
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"not as a particular entity, not a fellow man, not 
an idea either, or a form of 'cohumanity1, but as 
himself, the living Lord". (28)
Biblical anthropomorphism, although inevitable, does 
not bind God to any form of being.
"Nor does it imply, as the expression 'personal God' 
can be misunderstood to mean, the conceiving of God 
as 'a person'. God is not a person -not at any rate 
in the sense that by describing him thus we could 
classify him under a category of entities known to us 
and in that way make him conceivable to us".(op.cit.p. 
162-3).
UJe may recall Tillich's language which sounds very 
similar to the above. Yet there is an important distinction. 
Whereas Tillich at least gives the impression that the symbolic 
language which we use to express the meaning of the word 'God' 
is founded upon man's ontological awareness of the problem of 
being, Gollwitzer insists that we use such terms as 'Father', 
'Lord', 'Friend', because they have been actualized in God's 
action. Tillich's emphasis upon human experience and a fresh 
self-understanding lead us to suspect that the words in which we 
express the predicates of the deity describe no more than 
dispositions of the human mind.
Gollwitzer sums up his critique in these words:
"...on the one hand his concept of the symbolical makes 
it possible for him to speak of God in the Christian 
sense as the active, living Lord, yet on the other 
hand he is not completely serious in doing so and 
will not be held to it, because in his fear of making 
God finite and bringing him down to the 'level of
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what is' he is more concerned to emphasize the 
impropriety of these 'representations' than to show 
what they mean when taken seriously. UJhen he is 
discussing the descriptions of God as Father, Lord,
etc., it never becomes clear whether Tillich is aware 
that as biblical descriptions they have been 
necessitated by the biblical encounter with Yahweh 
and have strict reference to it, or whether he 
considers them universally possible designations, so 
that on the lips of a Babylonian, who means filarduk, 
and on the lips of an Israelite who means Yahweh, they 
are equally expressions for the unconditional concrete; 
since this is unthinkable for the Bible, it cannot 
be ignored as of no consequence for the interpretation 
of such designations of God".... "...if anyone
wishes to say what the world-wide title 'God' as used 
by biblical Christian faith is properly supposed to 
mean, then the one thing he must not do is to speak 
of 'being-itself' or of 'what unconditionally concerns 
us', as if these words were more proper designations 
of the One in question, but he must speak of Yahweh. 
Yahweh is the meaning of the symbolic word 'God' as 
the Bible understands it", (op. cit. pp.168.169.
Italics author's)
Gollwitzer goes on to give an exposition of the 
existence of God as an object of biblical proclamation.
The substance of his argument is that the statement, 
'God exists' is a joyous confession of faith arising from the 
I-Thou encounter with the self-disclosure of God in his Word of 
revelation. In attempting to put this experience into language 
we become aware of the 'unserviceableness of 'is' propositions'.
"He whose encounter in real ways, i.e. in ways which 
take place in the midst of our earthly historical 
reality, is what Christian faith lives from and 
testifies to does not exist if existing is here 
understood in the sense of existence as known to us 
from ourselves and the world about us", (op.cit. p.204)
-53-
In speaking of God - the biblical God - it is impossible for us 
to adopt the attitude of a disinterested objective observer.
Nor can there be an assent to the existence of God apart from 
the believing assent to his will.
"There is thus no knowledge of God apart from and 
before the faith that hears his UJord and is thereby 
brought face to face with him. Where we have to do 
with him, we have never to do with his being-in- 
himself, but always only with him in his 'being-for- 
us' in which he bestows himself on us", (op.cit.p.207).
It is a sign of grace that we can speak of the being and existence
of God.
The verbal response to the self-disclosure of God's 
'being-for-us' cannot therefore be other than an expression of 
adoration. For here we are not dealing with a truth that we 
can ascertain without any change in our own being, but with a 
truth that has changed us. Only on the basis of this change 
have we been able to make the response "God is!". The experience 
of grace is not a new self-understanding, but the recognition 
that our total situation has been transformed by the One who 
stands beyond us and over against us, and who has nevertheless 
disclosed himself to us in the encounter with his Uiord. Here 
we can and must speak of the 'objective reality' of Gode
Gollwitzer emphasizes the distinction between the 
terms 'God-for-us' and 'God-for-our-sake'. The God for our
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sake can be no more than a supplier of a deficiency in human 
existence, a deficiency of which the unbeliever may be as fully 
aware as the believer. The God for us is he who discloses 
himself to us in the contingent event of revelation. It is a 
consequence of this event that we come to know our need and 
the reality of grace and forgiveness. Now although the event 
of revelation comes to us through the word of proclamation, 
Gollwitzer insists that the kerygma points beyond itself to 
the God who encounters us in the proclamation. God cannot 
become the title for the experienced word-event itself, but 
must be distinguished from it.
"The impossibility of demonstrating this, however, 
must not hinder the believer as a hearer of the 
Word from distinguishing between God himself and 
the givenness of God in faith for faith, and from 
following up this distinction by making a 
theological distinction between God's being for 
us which flows from the freedom of his being for 
himself, and a being for our sake in which God, 
since he cannot like worldly entities be 
demonstrated in objective independence, can then 
be thought of only functionally", (op.cit. pp.231-2).
Notwithstanding the mystery and incomprehensibility
of God's being 'over against us',
"the gospel-character of the Gospel depends entirely 
on the fact that we may and we must say: God is."
(op. cit. p.235).
To speak of God only in terms of a power to live in love, in
faith, or in courage, is in the end to capitulate to an
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anthropocentric humanism which will perhaps tolerate the 
Christian message as a recitation of a myth.
Gollwitzer agrees with H.J.Iwand's statement that 
"the question of being must not be supplanted by a question of 
value". If God is reduced to a functional term then there is 
no possibility of communion with God, and love can be directed 
only to one's neighbour, (op. cit. p. 235). UJhat is at stake is
"nothing less than the distinction of the living God 
from the dead God of general truth", (op. cit. p.240).
In what sense, therefore, can we speak of the
existence of God?.
"The call 'God is'... calls us to fulfilment and 
life. ’God is' means: This event (the 'today' of
Luke 4 ) and the 'existence' of God among us are 
identical. But then we ultimately mean a different 
thing from what men usually call 'God'; we are 
giving stammering testimony to him who himself has 
named his own name in 3esus Christ, who has disclosed 
himself, and in so doing we first begin to exist in 
full measure", (op. cit. p.245. Italics author's)
Gollwitzer's emphasis on the confessing quality of
God-language is important and valuable. But one is left
wondering whether he has done anything more than re-affirm
the more traditional God-language. And this leads him into
contradiction. For while he agrees that God does not exist as
an object, he seeks to restore the concept of God's existence by
referring to
"the change that comes over the words 'existence'
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and 'reality1 when they relate to God".(op.cit.p.243). 
This change is derived from the disclosure situation of encounter 
with 3esus Christ and from the revelatory experience which is 
not a matter of believing a truth but of being changed by the 
truth in the very act of receiving it. Yet this can be expressed 
as a "stammering testimony" only in symbolic langauge.
Gollwitzer has not really succeeded in his attempt to depart 
from Tillich's affirmation that God does not exist, and that to 
speak of God as living is to speak in symbolic terms. It is not 
sufficient to appeal to the Gospel or to the Bible as a
validation of our God-language. It is of course true that these
may be in a sense vehicles of the revelatory encounter which 
gives rise to the joyful confession. To say that "Yahweh is 
the meaning of the symbolic word 'God' as the Bible understands 
it", is simply to point out the obvious fact that the 3ews 
used anthropomorphic symbolism to express the reality of their
experience of God. Tillich accepts the fact that
"anthropomorphic symbols are adequate for speaking 
of God religiously. Only in this way can he be the 
living God for man", (29).
Doubtless, Tillich would agree with Gollwitzer's stress on the
experiential element in meaningful speech about God. At the
end of the eighth dialogue in "Ultimate Concern"(30), Tillich
identifies himself with the statement of a contributor, referring
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to the present relationship of the believer to the Christ-event, 
that
"It is really the present experience of the saving 
power which in some way has come out of this 
historical event", (op. cit. p.220).
Gollwitzer argues that on the basis of such an experience one
can only confess that 'God is!'. This may well be so, but by
bestowing an ultimate authority upon the biblical symbols, he
is in danger of confusing the finite with the ultimate. The
biblical symbols may indeed be a meaningful expression of the
Christian confession, but they remain inextricably bound up with
the confession. In Tillich's terms, the symbols are valid
insofar as they are adequate to the confession which is wade.
In themselves they cannot be ultimately authoritative. It is not
possible to identify the God who is confessed with the symbols
through which the confession is made.
Critics of Tillich tend to concentrate on the
limitations and weaknesses of his ontological approach to
theological questions, which lead him into vagueness, abstraction
and obscurity. In defence of Tillich it must be said that he
does not claim as much for his method as many of his critics
suggest. It is for him an attempt, relevant to this age, to
speak of human existence in its finitude and In its relation cc
the ontological question of being in such a way as to raatee possible*
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in particular to the intellectual, an opportunity to reflect
upon the existential meaning and significance of faith. He does
not claim, for example, that the doctrine of God can be derived
from an ontological system.
"The character of the divine life is made manifest 
in revelation". (31).
Nor can one
"derive the divine self-manifestation from an analysis 
of the human predicament". (32).
Hie are left with the question of revelation, to which the
question of God ultimately points.
Hie began our whole discussion on the being and nature
of God with the question of the meaning of the term 'God' for
the secular man of today, and have considered some contemporary
5
efforts to restore the word to the area of meaningful discourse.
Paul van Buren would solve the difficulty simply by dropping 
the term altogether and giving our attention to the ITlan of 
Nazareth, and his contagious freedom. Although this procedure 
would solve some linguistic problems, it cannot be regarded as 
doing justice to the profounder depths of religious experience.
His strictly linguistic approach leaves us with a constricted 
flat earth view which fails to comprehend the richness and depth 
of man's relationships and responses.
T.F.Torrance attempts to argue that the theologian 
must accept the given objectivity of God in much the same way
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as the scientist accepts the objective existence of the world he 
investigates. But this is to confuse scientific and religious 
knowledge. For the knowledge of God is not so much a matter of 
theoretical thought as of one's personal existence. The scientist 
3ohn UJren-Lewis, rejects any attempt to speak of God in terms of 
a supernatural being, but refers to 'the Ground of Love' as the 
basis for a positive existence. The validity of this concept is 
confirmed by empirical experience of the power of love to enrich 
and to fulfil human life. But we are here, in the last ahalysis, 
offered a religiously tinted humanism which amounts to a 
prescription for self-salvation by pursuing an ideal.
Helmut Gollwitzer, while continuing to reach for a supporting 
authority, finds meaning in the words 'God is', as the confession 
of those who have encountered him in what they affirm to be his 
disclosure in 3esus Christ. This, however, raises the whole 
question of the nature, substance and authority of revelation. 
Approaching the question from the existential predicament of man 
in his awareness of finitude and the experience of the 
'ontological shock', and using highly symbolic terms such as 
'being-itself', 'the ground and power of being', 'ultimate concern', 
Paul Tillich reaches the end of his stimulating treatment of the 
question with the recognition that the doctrine of God concludes 
with the further quest for a doctrine of the Christ. The God
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whom we can conceive only as an object yet who is never an 
object, is the God who manifests himself to us ultimately in 
the power of the New Being in Jesus the Christ. And John 
ITIacquarrie suggests that "God is the religious word for Being, 
understood as gracious", an understanding that is a gift which 
comes to man in a revelatory experience inseparable in its 
fulness from Jesus. Here we are again confronted with the 
problem of revelation, to which we must now give our attention.
In "Has Christianity a Revelation?"(33), Gerald 
Downing offers a searching criticism of the concept of revelation. 
He concludes that
"the word 'revelation' is a source of great confusion.
A theology based on it is inadequate for the 
exposition of the traditional faith of Christians, 
even in the traditional terminology", (op. cit.p.274).
"If any 'mystery' is 'revealed' to present-day 
Christians with their kaleidoscopic beliefs, it is a 
mystery of diversity, and that by definition is not 
'God'. The traditional image of the 'mystery of God' 
is an ocean too deep to plumb; but the total course 
of Christian theology makes it look like a maze so 
complex that everyone gets lost in his own way. If 
there is a 'revealed mystery' it is this that is 
'revealed'....'Partially', 'gradually', 'mysteriously', 
rapidly become words for giving a semblance of meaning, 
when none really remains. lUhen 'reveal' is so 
heavily qualified, it is not being refined down towards 
an apex of meaning, to fit it to talk of 'God'. It is
having its meaning completely destroyed. The theologian
is using a word that normally describes 'making clear*
to mean 'leave unclear'."{op. cit. p.229).
Downing asserts that
"if God intended to 'reveal himself* in Christ, in the
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events of his life, death and resurrection and in 
his teaching, he failed." (op. cit. p.238).
After noting that Barth, Tillich and Brunner move
towards the interpretation of revelation in terms of salvation,
(op. cit. p.266). Downing himself wishes to substitute the term
'salvation' for 'revelation' entirely.(op. cit. pp.274ff.)
Salvation is of course bound up with the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus, but while these may be 'saving events',
they cannot be called 'revealing events' for there is no clear
knowledge given with them. To call these 'saving events' implies
a degree of commitment to the continuing possibilities for
existence that stem from these events.
"Sincerely to call particular events 'saving' is to 
commit yourself in some manner or other to 
possibilities that they still genuinely enable".
(op. cit. p. 280).
These events cannot be proved to be God's 'salvation', but,
"it makes good sense to say 'here is salvation'; it 
makes good sense, so long as a man does wish to 
commit himself in this way to a Christian possibility 
of love." (op. cit. p. 281).
It follows that Christians should not pretend to an 
awareness of 'God' which their lives and experience cannot ->
substantiate. But on the foundation of a self-committal-in- 
dependence to a saving event, ("the gift-without-authoritative- 
explanation in Jesus Christ" -op. cit p. 287), one may enter
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upon the possibility of life in love and freedom. Yet at no
point can one rest and say, "This is revelation: now I know for
sure." (op. cit. p.286).
In "The Shape of Christoloqy" (34), John Fflclntyre 
concludes his treatment of Christological models with these words,
"llihere there is no prior knowledge or acknowledgement 
of God, revelation propositions have no weight. If I 
say to an unbeliever, 'God is revealed in Jesus Christ', 
this proposition means no more or no less than the
term 'God' means. If God has no existence, the
proposition cannot assist his revelation. Propositions
asserting the revelation of God presuppose some prior 
knowledge of God if they are to have any significance. 
The assertion of God's being and God's revelation
cannot significantly be made in one proposition....
In short, then, the revelation model has no real 
place in an apologetic situation where we are 
conversing with total unbelievers. It has a place 
in a kerygmatic utterance only where it is made in 
the context of some degree of accepted belief in God".
( p. 171).
The warnings against looking to revelation as a 
solution of all mysteries, and against an uncritical use of the 
term are necessary and valuable. But Downing's argument appears 
to rest on a restricted understanding of revelation. Ule would 
agree that if revelation is taken to refer to an intellectualistic 
grasp of an objective fact or event which obtrudes itself upon 
our minds, then it is clearly nonsensical to speak of God having 
revealed himself. It is doubtful, however, whether such theologians 
as Tillich and Bultmann would accept this understanding of
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revelation, The answer to Downing's question, 'Has 
Christianity a Revelation'?, may well be in the negative, 
but this does not necessarily imply that the concept of 
revelation is meaningless. For although we may not have a 
revelation of God's 'nature', we do have in the life, death and 
resurrection of Desus certain events which we affirm as 
possessing revelatory significance. It is true, as Hflclntyre 
points out, that the unbeliever will probably discern no 
revelatory meaning in these events. Yet since there is a 
connection between actions and character, there is open to 
the believer at least the possibility of talking about the
7
character of God upon the basis of what are discerned to be 
his actions,
"Provided we understand it in terms which imply its 
historical dynamism", (35)
the concept of revelation may still be used in speaking of
judgment and forgiveness, and the new self-understanding
which are an integral part of the event of grace,-God's being-
for-us in the historical reality of the Christ, And from within
s
the revelatory situation we affirm the reality of God,
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I W 0
THE QUESTION OF SIN AND GUILT
There can be no understanding of the meaning of the 
Gross apart from man's sin and guilt. The view that all men 
are sinners is developed at length by St. Paul in the letter 
to the Romans, 1:18-3:20. "Dews and Greeks alike are all 
under the power of sin...There is no just man, not one." 
(Romans 3:9,10 N.E.B.). And in the hymnody of the Church the 
inseparable connection between the Cross of Christ and the 
sin of man has been a constant theme.
Yet it is apparent that to modern ears the words
'sin' and 'guilt', 'grace' and 'faith', to mention only a few,
have an archaic ring which reduces their power to communicate
any significant concept. Or, which is perhaps worse, the
terms have become so devalued that they are used in a
superficial, harmless kind of way. Even within the Christian
community it is doubtful whether such words are understood in
%
anything more than a vague and shadowy manner. It is clearly 
a task of theology to illuminate its language and to restore 
its depth and power. This will be no light burden, for not 
only are such words as 'sin' and 'guilt' misunderstood, but 
they are also rejected. Theology is therefore engaged in an
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important rescue operation.
In this chapter we shall first of all consider some 
current humanist arguments and then proceed to discuss the 
existentialist analysis of the human situation as a basis for 
the restoration of the terms 'sin' and 'guilt'.
The neo-Freudian psychologist, Erich Fromm, bases 
his enquiry into the psychology of ethics on a confidence in 
the capacity of man for goodness and productiveness.
"A spirit of pride and optimism has distinguished 
Western culture in the last few centuries: pride 
in reason as man's instrument for his understanding 
and mastery of nature; optimism in the fulfilment of 
the fondest hopes of mankind, the achievement of the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. Man's 
pride has been justified." (l).
All that is now required is that man should apply himself with
eqyal confidence and resourcefulness to the art of living,
making use of the progress of psychology in illuminating the
mysteries of the human psyche and the secret springs of
behaviour.
Fromm traces the ills of mankind to the frustration 
of man's inherent power of self-affirmation by authoritarian 
ethics, stemming from, e.g. God, the Church, social conventions, 
or parents. In humanistic ethics, therefore, good is the 
affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. Virtue is 
responsibility towards one's own existence and vice is
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irresponsibility towards oneself through submission to an
irrational authority which hinders the unfolding of one’s
potentialities.
At the root of our malaise lies an authoritarian
conscience which burdens the individual with fear and a load
of false guilt.
"The prime offence in the authoritarian situation is 
rebellion against the authority's rule. Thus dis­
obedience becomes the 'cardinal sin'; obedience, the 
cardinal virtue." (op. cit. p.148).
Living in fear, man attempts to appease authority by means of
sacrifices, and to atone for the pride in his strength and power
which challenges the authority's superiority.
"Paradoxically, the authoritarian guilty conscience is 
a result of the feeling of strength, independence, 
productiveness, and pride, while the authoritarian 
good conscience springs from the feeling of obedience, 
dependence, powerlessness, and sinfulness." (op. cit. 
p.150 Italics author's).
Throughout history, guilt feelings have both increased the
sense of dependency and enlarged authority's demands. A
vicious circle of transgression, guilt feelings, and craving
for forgiveness and absolution is formed which tends to stifle
productive living. Herein lies the source of the inner conflict
which expresses itself in neurotic conditions.
"If life's tendency to grow, to be lived, is thwarted, 
the energy thus blocked undergoes a process of change 
and is transformed into life-destructive energy. 
Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life".
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(op. cit. p.216. Italics author's).
(NOTE. Dr. Paul Tournier has given ample clinical 
evidence of the disastrous effects of an authoritarian moralism 
in developing infantile guilt feelings, fears and tensions. (2). 
He makes a clear distinction, however, between true and false 
guilt. The latter results from social suggestion, fear of 
taboos or of losing the love of others. It is the guilt of 
doing. The former, on the other hand, he describes as the 
guilt of being, the guilt of which one is aware, upon 
reflection, in relation to oneself, to others, and to God.
(op. cit. pp.63ff.). Properly understood, genuine religion 
delivers man from the oppressive influence of false guilt, 
while at the same time bringing to light the genuine, but 
often repressed, guilt of being, (op. cit. pp. 119ff.). )
The foundation of Fromm's argument is the assumption
"that man is able to know what is good and to act 
accordingly on the strength of his natural 
potentialities and of his reason." (3).
The humanistic conscience is the voice of our true selves.
It summons us to live productively, to develop fully and
harmoniously and thus to become what we potentially are. Given
the proper conditions,-faith in himself and deliverance from
an authoritarian conscience,- man is capable of building a
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social order governed by the principles of equality, justice 
and love. As rational faith this
His not ujishful thinking, but based upon the evidence 
of the past achievements of the human race and on the 
inner experience of each individual, on his ouin 
experience of reason and love." (op. cit. pp.207-8).
The real moral problem is man's indifference to himself, a
consequence of the feeling of impotence engendered by a 
socially patterned defect which is itself a product of a
negative, authoritarian religious manipulation of man's mind.
"Prophecies of doom are heard today with increasing 
frequency. UJhile they have the important function 
of drawing attention to the dangerous possibilities 
in our present situation they fail to take into 
account the promise which is implied in man's 
achievement in the natural sciences, in psychology, 
in medicine and in art. Indeed, these achievements 
portray the presence of strong productive forces 
which are not compatible with the picture of a 
decaying culture.... The outcome... rests upon man's 
courage to be himself and to be for himself."
(op. cit. pp.249-50).
UJith Fromm's passion for the liberation of man from 
the baneful consequences of what he calls the authoritarian 
conscience, we may indeed have a great deal of sympathy. It 
must be confessed that a certain moralistic emphasis in religion 
has tended to prevent the development of integrated, mature 
personality. Yet it must be questioned whether Fromm's 
diagnosis reaches the heart of the problem of man's predicament. 
Even some of his fellow psychologists prefer the dark vision
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of Freud to the "cheery platitudes of his revisers". (4).
The way to the improvement of the individual is not simply 
by a process of social engineering. In "Life Against Death". 
Norman Brown turites,
"It takes only the capacity to endure unpleasant 
truth to prefer the bleak pessimism of 'Civilisation 
and its Discontents' to the lullabies of sweetness 
and light which the neo-Freudians serve up as 
psycho-analysis." (5).
Freud stands opposed to Rousseau; not that man is good and
society corrupts him, but that man is anarchic and society
restrains him. Fromm, however, places his faith in the self-
actualising personality, with regard to which the terms 'sin'
and 'guilt' have a much reduced meaning.
(NOTE. In an interesting article, "The New Optimism -
From Prufrock to Ringo", (6), UJilliam Hamilton suggests that
in spite of our fears, the dominant mood today is one of
optimism about the future of man. The new optimism
"faces despair with the conviction that the human 
conditions that created it can be overcome, whether 
those conditions be poverty, discrimination, or 
mental illness." (op. cit. p.490).
The pessimism of neo-orthodoxy (e.g. Reinhold Niebuhr's 
'Nature and Destiny of (Ylan *) "doesn't persuade us any 
more", (op. cit. p.481).
Hamilton then describes the move from pessimism to optimism
in the social sciences, in the field of art, and in the civil
rights movement. Here the fashionable pessimism of the
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intellectual world is being challenged. Existentialist 
brooding on alienation and inauthenticity and forlornness 
is being repudiated as cant and nonsense, while in the field of 
art, there appears a new element of joy and celebration in life.
"Certain kinds of contemporary art... show that the 
ordinary things which technological society rejects, 
(coke bottles, cans, old newspapers, tires) can be 
reassembled, with only the slightest nudges from the 
artist, into something gay and beautiful, and thus 
the whole of life can become the subject matter for 
such creativity." (op. cit. p. 485).
He regards the civil rights movement as the most decisive
piece of evidence.
"That there is a gaiety, an absence of alienation, a 
vigorous and contagious hope at the centre of this 
movement is obvious, and it is the main source of its 
hold on the conscience of... young America. You can 
most easily discern this optimism, beyond tragedy, 
beyond alienation, beyond existentialism, by singing 
the songs of the movement.... Ulhen we listen to 'We 
shall overcome', we have come into the world of 
historical optimism, in which this world is the place, 
and now is the time, for the making of long-overdue 
changes." (op. cit. p. 486).
Something of the eschatological optimism of Jesus 
with his disciples may be supplanting the anti-optimism of Paul, 
Augustine, Kierkegaard and post-liberal theology. But Hamilton 
connects the new optimism with 'the death of God', and the 
consequent loss of the sense of tragedy.
"...the presence of tragedy requires the presence of God 
or the gods, and this presence is just what we do not 
have. The death of tragedy is due to the death of God."
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(op. cit. p. 487).
In the new mood of optimism, "me tryst the world, we 
trust the future, we deem even many of oyr intractable 
problems just soluble enough to reject the tragic 
mode of facing them." (op. cit. p. 490).
IDe do not have the dialectic between the presence and the
absence of God of neo-orthodox theology, or of existentialism.
"tlJe are the not-havers, whose undialectical "Yes" to 
the world is balanced by a 'No* to God." (op. cit. p.450Da,
UJe may be sceptical regarding the vitality and depth
of the new optimism of the Mew tliorld, but it is clear that in
this situation, which is not without parallel in the eager
participation of younger people in movements to overthrow
social and political evils in developing countries, words like
'sin' and 'guilt' sound faintly ridiculous. Yet while applauding
what seems to be a healthy absence of morbid brooding ran the
world's miseries and a determination that united action should
be taken against a sea of troubles, there are two observations.
which we would make. First, there exists the threat of a loss
of individuality in the desegregating pressures of partlcipatlffflrn-
a danger expressed in the almost compulsive desire to be "milfch It"*
Secondly, we may ask whether the new mood of optimism* has
sufficient depth to safeguard it against a bitter cynicism* In
the face of "the sheer cussedness of things1*, and whether It can
sustain "the courage to be" in the presence of obdurate evil,
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Uie turn now to consider the method by which an 
existentialist theology seeks to restore meaning to such 
traditional Christian concepts as 'sin' and 'guilt'. An 
existentialist approach may not wholly escape the suspicion 
that there is something morbidly introspective in a concent­
ration on the question of being. Yet, notwithstanding the 
reluctance of those imbued with a spirit of optimism to grant 
any importance to the question, the fact that in 'limit-situations' 
the individual is inexorably, albeit perhaps rarely, confronted 
with the question of his being, makes the attempt to analyse it 
worth pursuing.
An existentialist theology assumes that man and his 
being are central in all theological discussion, and that 
theological statements are significant only insofar as they 
relate to existence. Its approach is therefore phenomenological, 
that is, it begins with the descriptive analysis of the 
phenomena of existence, such as anxiety, the flight from 
responsibility, the quest for meaning, the sense of guilt, and 
the threat of death.
Now the philosophical roots of existentialist theology 
are to be found in the thought of martin Heidegger. In"An 
Existentialist Theology"(7), John fflacquarrie outlines the 
Heideggerian analysis of existence which has provided a conceptual
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framework for an interpretation of basic biblical insights 
with regard to the human situation. In Heidegger’s terms, 
man's existence in the world may be either authentic or 
inauthentic. Because he is aware of himself as existing, man 
may become an object to himself and understand himself as one 
object among other objects in the world. In this way, man 
becomes merged in his world and exists inauthentically. In 
biblical terms, the concept of the 'body of sin', (Romans 6:6), 
stands for a way of being in which man exists in relation to 
his world. In this situation he has actualized the possibility 
of sinful existence, which is one aspect of his being as man.
He becomes estranged from himself and loses himself in his world. 
This is 'life according to the flesh' (Romans 8:5). There is, 
on the other hand, the possibility of authentic existence, in 
which man is at one with himself, the way of being described as 
'life in the Spirit' (Gal. 6:8).
UJe may put this another way by saying that in his 
inauthentic existence, man becomes absorbed in his concern with 
the world. He loses himself in the world and regards himself 
only as belonging to the world. This threatens to conceal from 
man the difference between his own being which transcends the 
subject-object relation, and the being of objects in the world. 
The consequence of all this is to be observed in the phenomena of
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anxiety, restlessness, despair, hostility and guilt.
Now the analysis of the experience of man as being-in- 
the-world claims to yield knowledge of man which is more funda­
mental and indubitable than any scientific understanding of man 
that is based upon concepts of substance and causality. 
Scientific knowledge is therefore subordinate to existential 
knowledge - the knowledge which man has of himself as existing.
Much use is here made of the feeling or mood of
anxiety, in which man is aware of the split in his existence as
he faces the necessity for decision. On the one hand he is 
aware of himself as a responsible being, yet on the other hand 
he is aware that he is not the master of his existence. There 
is an inescapable dualism in man's self-awareness, a dualism of 
man over against nature, a dualism within himself as one who is 
responsible yet who, at the same time, is subject to conditions 
over which he has no control, a dualism within the range of his 
possibilities, to exist authentically or inauthentically, and 
a dualism with regard to the world, which may corrupt man and 
become corrupted, or in which he may find his true being.
From the existentialist point of view all this is to be
understood in terms of man's fallenness from his true being.
This is the ontological presupposition which lies behind the 
phenomenological analysis.
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In his “Theology of the New Testament” (8), Bultmann 
interprets St. Paul’s theology as a doctrine of man, making 
use of the insights of existential philosophy to illuminate 
such Pauline terms as soma, pneuma and sarx.
"The most comprehensive term which Paul uses to 
characterize man's existence is soma." (op. cit.vol.1,
P.192).
"lYlan is called soma in respect of his being able to make
himself the object of his own action or to experience
himself as the subject to whom something happens. He 
can be called soma, that is, as having a relationship 
to himself." (op. cit. pp.195-6).
Now this relationship can be either an appropriate or 
a perverted one. (flan may be at one with himself or at odds with 
himself; he may find himself or lose his grip on himself, he may 
gain his self or fail to do so. But man has missed his true 
existence; he has chosen the possibility of inauthentic 
existence and has fallen from his true being. Paul sees man as
constantly placed before God. Hence,
"the ontological possibility of being good or evil is 
ontically the choice of either acknowledging the Creator 
and obeying him, or of refusing him obedience." (op. cit.
p.228).
To turn from the Creator is however, to turn to the creation. IKIan 
therefore seeks to find his existence within the world and to live 
by his own power. This is the essence of sin. This is life 
'after the flesh' -kata sarka - (Romans 8:5), in which man 
decides to understand his existence purely in terms of the world
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quits apart from any relationship to God. It is a way of being 
characterized by care, desire, an illusory sense of contentment, 
boastful self-confidence, and at the same time a sense of alien­
ation and discontent. This situation, so full of conflict and 
contradiction, reflects man's alienation both from himself and 
from God. The sense of guilt, in this analysis, is therefore 
totally other than the pathological fruit of an authoritarian 
moralism. It belongs to the very existence of man in his 
fallenness, in his alienation from himself in the choice of 
inauthentic existence.
Believing that "existentialism is a natural ally of 
Christianity",(9), Paul Tillich attempts to relate the questions 
raised in human existence with the answers implied in the self- 
manifestation of God in Christ. He assumes the essential truth 
and validity of the existential analysis of man's existence, an 
existence in which man finds himself estranged from himself, the 
world and from God, and threatened with disintegration and self 
destruction. Tillich interprets.manfs predicament in terms of 
a conflict between essence and existence. ITlan has fallen from 
what he essentially is. This transition from essence to 
existence is expressed in the symbol of the Pall. The consequence 
is the sense of estrangement which may be analysed in terms of 
unbelief, hubris and concupiscence. In unbelief, man rejects
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his relationship to God. The other side of this is hubris. in 
which man seeks to elevate himself as the centre of his world.
He seeks to ignore his finitude, and is unwilling to admit 
error, ignorance or limitation. And overcome with concupiscent 
desire he attempts to use the world as a means to self-glorific­
ation. (op. cit. pp.53-63).
The melancholy outcome is strife, disorder, tension, 
self-disgust, despair and disintegration. Freedom becomes mere 
arbitrariness: destiny appears as a fatalistic determinism 
against which one is powerless. The striving for self-transcend­
ence degenerates into a frantic search for new and meaningful 
experience. Order expresses itself in an oppressive legalism 
which is suspicious of creativity. The sense of finitude appears 
as the horror of death and the doubt which is proper to finitude 
is distorted into a despairing relativism which seeks to avoid 
decisions, (op. cit. pp.72-86).
Furthermore, under the conditions of estrangement, 
anxiety assumes a tragic character, brought on by the element of 
guilt. It transforms the anxious awareness of one's 'having to 
die' into the painful realisation of a loss for which one is in a 
real sense responsible, in spite of its tragic universality.
The profound ambiguity between good and evil which permeates 
the whole of existence is the source of the experience of guilt.
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And the threat of death carries the anxiety of condemnation - 
not to an eternal punishment, but to the despair of having lost 
one's true destiny. All this is nothing but the manifestation 
of the power of Sin. (10).
It is clear that Tillich's thought is far removed from 
the psychologist's notion of sin as the transgression of the 
commands of a heteronomous authority. The existence of neurotic 
guilt feelings in no way contradicts the reality of genuine 
guilt which lies behind man's despair. The 'salvation' offered 
by psycho-analysis reaches only as far as these misplaced or 
neurotic guilt feelings. It is not the salvation which gives the 
courage to live in the constant and sometimes despairing awareness 
of existential guilt.
Uie would agree with John ITIacquarrie' s judgment that
"existentialism is making a powerful contribution toward 
renewing some basic Christian words." (11).
With its stress on the finitude of man as thrown into a world in
which he has to be; on the uncertainty of human life which is all
the time haunted by the inevitability of death; on the fundamental
anxiety which is attendant upon such an existence in which
nevertheless, responsible decision is inescapable, existentialism
focusses our attention upon truths from which we are all too
prone to hide. In so doing, it endeavours to make us more
receptive to that wisdom which is
-82-
"not a technical achievement but a divine power which 
tries to show us the ultimate problems of our 
existence." (12).
And in response to the accusation that existentialism 
is morbid and pessimistic, we can reply that this appears to be 
so only if it is regarded in isolation from the answers which 
are implied in the questions it raises. But this leads us to
matters which will be discussed in a later chapter.
One question, however, remains to be considered.
Does an existentialist theology distort the biblical faith and the
biblical message in the direction of a prevailing philosophical 
fashion?. Three points may be made in reply. First, an 
apologetic purpose can be traced throughout the history of 
theology. And in order to be genuinely contemporary and 
relevant, theology has always attemped to present the Christian 
faith in terms intelligible to its age. There are, of course, 
dangers in such an apologetic procedure. But the risk must be 
taken, even if on occasion alien elements may slip in. As an 
example we refer to the influence of Greek philosophical 
concepts on the theological thought which produced the classical 
creeds of Christendom. Secondly, the purpose of an existential­
ist theology is above all to clarify the thought of the New 
Testament in such a way that its message can speak for itself. 
Bultmann, for example, has no other intention than to enable
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man to confront the Gospel as judgment and as grace.
Thirdly, it cannot be denied that for many the use of exist­
entialist concepts has presented an extraordinarily clear view 
of the New Testament understanding of fallen man, and far from 
accommodating the Christian message to a prevailing fashion, 
has imported into New Testament interpretation a remarkable 
degree of clarity and consistency. UJe allow Tillich to 
defend the existentialist approach:-
"The test of a phenomenological description is that the 
picture given by it is convincing, that it can be seen 
by anyone who is willing to look in the sane direction, 
that the description illuminates other related ideas, 
and that it makes the reality which these ideas are 
supposed to reflect understandable. " (13).
Hie conclude then, that the terms 'sin* and * guilt *
have not lost their truth, and that their expressive poisser has
been regained through the insights which existentialism has
given us.
Before leaving this chapter we must give attention to 
the charge sometimes made that existentialist theology is simply 
natural theology masquerading under a modern guise. Does the 
existentialist analysis of man's predicament really take us any­
where near the biblical view of man as a rebel against God?.
Can there, in fact, be any true and wholesome awareness of sin 
apart from the experience of grace and forgiveness?.
The charge rests either upon a misunderstanoing of tos1
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existentialist approach or upon a rigid and defensive 
dogmatism. UJe cannot here enter into a debate with the latter, 
but will attempt to clarify a number of points to overcome 
misunderstandings.
An existentialist theology does not in any way 
minimise the reality of man’s alienation from God. Nor does 
it suggest that by any moral, intellectual or psychological 
tour de force he is able to overcome his guilt, his conflict, 
his estrangement and achieve authentic existence. His fallenness 
belongs to his being as man, and this means that he has fallen 
into a situation in which it is no longer possible for him to 
choose authentic existence.
The anxious question then is, how can man achieve 
authentic existence? It becomes evident that at this point 
existentialist theology must go beyond its philosophical 
foundations. Existentialist philosophy either tends to assume 
that the exposure of the possibility of authentic existence is 
sufficient to empower man to choose that possibility, or to end 
its analysis of the human predicament with a pessimistic, 
nihilistic challenge to a courageous despair. On the other 
hand, existentialist theology sees in the disclosure of man's 
existence in guilt and anxiety, the opportunity for a new self- 
understanding. This new self-understanding, however, includes
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not only the au/areness of one's tragic situation, but also 
the genuine possibility of an authentic existence. Alien­
ation is now seen not as the consequence of a bitter rebellion 
against evil fate, but as estrangement from the ground of one's 
being, now understood as gracious. The analysis of alienation 
from oneself has opened the door for the religious awareness 
that this alienation is also from God. Grace, then, is the 
event in which the real nature of both inauthentic and 
authentic existence is revealed and the new possibility of 
authentic existence is placed within man's grasp.
The transition from fallen to authentic existence is 
therefore not the work of man but of God. Neo-orthodox 
theology, says Tillich,
"is right in asserting the inability of man to reach 
God under his own power, fflan is the question, not the 
answer." (14).
Bultmann similarly emphasises that it is in confrontation with 
the Christian proclamation that man achieves a new self- 
understanding and that the lost possibility of gaining 
authentic existence is restored to him. (15). All this is 
a gift to man which has its source in the salvation-occurrence 
in Christ.
Furthermore, the extent of one's alienation and 
lostness is now fully revealed. The fatal nature of the
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phenomena of estrangement is now understood, and the 
'exceeding sinfulness of sin1 becomes apparent. UJe can 
properly speak of sin only because its power over us has been 
broken.
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THE CROSS 
in the 
NEW TESTAMENT
A. How did Jesus understand his death?
The question itself raises a host of related 
problems concerning the nature of the Synoptic tradition 
and the relation between the historical Jesus and the 
kerygma. It would take us far beyond the scope of this 
chapter to go into these highly controversial questions in 
detail. Some general observations will suffice as a back­
ground to the primary question with which we have to deal.
The attempt to derive a clear, unambiguous picture 
of the life and teaching of Jesus from the Gospels has been 
shown to be fruitless. So-called "Lives of Jesus" revealed 
more about the author's presuppositions, ideals and prejudices 
than about the historical Jesus. Few serious scholars would 
now deny that the Gospels are not historical narratives but 
reflections of the dogma and worship of the primitive church. 
Yet how much of the history of Jesus is it possible to detect
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behind the kerygmatic proclamation? It is around this 
question that scholarly controversy rages at the present time.
The motive for whatfhas been called "a new quest for 
the historical Jesus" is not mere curiosity* Some important 
issues are involved. Can we be certain, for example, that 
the history of Jesus can bear the weight of its post-Easter 
interpretation in the kerygma, with its reference to such 
"myths" as incarnation, atonement, resurrection? It is 
certainly not possible to demonstrate that Jesus' under­
standing of his history is identical with the kerygmatic 
interpretation, nor is there any suggestion that we can re­
construct the teaching of Jesus in such a way that it is 
possible to set it over against the preaching of the 
primitive church. But we may enquire whether there is a 
continuity between Jesus and the kerygma.
The issue was raised in a significant paper by E. 
Kasemann in 1953. (l). He recognises without question the 
kerygmatic nature of the Gospels.
"UUe can only gain access to this (historical) Jesus 
through the medium of the primitive Christian gospel 
and the primary effect of this gospel is not to 
open up the way for us but to bar it. The historical 
Jesus meets us in the New Testament, our only real 
and original documentation of him, not as he was in 
himself, not as an isolated individual, but as the 
Lord of the community which believes in him. Only 
in so far as, from the very outset, he was potentially
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and actually this Lord, does the story of his earthly 
life play any part in our Gospels." (op. cit. p.23).
Yet the very fact that the Gospels were written shows that
the Church was not minded to allow the earthly Jesus to be
hidden by the kerygmatic proclamation of the exalted Lord.
Far from being unconcerned with the character and content of
Jesus' history, the primitive church related its gospel to
this man from Nazareth and to a concrete time with its special
circumstances.
But how far does this really take us along the road
to discovering authentic Jesus material in the Gospels?
Admittedly not very far. Kasemann finds more or less safe
ground only
"when there are no grounds either for deriving a 
tradition from Judaism, or for ascribing it to 
primitive Christianity, and especially when Jewish 
Christianity has mitigated or modified the received 
tradition, as having found it too bold for its taste." 
(op. cit. p.37).
He concludes that the distinctive element in the earthly Jesus 
is his preaching of the kingdom that had dawned and of
"how God was come near to man in grace and demand."
(op. cit. p.45).
Although "it is certain that Jesus regarded himself 
as inspired", (o p. cit. p.41). Kasemann rejects the 
predication 'Son of fYlan1 as inauthentic and denies 
that Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah.
(op. cit. p.43).
A number of other scholars have taken up the new
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quest. Bornkamm speaks of a general impression made by 
Jesus which is quite independent of the authenticity of any 
particular saying. (2). Uie are impressed by Jesus' humble 
submission to God and by his tremendous sense of authority. 
Ebeling similarly speaks of
"a historically reliable general impression of Jesus"
(3)
which may be derived from the Gospels. The core of Jesus' 
message is found to be the rule of God, the nearness of God 
and the call to joyful obedience of the will of God. In a 
paper entitled "The Quest of the Historical Jesus" (4), Fuchs 
claims that Jesus was put to death because of his audacious 
assertion through his own conduct that God's will was a 
gracious will. (op. cit. p.21). And since actions are more 
likely to stimulate imitation than words, it is highly probable 
that notwithstanding justifiable doubts on the genuineness of 
particular sayings, the Gospels cast light on Jesus' conduct.
John Macquarrie feels compelled to assert a minimal 
core of factuality if the New Testament is to retain any 
significance even as providing an understanding of the 
possibilities of human existence. He believes the question 
of historicity is theologically important, since without a 
firm hold in history the Christian message cannot be
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distinguished from a fairy-tale or a utopian ideal. The 
minimal core of which he speaks is not a short list of basic 
facts, but
"the assertion that at the source of the Christian 
faith there was an actual historical instance of the 
pattern of life proclaimed in the kerygma under the 
notions of dying and rising." (5).
He points out that even Bultmann maintains that
"the general character of his (Jesus') life is rightly 
portrayed in them (the Gospels) on the basis of 
historical recollections." (6).
(Klacquarrie concludes,
"This minimal core of factuality - that there was an 
historical instance of the pattern of life which the 
gospel proclaims - is not indeed something certain, 
but it is something that has overwhelming probability... 
Historical research can give no 'guarantee' for such 
a commitment ('Thou art the Christ'), but we can have 
reasonable confidence that the commitment is to a 
realistic possibility of existence."(7).
John McIntyre points out in "The Shape of Christology"(8). 
what he regards as certain unwarranted conclusions which are 
often drawn from the attitude of historical scepticism.
He writes,
"Historical scepticism... has had observable consequences 
in the form of two denials, first, that it is quite 
impossible to construct a biography of Jesus; and 
secondly that later generations (that is, after the 
ascension of Jesus) have been cut off from all knowledge 
of the personality of Jesus... The second denial is 
one which to my mind is too readily dismissed as an
irrefutable consequence of the previous denial. It is
valuable to notice what is being denied and what remains
after the denial. llJhat is being denied is that we know
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how 3esus developed psychologically from childhood 
to manhood; how he arrived at his messianic conscious­
ness so-called; how indeed mind and tuill operated in 
his tujo-nature person. These are all significant and 
permissible denials. tUhat is not necessarily implied 
by these denials is that we are ignorant therefore of 
uihat might be called ’the mind of Christ1, of how he 
thought about the Father, about his own death, about 
men and women. It is not 'uncontrolled imagination' 
(Kasemann's phrase) that speaks of these subjects. 
Without some fill-in of that kind in our conception 
of Christ, without some understanding of what he 
thought or of his motivation, it is difficult indeed 
to say whom we are speaking about when we speak of 
3esus Christ. He becomes simply an X recurring in 
a series of propositions about the kerygma; an X, 
moreover, concerning whose internal nature we are 
forbidden to speak even on the basis of the series of 
propositions. In short, my reply to such a view 
would be that if we are unable to speak of the 
personality of 3esus, we are ex vi terminorum 
forbidden to speak about 3esus.
This much is clear: if the psychological
model is to be discarded, then modern christology 
is on the verge of reintroducing its own brand of 
docetism. The UJord was made flesh, but made flesh 
in a manner which escapes all the ordinary psycho­
logical observations that one would make about a 
human personality." (op. cit. pp.123-4).
lYlcIntyre's argument appears to be thoroughly
reasonable, reflecting a genuine interest in historical
features. But we must ask what is gained by an attempt to
construct the outlines of the historical human personality
of 3esus? It is not, of course, denied that behind the
kerygma there is the historical figure. But if the interest
in the historical 3esus is to legitimize the kerygma, then
faith finds itself at the mercy of the historian. Bultmann
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points out that
"the kerygma is not interested in the 'objective 
historicity1 beyond the simple 'that' (3esus lived).
(9).
Bultmann goes on to ask, "If the message (and work) 
of 3esus place the hearer before a decision and 
disclose to him the possibility of a new existence - 
why can the apostolic preaching not limit itself 
simply to repeating the message of 3esus, as other 
disciples repeat the teaching of their master? Why, 
in addition, or rather in the first place, had they 
to demand faith in him as the coming Son of Oflan, a 
faith which the historical 3esus never asked for?
Why could the message concerning Christ entirely 
turn away from this 'repetition' as we see in Paul 
and 3ohn? (loc. cit).
(ilust the kerygma be validated on historical grounds 
before we can respond to the proclamation concerning the 
Christ? McIntyre seems to come very close to making faith 
dependent on a credible historical reconstruction of the 
personality of 3esus.
But we must leave aside discussion of the interesting 
issues raised by the new quest. It is already clear that
whatever conclusions may be reached on the question of the
relation of the historical 3esus to the kerygma, we are still 
left with the embarrassing fact that the new quest does not 
greatly help us to arrive at firm conclusions to the question 
of how 3esus himself understood his death. A general impression
of the character and conduct of the ITian of Nazareth is no
substitute for authentic expressions of 3esus' self-conscious­
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ness in regard to his death.
Do any of the sayings attributed to Jesus relating
to his death provide the clear and unambiguous information
upon which we can speak definitely of Jesus1 understanding
of the Crucifixion? There are critical scholars who believe
that the Synoptic Gospels do give us this information. In
his study of the Passion-Sayings in the Gospels, Vincent
Taylor writes,
"Whatever explanation of the death of Jesus we may 
give today, there can be no doubt at all that Jesus 
himself understood its meaning in terms of sacrifice." 
(10).
Jesus reinterpreted the mission and destiny of the Son of Man,
and regarded his death as an essential part of his messianic
achievement, (op. cit. p.90). Taylor finds in Mark 9:9-13
confirmation of the view that
"Jesus believed he must suffer as the Son of Man, and
that he had taught this truth to his disciples." (op. cit
p.96).
The ’Ransom1 passage (Mark 10:45), accepted by Taylor as 
authentic, means that
"Jesus regarded his death as in some way an act of 
requital." (op. cit. p.104).
Similarly, the sayings at the Last Supper, suggest that
"Jesus looked upon his suffering and death as a 
sacrificial offering of himself for men." (op. cit.p.125)
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Again, "the most fundamental idea which lies behind 
the Passion-Sayings is the steadfast belief of 
Jesus that the purpose and experiences of his Passion 
lay deep in the providence of God.11 (op. cit. p.255).
In suffering, Jesus was fulfilling his messianic vocation, 
through which he made possible a relationship of true fellow­
ship between men and God.
"Translated into its simplest terms, the question 
whether there is a dogmatic element in the thought 
of Jesus, is the inquiry whether he knew what he 
meant to achieve for men by his messianic ministry 
of suffering and death. This question, it is here 
maintained, should be answered in the affirmative." 
(op. cit. p.273).
Uiilliam (Hanson comes to a similar conclusion in 
"Jesus the Messiah"(11).
"The Synoptic tradition makes it plain that the 
acceptance by Jesus of death was the price not 
simply of his fidelity to truth but of his carrying 
through to the end his task of reconciling the many 
to God and his conviction of herein serving the 
will of the Father in heaven." (op. cit. p.164).
Manson holds that the great expansion of the Son of Man
doctrine according to which the Son of Man's exaltation is
from a human life of suffering on earth originated in the
depths of Jesus' religious spirit, (op. cit. p.117).
Furthermore, Jesus invested the necessity of his suffering
as Son of Man with redemptive significance, (op. cit. p.127).
With reference to Mark 10:45, Manson concludes that
"it will not do to pronounce it impossible or un-
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likely that Jesus, who saw his work and teaching 
to be fraught with critical significance for his 
nation, should think of his sacrifice in terms of 
an '.asham for many, as completing and consummating 
the work - the conversion and redemption of the 
many - which he had sought by his life to effect." 
(op. cit. p.133).
At the end of his study Manson declares categorically,
"To history belongs not the suffering of Jesus 
only but the mind with which he approached that 
suffering and the interpretation which he put 
upon it. At the heart of the Synoptic tradition 
there stands... an irreducible core of words of 
Jesus about the 'cup' which he must drink, the 
'baptism' which he must undergo, the rejection
and death which the Son of fflan must endure...
UJords such as these are not easily put down to 
ex post facto invention on the part of the Christian 
community, nor can this be done without the 
consequence of denying to Jesus all part in the 
making of Christianity." (op. cit. p.162).
It is clear that for Taylor and Manson the
Synoptic tradition is a faithful reflection of the mind
of Jesus regarding his death. There is no real problem
as the words of Jesus may be accepted as authentic to a
highly probable degree. Now although this view is probably
shared by most modern preachers, it is certainly contrary
to the trend of critical historical and theological
scholarship both in Germany and in the English-speaking
world. Bultmann finds the origin of St. Mark's Gospel,
in which 'the Gospel type' is first met, in the taking over
of the Palestinian tradition by the Hellenistic Church and
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in the new motives in the Hellenistic Church uihich
produced the shaping of the traditional material into a
Gospel.(12). In the primitive Christian kerygma that grew
up on Hellenistic soil,
"the Christ who is preached is not the historic 
Jesus, but the Chfcist of the faith and the cult.
Hence in the foreground of the preaching of Jesus 
stands the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
as the saving acts which are known by faith and 
become effective for the believer in Baptism and 
Lord's Supper. Thus the kerygma of Christ is cultic 
legend and the Gospels are expanded cult legends." 
(op. cit. pp.370-1),
The Kerygma does not refer to any other than the Man of
Nazareth, but what can we know of his work and character?
Bultmann writes,
"With some caution we may suggest the following 
about the work of Jesus. Exorcisms are character­
istic, the break with the law about the Sabbath, the 
attack upon prescriptions about purity, polemic 
against Jewish law, fellowship with outcasts like 
tax-gatherers and fallen women, a liking for women 
and children. Further, we may recognise that Jesus, 
unlike John the Baptist, was no ascetic, but liked to 
eat and to drink a glass of wine. Perhaps one could 
add that he summoned men to follow him, and 
gathered about himself a small group of followers, 
both men and women.
As for what he proclaimed... only this 
can be said, that he undoubtedly came forward in 
the consciousness of being commissioned by God to 
proclaim the eschatological message of the imminent 
rule of God and the demands and invitations of the 
will of God." (13).
In the kerygma Jesus as the Christ confronts us with an
eschatological, absolute claim, as one who offers final and
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authentic self-understanding.
This, however, is not dependent upon an acceptance
of the historical authenticity of any particular saying of
Jesus. It is the proclamation of the faith of the Church
in regard to the life and death of Jesus. It is therefore
an alarmist exaggeration to speak with Manson of the
'inventions' of the Christian community and of 'denying
to Jesus all part in the making of Christianity.' On the
contrary, the resurrection faith
"is a way of affirming ths forgiving purpose of God 
in tNS historical reality of the life of Christ."
(14).
The kerygma confesses Jesus as the vehicle of God's eschato­
logical action and invites us to
"recognise and confess in the Cross of Jesus the
judgment of God upon all history" and "the forgiving
action of God extended to all history." (op. cit. p.92).
In his discussion of the Gospel references to the
death of Jesus, John Knox concludes that although Jesus was
remembered to have expected the coming of the Son of Man,
"nowhere does Jesus identify himself, whether 
explicitly or by implication, with the Son of Man."
(15).
With Bultmann and others, he regards the conception of Jesus 
as the suffering Son of Man - a conception confined to Mark - 
as an expression of Mark's understanding of the theological
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significanee of the death of Jesus, Knox also argues
“the psychological implausibility of the conception 
of the Servant-fflessiah as a mode of Jesus1 own 
self-consciousness,” (op. cit. p.54),
Such a conception is regarded as incompatible with his full
and unqualified humanity.
Jeremias, on the other hand, argues that the most
critical analysis of the Synoptic material cannot but
"reveal a core of Jesus’ sayings about his passion 
which must antedate the crucifixion." (16).
He is convinced that the phrase 'after three days' (lYlark 8:31,
14:58, Luke 13:32) in which
"there is nowhere a distinction between the 
resurrection and the parousia ... shows that the 
substance of such announcements antedates Easter." 
(op. cit. p.43).
Furthermore the great variety of indirect announcements of
the passion, for example, cup, baptism, slain shepherd,
indicate that Jesus at least predicted his death.
But it is in five texts that Jeremias finds the
bedrock of tradition:- (a) The Eucharistic words 'for many',
which show "that Jesus found the key to the meaning of his
passion and death in Isaiah 53." (op. cit. p.46). (b) Mark
10:45. "The least that must be said:.., this... tradition.. •
presents Jesus as interpreting his passion with the aid of
Isaiah 53." (o p . cit. p.47) (c) Luke 22:35-38.
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"As soon as we realise that what Jesus announces is 
not just hatred and persecution but the imminent 
beginning of the apocalyptic tribulation, it is 
evident that we are dealing with a saying which 
cannot have been coined ex eventu but must be 
pre-Easter... Again it is Isaiah 53 which furnishes 
in Luke 22:35-38 the interpretation of the passion 
lying before Jesus." (op. cit. o. 47).
(d) fflark 14:27f. "The image of the shepherd preceding 
his flock and guiding them to Galilee can by no means 
have been worded ex eventu after the resurrection." 
(op. cit. p.48). The idea is not only of the 
eschatological tribulation of the flock but also of 
the gathering of the tried and purified remnant 
within the kingdom of God. In this reference, Jesus' 
death "marks the turning point inaugurating the final 
tribulation and salvation." (op. cit. p.48).
(e) Luke 23:34. "UJe have in this prayer an implicit 
interpretation of Jesus' death. For Jesus offers 
it in place of the expiatory vow: 'Way my death 
expiate all my sins', which a condemned man had to 
say before his execution, Jesus applies the atoning 
virtue of his death not to himself, as was the custom, 
but to his executioners. Here again Isaiah 53 is in 
the background." (op. cit.pp.48-9).
Now although Jeremias argues for the authenticity of 
these words, he yet speaks only of the "great probability" 
that Jesus interpreted his death as a fulfilment of Isaiah 53.
"Certainty is not to be expected." (op. cit. p.50).
Our conclusion is that it is not possible to go 
behind the kerygma to indubitably authentic words of Jesus 
with regard to his death. Hie cannot be sure in what sense 
Jesus understood his death. The problem, however, is one for 
history, not for faith. Faith is not a belief that Jesus 
entertained certain ideas, which therefore must be true, or
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that he spoke certain words on particular occasions, the
authenticity of which we cannot doubt; it is rather the
conv/iction that his life and death was the central element in
a divine and supremely significant event.
"Faith affirms the real presence of God in the life 
and death of Jesus", and "the certainty of faith 
is the affirmation of meaning in that life of self­
giving which is Christ's." (17).
Similarly Tillich writes,
"The certitude of faith does not imply certainty 
about questions of historical research." (18).
It is impossible to provide a safe foundation for the Christian
faith by positing a minimum of reliable facts about the Wan
of Nazareth. The christological symbols such as Son of Wan,
Son of God, Wessiah, are the titles applied by faith to the
One
"in whom the essential unity of God and man has 
appeared under the conditions of existence ."
(op. cit. p.126).
This faith is affirmed by those who find themselves trans­
formed into the state of faith. No historical criticism can 
question this awareness, nor can any 'assured results' of 
historical research strengthen it. Faith is confirmed by 
the transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. 
The risk of faith is not a risk concerning uncertain historical 
facts,
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"The risk of faith is existential." (op. cit. p.134). 
It involves eur total response to the claim which arises out 
of our past in the message concerning Jesus, a claim which 
involves a decision concerning the way we understand our life 
and its meaning. (19).
Although Gregor Smith and Tillich express themselves 
rather differently, it is clear that for both of them the 
fundamental quality of faith in Jesus is neither belief in 
spite of inadequate historical foundations nor belief because 
of certain indubitable facts, but an existential decision 
concerning Jesus as the New Being ( Tillich),or as the 
eschatological event ( Gregor Smith).
But this leads us to a closer examination of the 
message concerning Jesus, and to that we now turn*
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THE CROSS 
in the 
NEW TESTAIY1ENT 
(continued)
B. The Primitive Church.
In the final chapter of his survey of the present 
position of New Testament study, Reginald Fuller draws 
attention to a number of issues that require fuller and 
deeper investigation. One of these is the need for
"a greater clarification between Palestinian and 
Hellenistic strata in the traditions behind our 
written gospels." (20).
He points out that the whole distinction between Palestinian
and Hellenistic Christianity is becoming increasingly
problematical.
With this caveat in mind, we will set down as
briefly as possible the kerygma of the Palestinian and the
Hellenistic churches as outlined by Bultmann in his "Theology
of the New Testament".
From the beginning, the earliest church recognised
and acknowledged in Jesus, the lYlessiah. But the proclamation
occurred within the framework of the Jewish eschatological
expectation, and it was therefore more particularly as the
coming Messiah that he was proclaimed. Therefore,
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"Jesus' importance as Messiah - Son-of-Man lies not 
at all in what he did in the past, but entirely in 
what is expected of him for the future." (21).
This accounts for the lack of interest in the earliest church
in the personality of Jesus. The church mas an eschatological
congregation awaiting the near end of history.
Yet Jesus' coming was already being recognised as
in some sense a decisive eschatological event. A christology
was
"explicit in the earliest church to the extent that 
they understood Jesus as the one whom God by the 
resurrection has made Messiah, and that they awaited 
him as the coming Son of Man." (op. cit. pp.43-4).
But the Cross presented a difficulty. How could one who had
suffered such a death be acknowledged as having been sent by
God, as one who claimed the allegiance of men? The scandal
of the Cross was surmounted in the Easter faith.
"The rise of the Easter faith made necessary a way 
of understanding the Cross that would surmount, yes, 
transform, the scandal of the curse which in Jewish 
opinion had befallen Jesus; the Cross had to make 
sense in the context of the salvation-process."
(op. cit. pp.45-6).
In the process of understanding, it was recognised that the
Cross was a skandalon, but that it was also a divine necessity.
(cf. Luke 24:26f. - 'IJJas the Messiah not bound to suffer thus
before entering upon his glory?').
But beyond that, Jesus' death was probably already
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being conceived as an expiatory sacrifice. Bultmann sees
in Romans 3;24f, a reference to the earliest kerygma.
"The designation of Christ as the hilasterion 
occurs only here in Paul; nor is it Paul's habit 
elsewhere (except Romans 5:9, and, again following 
tradition, in reference to the Lord's Supper, to
speak of 'the blood1 of Christ, but of 'the Cross'...
The idea found here of the divine righteousness 
demanding expiation for former sins is otherwise 
foreign to him." (op. cit. p.46).
In the Hellenistic world, Christian missionary 
preaching began with the proclamation of the one God.
Because it does not know God, the pagan world is held to be 
sunk in ignorance and error. To accept the Christian faith 
is therefore to know God, or the truth. But since polytheism
and idolatry was seen to be part of the world's sin and vice,
the acceptance of the Christian faith involved a repentanee 
as well as a turning aside from idols. The call to repent­
ance was made under the conviction that the one God, the 
Creator, was also the Judge.
"Hence Christian preaching of the one true God is 
at the same time eschatological proclamation, 
preaching of the impending judgment of the world." 
(op. cit .p.74).
At an early stage the christological motif enters
the kerygma with the assertion that Jesus appears as the 
Judge of the world. Christ is the judge of the living and 
the dead. According to Acts 17:31, God gave proof that he had
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appointed Christ Judge of the world by raising him from the 
dead. But the Judge is also to be the Saviour of those who 
believe, (l Thess.4:15-18).
The Judge, however, was none other than he who bad 
previously been put to death on the Cross. (Romans 4:25, 1 Cor. 
15:3f,). Therefore the telling of the passion story played 
a considerable part in the proclamation concerning Jesus.
"It is hard to say, however, to what extent there was 
theological reflection on the death of Christ, i.e., 
to what extent positive significance for salvation 
was ascribed to it." (op. cit. p.84).
UJhat theological significance the Cross did receive was 
determined by the Old Testament tradition and not, at least 
yet, by concepts derived from Hellenistic syncretism*
Bultmann affirms that
"the interpretation of Jesus’ death as an expiatory 
sacrifice for sins... was without doubt presented 
in the Hellenistic-Christian mission." (op. cit. p.84).
In such terms as 'for you', 'for us', 'for sins', the signif­
icance of the death of Christ is expressed. From the same 
tradition come the references to Jesus’ death as a sacrifice 
and as a covenant sacrifice, linking the death not simply to 
the individual but to the congregation, the 'people of Cod'.
And the same train of ideas is to be seen in the references to 
Jesus' death in terms of deliverance from sin, and a means of
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sanctification, grounded in forgiveness,
UJe may note in passing that Vincent Taylor, from a 
point of view much less critical than Bultmann's, concludes 
that the beliefs of primitive Christianity relating to the 
death of Jesus refer to its messianic, sacrificial significance. 
Furthermore, the death bore a close relation to sin and was 
understood as a vicarious act.
"The belief which lay deepest in the mind of 
primitive Christianity was that Jesus, as the 
Christ, the Son and Servant of God, had died and 
risen again to deliver men from sin and to establish, 
by the sacrifice of himself, a new covenant relation­
ship between them and God. No theory, no rationale, 
of this conviction is given in the records, but the 
evidence shows that the deed of Christ was widely 
understood as the fulfilment of the ancient purpose 
of God, as a vicarious act, and as in some sense 
representative." (22).
In summary, then, it seems clear that while the death 
of Jesus had not as yet received doctrinal formulation, it was 
reckoned to be an integral part of the salvation process, an 
event with sacrificial significance whereby believers received 
forgiveness, and deliverance in the day of judgment. Closely 
related was the call to repentance and the exhortation to live 
a life 'pure and undefiled'. And in the liturgy of the Lord's 
Supper, these themes were given sacramental confirmation
and expression.
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THE CROSS 
in the 
NEW TESTAIY1ENT 
(continued)
C, The Cross in the Theology of Paul.
Critical scholarship has not yet resolved the 
question of the theological environment out of which Paul 
emerged. Was his theology influenced predominantly by his 
Pharisaic background or by the Hellenistic environment in 
which he was born and in which he worked? While Bultmann 
finds the Hellenistic influences decisive, W.O.Davies 
argues that although
"both Hellenism and Judaism were his tutors unto 
Christ", (23)
elements in Paul's theology which are often labelled 
Hellenistic might well be derived from Judaism. Whatever 
conclusions are reached by scholars concerning individual 
features of Paul's thinking, it is surely clear that his 
profound reflection on the meaning of the Christ led him 
quite naturally to use the ideas and concepts which were to 
hand in his rich cultural and religious environment. Not 
only did he receive the kerygma, but he interpreted it with 
regard to his understanding of the human situation, and gave 
the gospel the stamp of his own brilliant mind.
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Of one thing we can be sure, and that is the
centrality of the Cross in his preaching and teaching.
"God forbid that I should boast of anything but 
the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which 
the world is crucified to me and I to the world!"
(Gal.6:14. N.E.B.).
In Corinth he declares that he was resolved
"to think of nothing but Jesus Christ - Christ 
nailed to the Cross." (l Cor.2:2. N.E.B.).
He had been sent to preach the gospel
"and to do it without relying on the language of 
worldly wisdom, so that the fact of Christ on his 
Cross might have its full weight." ( 1 Cor.1:17. N.E.B.).
This emphasis may be traced to his conversion. Bultmann writes,
"The question thrust upon him... was whether he was 
willing to regard the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, 
whom the kerygma asserted to have risen from the 
dead, as the expected Messiah, But for Paul, the 
fervent champion of the traditions of the fathers, 
straightway recognising how basically the Torah 
was called into question by the Hellenistic mission, 
that meant whether he was willing to acknowledge in 
the Cross of Christ God's judgment upon his self- 
understanding up to that time -i.e. God's condemn­
ation of his Jewish striving after righteousness by 
fulfilling the works of the Law. After he had first 
indignantly rejected this question and become a 
persecutor of the Church, at his conversion he sub­
mitted to this judgment of God... His was not a 
conversion of repentance; neither, of course, was it 
one of emancipating enlightenment. Rather, it was 
obedient submission to the judgment of God, made 
known in the Cross of Christ, upon all human 
accomplishment and boasting. It is as such that, his 
conversion is reflected in his theology." (24).
Although this may be recognised as the well-spring
-112-
of his theology, the problem for Paul's interpreters has 
been to reconcile what appear to be contradictory 
explications of the meaning of the Cross. The mass of 
literature on Pauline theology is witness to this fact.
But it is not to be thought that Paul was a systematic 
theologian, and for him the personal and cosmic significance 
of the Christ on his Cross was utterly beyond the reach of 
neat systematisers and those bent on removing all apparent 
inconsistencies. The caricatures of Paul's view of the 
Cross which have appeared in the falsely objectified 
'theories of the atonement' show the impossibility of 
confining the dynamic richness of a personal relationship 
within the rigid framework of a dogmatising theology. Ule 
shall therefore indicate in this section the primary images 
which Paul uses in seeking to expound the word of the Cross. 
But first we must examine Paul's understanding of the human 
condition, his anthropology.
Bultmann has interpreted Paul's theology on the 
basis of what he regards as a fundamental Pauline distinction, 
that between man prior to faith, and man under faith. The 
transformation is made possible through the Cross in which 
the 'old man' is judged and condemned, and the life in faith,
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the 'new creation1 comes into being. Nothing less than a 
radical transformation and reorientation of life is involved.
The situation of man prior to faith is one of 
slavery. To understand this we need to examine Paul’s use 
of the terms 'soma1 (body) and 1sarx’(flesh). The term 
'soma1 denotes for Paul, man as a person, man as a whole.
"Man is called soma in respect of his being able to 
make himself the object of his own action or to 
experience himself as the subject to whom something 
happens." (op. cit.vol.1. p.195).
Romans 12:1, for example, reads,
"I implore you by God's mercy to offer your very 
selves (soma) to him: a living sacrifice." (N.E.B.).
On the other hand, man is able to yield himself to sin:
"So sin must no longer reign in your mortal body." 
(soma) (Romans 6:12, N.E.B.).
Man therefore is a being who has a relationship to himself,
and that relationship may be either appropriate or perverted.
He can be at odds with himself or in control of himself. The
term corresponds most closely to the Hebrew 'nephesh',
'living soul' - man as a self-conscious being.
But the soma understood as the self, may be under
the rule of 'sarx'• lUhen under the domination of sarx ,
the term soma may be used in the same way as sarx. Thus in
Romans 8:13 -
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"But if by the Spirit you put to death all the 
base pursuits of the body, then you will live,"(N .E .B. ) ,
the body (soma) under the sway of sarx can be spoken of in 
the same way as sarx itself. Hence the flesh-ruled soma 
comes to be spoken of as 'the flesh'. ITian, then, is seen 
by Paul as under the domination of sarx, a power which lays 
hold of him and determines his life and behaviour. Deliver­
ance from slavery to sarx does not therefore mean release 
of the self from the body, as though the body were a prison, 
but rather the transformation of the soma into a Spirit-ruled 
soma.
Yet it must not be thought that Paul uses the term 
sarx to refer simply to physical flesh. Sarx can denote 
not only the material body but also 'fleshiness1, referring 
to an attitude in which man seeks to discover his life in 
purely human and transitory concerns. Life 'after the flesh* 
means life which is centred on the self and the world.
(2 Cor. 11:18 -"people brag of their earthly distinctions.." 
N.E.B.). For Paul, this life is the spurious life. But it 
is also the sinful life, for it is nourished by the self- 
delusion that man can find his life in himself apart from 
his Creator. This gives rise to boastful arrogance in the 
'works of the flesh', pride of knowledge and wisdom, and the
-115-
striving after righteousness in the zealous bustle of moral 
and religious activities. ( 1 Cor. 1;26, 2 Cor. 10:12-18, 12:1.) 
In Philippians 3:3-7, Paul makes it especially clear that the 
attitude which orients itself by 'flesh' is the self reliant 
attitude of the man who puts his confidence in his own 
strength and in that over which he has mastery. Such an
attitude is characteristic both of the Jew, who boasts of
God and the Torah (Romans 2:17,23), and of the Greek who 
boasts of his wisdom ( 1 Cor. 1:19-31). It also gives rise 
to the tendency in man to compare himself with others in 
order to be able to boast (Gal.6:4).
But the baleful consequence of this life 'kata 
saxka', is fear, fear which is the reverse side of zeal.
Man becomes fearful and anxious with care. He becomes the
slave of that which he supposes he can control. In Paul's
understanding, therefore, man has fallen victim to flesh and 
sin (regarded as a demonic power) and against them he is 
powerless. Their rule in man's life is ultimately destructive, 
for man becomes divided against himself, he is dominated by 
fear and fails to achieve that life which he intends.
UJhat then, does Paul understand by the terms 
'psyche' and 'pneuma'? He seldom uses the word psyche and 
it usually means 'life itself' in contrast to self-conscious
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existence. Like soma it can almost correspond to the 
Hebrew nephesh ( Bultmann. op. cit. p.204). The word may 
also be translated as 'spirit1 with a small 's'. In 
Philippians 1:27, Christians are exhorted to stand firm in 
one spirit, with one mind (psyche), i.e. to have the same 
attitude or orientation of will. The phrase 'ek psyches',
(Eph. 6:6), means 'heartily', 'with a will', 'with spirit'.
Yet the term can also have the meaning of 'inferior'. The 
man who is 'psychikos' (l Cor. 2:14 - unspiritual, N.F.B.), 
is the man whose life is bound by earthly concerns.
Paul uses the term 'pneuma' prdominantly to refer 
to the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God, and in Romans 8:16
the divine pneuma, which Christians have received, is
distinguished from 'our Spirit'. ("In that cry,(Abba! Father!) 
the Spirit of God joins with our spirit"). Uiith reference to 
the human spirit, Paul's use of the term pneuma approaches 
the modern idea of consciousness, or self-conscious awareness.
"UJhen Paul speaks of the pneuma of man he does not
mean some higher principle within him or some
special intellectual or spiritual faculty of his, 
but simply his self." (op. cit. p.206).
Pneuma approaches the concept of 'nous'. In 1 Corinthians 14:14,
for example, there is the contrast between the divine pneuma
and the human mind. Pneuma, then, refers particularly to the
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self-conscious willing self. To be 'led by the Spirit' 
therefore means to have one's will orientated in a part­
icular direction. It is not clear whether Paul was thinking 
in terms of possessing, so to speak, a particle of the 
divine Spirit. But the divine pneuma is evidently an active 
power which is contrasted with the domination of the flesh.
In the Christian, the old life, en sarki, has been displaced 
by the new life, en pneumati.
According to Paul then, man is a living unity, 
aware of himself, his relation to others and to the world.
But the analysis of his existence reveals a perversity which 
thwarts his efforts to achieve his goals and intentions. His 
existence is never a fulfilled reality. Yet his existence is 
always 'existence before God', the Creator who demands 
obedience. Man therefore is confronted with the choice 
either of acknowledging the Creator and obeying him, or of 
refusing him obedience; of living after the flesh, striving 
to justify himself, or of accepting his creaturely relation­
ship, But under the dominion of sin man chooses to justify 
himself, and victimized by his self-delusion, he gains not 
life but death.
In what sense is man responsible for his situation? 
Paul's statements are not consistent with each other. In
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Romans 1:18-3:20 Paul demonstrates the universality of sin, 
but simply shows that all men, both Gentiles and Jews, are 
sinners. Their behaviour demonstrates their apostasy from 
the Creator, and involves genuine guilt. But in Romans 5:12-19, 
sin is attributed to Adam's sin. Man henceforth lives under 
a curse for which he is not himself responsible.
"Through the disobedience of the one man the many 
were made sinners." (Romans 5:19, N.E.B.).
It is not possible to speak of guilt in the ethical sense
in this situation.
Yet we may infer from the notion of inherited sin
that every man is born into a humanity that is and always
has been guided by false strivings. In human relationships,
trust can be destroyed by a single lie, and a single deed of
violence can give rise to strife. Everyone in fact lives in a
world in which each strives to justify himself, insists on
rights and is aware of inner conflict, Paul's 'inconsistency'
derives from his insight into the human situation, and no
theologian who shows similar insight has avoided the same
inconsistency. For on the one hand there is the evil tendency
in man which makes him prefer darkness to light, and the
responsibility which must be his if he is to be held
accountable for his existence. It is doubtful if even a
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behaviourist psychologist would be unaware of a conflict 
arising from a sense of responsibility if he were required 
under duress to deny his behaviourist theories.
Two further concepts are basic to Paul's understanding 
of man's plight: the cosmos, and the Law. Besides meaning 
simply 'the creation', 'Kosmos' often denotes
"the quintessence of earthly conditions of life 
and earthly possibilities," (Bultmann, op. cit. p.254).
In 2 Corinthians 1:12 Paul uses the term to refer to his
relationship with his fellow-men. Similarly in Romans 5:12,
the use of the term signifies the 'world of men' rather than
the universe. In some places, however, Paul thinks of kosmos
as the sphere of human life, which in its totality is at
enmity with God. (Rom.3:6, 19, 2 Cor,5:19.). The kosmos
is this evil age, in which sin abounds and which is destined
for death. Bultmann regards Paul's usage of 'flesh' and
'world' as sometimes synonymous.
"Then the eerie fact is that the kosmos, the world 
of men, constituted by that which the individual 
does and upon which he bestows his care, itself 
gains the upper hand ot/er the individual. The 
kosmos comes to constitute an independent super- 
self over all individual selves. " (op. cit. pp.256-7).
IJJe may speak of 'the spirit of the world', 'the spirit of
science', or the 'cultural environment' as the compelling
atmosphere which influences every man.
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This eschatological-historical meaning is expressed 
also- in Paul's mythological statements about the powers of 
the kosmos. The kosmos is the domain of demonic powers - 
'angels, principalities and powers' (Romans 8:38), 'the rulers 
of this age1 (l Cor. 2:6, 8). The head of these anti-divine 
powers is Satan (Romans 16:20, 1 Cor. 5:5), the 'god of this 
age' (2 Cor. 4:4). Paul, however, does not think of these 
powers in the dualistic manner of Gnosticism. The powers 
belong to God's creation, but they derive their evil signif­
icance from man who lets them on to the throne of his life.
For the Christian, they are dethroned and he is no longer 
subject to them. Hence the mythological notion of spirit 
powers is not the product of cosmological speculation 
attempting to explain terrifying phenomena, nor is it an 
attempt to relieve man of responsibility and guilt.
As a Pharisee of the Pharisees, Paul's life and 
religion were centred in the Torah, the Law of God. The 
Law was not a rational moral law inherent in man's intellect, 
but the concrete demands, cultic, ritual and ethical, which 
man must obey. Yet in his experience, Paul discovered that 
his most earnest efforts to achieve a right relation with God 
by keeping the Law only led him into more sin and into despair. 
Vincent Taylor describes Paul's words in connection with the
-121-
Law as "the language of intense spiritual disappointment" (25). 
Yet the Laui is 'holy and good' (Romans 7:12), and it is 
through the Law that we come to an awareness of sin. It 
brings to light the perversity of man's willing. Paul 
believed that the attempt to justify oneself on the basis of 
obedience to the Law was already sin. For sin is man's self- 
powered striving to procure his own salvation by his own 
strength.
"It is not merely evil deeds already committed that 
make a man reprehensible in God's sight, but man's 
intention of becoming righteous before God by 
keeping the Law and thereby having his 'boast' is 
already sin." (26).
Paul's attitude to the Law inevitably became 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the Law was God-given, part of 
his purpose for mankind, it provided moral and religious 
stability. On the other hand it became an unbearable burden 
and under the power of sin, set itself in the place of God.
Man's situation within the Law became a desperate one.
Summarising, we may say that Paul sees the Cross 
against the background of man's desperate need for deliverance. 
UJe now turn to examine the images he employs to relate Christ's 
death to that deliverance.
One of the dominant concepts used by Paul is that of 
sacrifice. This he found to be part of the tradition he had
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received, and which sauj in Jewish sacrificial practice an 
analogy to the death of Jesus. Jesus' death is the 
*hilasterion' in his blood, it is the expiatory sacrifice 
by which forgiveness of sins is effected.
"For God designed him to be the means of expiating 
sin by his sacrificial death." (Romans 3:25. N.E.B.).
The same concept is dominant in the liturgy of the Lord's
Supper, (l Cor. ll:24f.). Similarly the idea of expiation
is behind the passages in which Jesus is spoken of as having
'died for our sins' (l Cor. 15:3, 2 Cor. 5:14); 'died for us'
(Romans 5:6, 14:15); or as having 'given himself up' or
'sacrificed himself' (Romans 8:32, Gal. 1:4). In 1 Cor.5:7
Christ is referred to as our Passover sacrifice. The
sacrifice is vicarious -
"God made him a sin-offering for us." (2 Cor. 5:21, 
N.E.B. margin). "Christ bought us freedom from the 
curse of the law by becoming for our sake an 
accursed thing." (Gal. 3:13, N.E.B.),
In this reference, the vicarious death of Jesus is
the means whereby we are redeemed from the curse of the Law.
This apparently means release from the punishment imposed
upon sin understood as disobedience to the Law. The sacrifice
is believed to cancel guilt and punishment. Yet we should
here notice Galatians 4:4, where Paul speaks of Christ having
been sent "to purchase freedom for the subjects of the Law."
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Here freedom clearly refers not simply to release from 
punishment but from bondage to the Law itself, understood 
as a power of this sin-dominated age. This is further 
emphasised in Galatians 1:4, where it is declared that
"Christ ... sacrificed himself for our sins, to 
rescue us out of this present age of wickedness." 
(N.E.B.).
It seems clear that Paul found the concept of 
expiatory sacrifice inadequate in itself to express the 
significance of Jesus' death. This is further confirmed 
in the fact that Paul has very little to say about forgiveness 
in relation to the crucifixion. Bultmann suggests that the 
concept of sacrifice does not express Paul's characteristic 
view. (op. cit. p.296). Similarly Vincent Taylor observes 
that Paul never represents forgiveness as the object for 
which Christ died. (27). UJ.D.Davies, on the other hand, 
insists that the background of the Jewish sacrificial system 
cannot be ignored. He suggests that
"it was Paul's very familiarity with the sacrificial 
system that possibly accounts for the comparatively 
little use he makes of it in his theology." (28).
In all sacrificial activity it was the blood which was
central. Therefore through, the outpouring of Jesus' blood
the defilement which separated man from God was removed.
Davies links the hilasterion of Romans 3:2d with the
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'kapporeth1 of Exodus 25:17-22. In the cultic ritual of 
Judaism, the Law dealt with the expiation of sin in the 
sprinkling of the innermost shrine of the sanctuary with 
blood. So Paul thinks of Christ in terms of the spiritual 
hilasterion publicly set forth, not hidden away inaccessibly 
in the Holy of Holies and effective for atonement in virtue 
of his own blood, not that of any beast.
In spite of Davies' point, it remains true, 
nevertheless, that Paul did not make use of the sacrificial 
concept in the same way as for example, the author of the 
letter to the Hebrews. The concept was undoubtedly a major 
feature of his spiritual heritage, but he did not lay great 
stress on it as an interpretative principle, and easily 
moved when speaking in sacrificial terms to other concepts, 
notably that of release from bondage. Davies himself concludes 
that sacrificial categories are of only minor importance 
compared with the concept of the New Covenant and the perfect 
obedience which is implicit in it, Davies finds great 
significance in the references to the obedience of Jesus.
Just as the covenant at Sinai was sealed with blood and 
involved obedience to Jahweh, so the new covenant instituted 
by Jesus (l Cor.11:25), was ratified by the shedding of his 
blood, which was itself the supreme act of obedience and
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hence the perfect fulfilment of the Law.
"For Paul, Jesus himself in the totality of his 
being was a New Torah: Christ is for him both the 
New Torah and also the example of a perfect obedience 
to that new Torah." (op. cit, p.266).
The merit of Christ's obedience is efficacious for all who
believe.
'JJe have already referred to the idea of release 
from bondage to the Law, which is certainly close to the 
heart of Paul's thinking. Christ's death is not merely a 
sacrifice which cancels out sin and punishment, but effects 
a release from the dominion of the powers of this age - Law, 
Sin and Death. Here the complexity of Paul's thought cannot 
be reduced to consistency. In 1 Cor.6:20 Paul writes,
"You were bought at a price". To whom or to what was the 
price paid? UJithin the context of 1 Cor. 6:12-20 it seems 
obvious that Paul is not referring to any fantastic notion 
of a price paid to the Devil but to those powers into whose 
grasp man has fallen. In Colossians 2:15, however, Paul 
places the emphasis on the direct victory of Christ over
"the cosmic powers and authorities".
Paul uses a variety of images - sacrifice, ransom, 
obedience, victory over demonic forces - to relate the death 
of Jesus to the need of man for salvation. His language is
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often strongly metaphorical, resisting any attempt to 
reduce it to rigid theological consistency. But the 
question arises whether these images really take us to 
the heart of the 1salvation-occurrence1. Are they more 
than traditional images which Paul found at hand? Can 
we build any theory of atonement on any or all of these 
images combined? It would seem that at the root of the 
fact that theories of the atonement are so unsatisfactory 
is the tendency to ground them upon limited or inadequate 
concepts.
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THE CROSS 
in the 
NEUJ TESTAMENT 
(continued)
D. The Johannine Writings.
The most striking characteristic of the Johannine
writings is the use of antithetical terms - truth, falsehood;
life, death; light, darkness; love, hate; this worldly, not
of this world - to express the two possibilities of existence,
either as a slave to 'the prince of this world' or as one who
in faith has been brought from darkness to light. The coming
of Jesus faces men with the decision to choose between the two.
This world is under the dominion of the Evil One and therefore
is in darkness, but the appearance of Jesus breaks the
tyranny of the Devil.
"The Son of God appeared for the very purpose of 
undoing the devil's work," (l John 3:8, N.E.B.),
Sin is understood as a despotic power,
"everyone who commits sin is a slave to sin." ( John 
8:34, R.S.V.).
The certainty and universality of sin are expressed in
blunt terms-
"If we claim to be sinless, we are self-deceived and 
strangers to the truth." ( 1 John 1:8, N.E.B.).
Now although John, like Paul, sees the coming of
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Jesus against the background of the present evil age, and 
affirms that Jesus has radically changed man's situation, 
he does not link the accomplishment of that change as 
directly as does Paul to the death of Jesus. He nowhere 
speaks of the 'cross' or the 'crucified' in the manner of
Paul. John rather speaks of the death of Jesus as the
culmination of his whole ministry, which in its very 
totality, was the manifestation of the divine action 
against the powers of darkness. This fact has led Bultmann 
to conclude that,
"The common Christian interpretation of Jesus'
death as an atonement for sins is not, therefore,
what determines John's view of it." (29).
He supports this conclusion by regarding 1 John 2:2 ("He is
himself the remedy for the defilement of our sins, not our
sins only but the sins of all the world), and 1 John 4:10
('.'..the remedy for the defilement of our sins"), as
redactional glosses.
Nevertheless it is apparent that John does not make
sacrificial concepts central to his interpretation of the
Christ-event. He makes certain allusions, but the reader is
left to discern their significance, for example, the grain
of wheat, (John 12:24), the Passover lamb, (John 19:36), and
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consecration (3ohn 17:19). It is also noteworthy that 3ohn 
does not narrate the institution of the Lord's Supper in 
which the atonement idea occurs in the words, 'for you' and
’for many1. 3ohn also substitutes the 'new commandment' ( 13:34)
for the 'new covenant' ( 1 Cor. 11:25). Furthermore, he makes 
no use of the concepts of righteousness and justification,
Vincent Taylor writes with a degree of disappointment,
"He never represents Christ as dying for sinners, as 
bearing their sins, falling under their curse, 
offering himself in sacrifice on their behalf, 
inviting them to trust in his redemptive ministry
and share in the power of his self-offering,...
There is no description of a self-offering of 
Christ for sinners with which they can identify 
themselves in their approach to God for pardon, 
reconciliation and peace. " (30).
This is a revealing statement, for it expresses both the fact
that sacrificial categories are lacking in 3ohn's thought
and the difficulties which arise when the attempt is made to
interpret the New Testament witness to the Cross within the 7
framework of the concept of sacrifice.
UJe are here confronted with, the crucial question as
to whether sacrificial concepts are in fact adequate to
express the meaning of the Cross. Two considerations must
be borne in mind. First, there is the evidence from Paul
and 3ohn that while reference is made to sacrifice and the
sacrificial efficacy of the death of 3esus, their thought
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goes beyond the limits of sacrificial concepts. Hie have, 
for example, the recognition of the eschatological signif­
icance of Jesus' life and death and resurrection. In John 
this overshadows the idea of sacrifice and leads Vincent 
Taylor to conclude that John has a weaker grasp of the 
meaning of Jesus' death than has Paul. (op. cit. p.156).
Yet the same eschatological interpretation of the Cross is 
apparent in Paul when his thought is released from the bonds 
imposed by sacrificial concepts. While the 'word of the Cross' 
is the substance of Paul's gospel, it is understood as the 
proclamation of the total salvation-event, which includes 
the resurrection. Furthermore, Paul stresses the presentness 
of the new aeon.
"The old order has gone, and a new order has already 
begun." (2 Cor. 5;17, N.E.B.).
In the second place, the attempt to confine the
presentation of the death of Jesus to sacrificial categories
has led so-called theories of the atonement into gross
absurdity, or into an objectivity which leaves an unbridged
gap between the Cross and the believer. For what does Jesus'
death, reckoned as a sacrifice, accomplish? The transference
of the penal consequences of sin from man to Jesus? The
satisfaction of God's justice so that he is free to forgive
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sinners? A change in the attitude of God towards sinful 
man? The conservation of ethical values in a world of moral 
realities? Is Jesus1 sacrifice of his life an example of 
heroism and love which arouses a responsive love and devotion 
in man?
In each case the dynamic relational quality of 
faith tends to be obscured. The individual is left as it 
were at a distance to observe what is claimed to be the 
objective fact of the sacrificial death and to accept the 
further claim that this death in the distant past somehow 
effected a change in his status before God. fYIan remains a 
spectator of a wondrous action of God. The crude object­
ivity of such a view of the Cross is sometimes modified in 
the attempt to involve the individual more directly in the 
sacrificial act. Taylor, for example, affirms that the 
saving deed of Christ and the appropriation of his work by 
faith
"together constitute the Atonement". He goes on,
"UJe need an objective deed which in its sublimity 
stands apart from us, something which is there 
whether we accept it or not, something which is 
true whether we believe or whether we reject it, 
a stark irremovable reality which exists in its 
own right and which owes nothing to ourselves by 
way of creation or action. Such a reality is the 
saving deed of God in Christ. But we need also a 
believing response if this deed is to become 
effective in our relationships with God. This 
response is faith union with Christ." (31).
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Now although Taylor's argument appears to overcome 
the remoteness and unreality of the objective sacrificial 
view, we are left with two acts of faith - belief in the 
'fact' reported about Jesus' death as a sacrificial act,
'the saving deed', and a faith-commitment in terms of 
repentance, acknowledgement of guilt and self-surrender.
A further consequence of Taylor's view is that the gap 
between God and the individual is in part overcome by 
certain conditions fulfilled by the believer. In "The 
Atonement in New Testament Teaching", he speaks of the 
moral conditions which are necessary if man is to be 
reconciled to God, namely, repentance, obedience and 
submission to the will of God. (p.195).
The difficulty lies in the assumption that 'the 
saving deed' can be observed objectively. But that the 
death of Jesus is a saving deed is not an immediately 
accessible 'fact'. Hie cannot properly speak of Jesus' 
death as having redemptive significance apart from a prior 
relationship of faith. It is only as in faith I recognise 
and accept in the life and death of Jesus God's judgment and 
forgiveness that I can speak of a saving deed. Hie may from 
within the faith relationship think of Jesus' death as 
having sacrificial qualities, but this follows upon the
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acceptance of the message concerning the life and death 
of Jesus as a message of judgment and hope, a message about 
God's being-for-us in the present.
UJe conclude that notwithstanding the use made of 5 
sacrificial concepts in the New Testament witness to the 
Cross, they are in themselves inadequate to express the full 
significance of the salvation-occurrence as an eschatological 
event. Sacrificial categories, regarded in isolation, lead 
to an almost mechanical objectivity and to the necessity 
of justifying the ways of God in terms of his subjection to 
"moral realities". (32). But the result is far from 
convincing. In spite of the use of such terms as 'particip­
ation' (op. cit. p.265). and 'appropriation' ("The Cross of 
jChrist"p.l00f.), the saving event remains separated from the 
present by an extending period of history; faith inevitably 
presupposes a 'believing that'; and the Cross is either 
reduced to a moral example or affirmed as a substitutionary 
sacrifice•
We turn now to a consideration of the Cross in 
relation to the formative theological thought of Rudolf 
Bultmann.
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THE CROSS
and
NEW TESTAIY1ENT MYTHOLOGY
It is immediately apparent to a modern reader of 
the Gospels that the view of the world held by the authors 
is fundamentally different from that of a man living in an 
age of science. The difference may be a source of bewilder­
ment and raise difficulties that are not at all related to 
the essential gospel proclamation. The urgent need is to 
examine the question whether the gospel is bound to its 
particular world view. The name of Rudolf Bultmann is in­
extricably associated with the attempt to grasp the meaning 
of the kerygmatic proclamation through the interpretation of 
the mythological terms in which it is expressed.
In religious terms, a myth may be defined as the 
attempt to express in concrete objective terms a particular 
aspect of the mystery of human existence in relation to 
transcendent realities, Bultmann writes,
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"(Ylyths express the knowledge that man is not master 
of the world and of his life, that the world within 
which he lives is full of riddles and mysteries and 
that human life also is full of riddles and mysteries, 
mythology expresses a certain understanding of 
human existence. It believes that the world and 
human life have their ground and their limits in a 
power which is beyond all that we can calculate or 
control, mythology speaks about this power inadequate­
ly and insufficiently because it speaks about it as 
if it were a worldly power. It speaks of gods who 
represent the power beyond the visible, comprehensible 
world. It speaks of gods as if they were men and of 
their actions as human actions, although it conceives 
of the gods as endowed with superhuman power and of 
their actions as incalculable, as capable of breaking 
the normal, ordinary order of events. It may be 
said that myths give to the transcendent reality an 
immanent, this-worldly objectivity. " (l).
Now when we look at the Gospels we find that one of
the characteristic references is to the Kingdom of God. It is
a matter of common agreement among New Testament scholars that
the Kingdom was generally understood as something whose coming
was imminent and which would be inaugurated by a cosmic act
of God. Certainly Jesus, the earliest church and Paul
expected the Kingdom of God to come in the immediate future.
However, "this hope of Jesus and the early Christian 
community was not fulfilled. The same world still 
exists and history continues. The course of history 
has refuted mythology. For the conception ’Kingdom of 
God' is mythological, as is the conception of the 
eschatological drama. Just as mythological are the 
presuppositions of the expectation of the Kingdom of 
God, namely, the theory that the world, although 
created by God, is ruled by the devil, Satan, and that 
his army, the demons, is the cause of all evil, sin
and disease. The whole conception of the world which
is presupposed in the preaching of Jesus as m  the Few
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Testament generally is mythological; i.e., the 
conception of the world as being structured in 
three stories, heaven, earth and hell; the 
conception of the intervention of supernatural 
powers in the course of events; and the conception 
of miracles, especially the conception of the inter­
vention of supernatural powers in the inner life of 
the soul, the conception that men can be tempted 
and corrupted by the devil and possessed by evil 
spirits. This conception of the world we call 
mythological because it is different from the con­
ception of the world which has been formed and 
developed by science since its inception in ancient 
Greece and which has been accepted by all modern 
men. In this modern conception of the world the 
cause-and-effeet nexus is fundamental. Although 
modern physical theories take account of chance in 
the chain of cause and effect in subatomic phenomena, 
our daily living, purposes and actions are not 
affected. In any case, modern science does not 
believe that the course of nature can be interrupted 
or, so to speak, perforated, by supernatural powers." 
(op. cit. pp.14-15).
And it is not otherwise in the case of the modern study of
history. No historian proceeds with notions involving the
intervention of God or the devil or of demons in the course
of history.
"The question inevitably arises: is it possible that 
Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom of God still has 
any importance for modern men and the preaching of 
the New Testament as a whole is still important for 
modern men? The preaching of the New Testament 
proclaims Jesus Christ, not only his preaching of 
the Kingdom of God but first of all his person, 
which was mythologized from the very beginnings of 
earliest Christianity...His person is viewed in the 
light of mythology when he is said to have been 
begotten of the Holy Spirit and born of a virgin, 
and this becomes clearer still in Hellenistic 
Christian communities where he is understood to be
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the Son of God in a metaphysical sense, a great, 
pre-existent heavenly being who became man for the 
sake of our redemption and took on himself suffering, 
even the suffering of the cross." (op. cit. pp 16-17).
Bultmann believes that "for modern man the mytho­
logical conception of the world, the conceptions of 
eschatology, of redeemer and of redemption, are over 
and done with." (op. cit. p.17).
These extensive references to Bultmann's own words 
serve to outline the extent to which he is prepared to apply 
the method of demythologizing to the New Testament. It is not 
the purpose of this chapter to discuss the scope or the limits 
of demythologizing but rather to show how as a hermeneutic 
method it may enable the 'word of the Cross' to confront man ^
with a decision which is meaningful in terms of his present 
existence.
This leads us to notice another important feature of 
Bultmann's work, namely, his use of existentialist philosophy 
in his biblical interpretation. In defence of his position 
Bultmann draws attention to the undeniable fact
"that every interpreter brings with him certain 
conceptions, perhaps idealistic or psychological, 
as presuppositions of his exegesis... But then the 
question arises, which conceptions are right and 
adequate? Which presuppositions are right and 
adequate?" (op. cit. p.48).
Now Bultmann clearly distinguishes between presuppositions in
respect of results and presuppositions in respect of method.
In other words, exegesis is not determined by any pre­
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suppositions as to what the results of the exegesis should 
be. He regards his existential philosophy as providing a 
method of putting questions to the New Testament. It is 
obvious that if we ask the wrong questions we shall not be 
able to interpret the New Testament aright. The 'right 
question' arises from the problem of man's existence.
"This is, then, the basic presupposition for every 
form of exegesis: that your own relation to the 
subject-matter prompts the question you bring to 
the text and elicits the answers you obtain from 
the text." (op. cit. p.51).
UJhat question do we bring to the Scriptures?
Bultmann affirms that
"the right question to frame with regard to the Bible
... is the question of human existence. I am
driven to that by the urge to inquire existentially 
about my own existence." (2)
This question is integral to the question about God.
"lYlan has a knowledge of God in advance, though not of
the revelation of God, that is, of his action in
Christ. He has a relation to God in his search for 
God, conscious or unconscious. Ilian's life is moved 
by the search for God because it is always moved, 
consciously or unconsciously, by the question about 
his own personal existence. The question of God and 
the question of myself are identical." (3).
In Bultmann's view, what we might call the religious question
appears as the existential question.
We have already discussed the insight which an 
existential theology provides into the meaning of sin and
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guilt, (chapter 2), and noted that fallen or inauthentic 
existence is characterized by anxiety, care, the tendency 
towards depersonalization, and the fear of ultimate 
meaninglessness and annihilation. Out of this fallen 
condition man asks the question of his being and existence, 
li/hat is man's true life? How is it to be secured? What is 
authentic existence?
How then, is the ’word of the Cross’ to be under­
stood in non-mythological terms and from within the context 
of man’s existential concern for his true life?
Bultmann believes, as every Christian theologian 
must, that God has acted in Jesus Christ. This is the 
fundamental assumption of all attempts to comprehend 
Christian faith and experience. But in what sense can we 
speak non-mythologically of the action of God? Clearly, if 
we think of God’s action in Christ as an observable inter­
vention in the course of historical events we remain bound to 
mythological concepts. For Bultmann, the action of God is 
not to be thought of as an action which happens as an inter­
vention into history from a supernatural realm. Rather it is 
an action which happens within the course of worldly events, 
In other words, the action of God in the events of history 
remains hidden from every eye, except the eye of faith. _.e
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cannot discern the action of God from the detached, objective
standpoint of a scientific observer. The action of God can
be recognised? only in relation to the question u/hich I ask
concerning my own existence. UJe cannot, therefore, speak of
God as acting in a general way.
"God’s action generally, in nature and history, is 
hidden from the believer just as much as from the 
non-believer. But in so far as he sees what comes 
upon him here and now in the light of the divine 
word, he can and must take it as God's action."
(op. cit. p. 64).
For the believer, therefore, the scientific world­
view does not comprehend the whole reality of the world and 
of human life. Certainly events may be investigated and 
found to be completely intelligible within a natural and 
historical connection. Nevertheless, the man of faith may 
discern in these events an action of God in relation to his 
particular existence. And only in this way can we speak of an 
act of God.
"I can speak only of what God does here and now with 
me, of what he speaks here and now to me." (op. cit.p.66).
UJe can speak of an act of God only when we are personally
involved in the action in which we find ourselves addressed,
judged or accepted by God. The act of God is therefore 
inseparable from the existential relation between God ana man. 
"Statements which speak of God’s actions as cosmic
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events are illegitimate. The affirmation that God 
is creator cannot be a theoretical statement about 
God as creator mundi in a general sense. The affirm­
ation can only be a personal confession that I under­
stand myself to be a creature which owes its existence
to God. It cannot be made as a neutral statement
but only as thanksgiving and surrender. Moreover, 
statements which describe God’s action as cultic 
action, for example,that he offered his Son as a 
sacrificial victim, are not legitimate, unless they 
are understood in a purely symbolic sense." (op. cit. 
pp. 69-70),
Now the New Testament commonly speaks of God’s act 
in Jesus Christ as an act of grace. How are we to understand 
this affirmation? It is important to grasp the way in which 
Bultmann speaks of grace. Grace is not a quality of God which
may be observed in a general way; it is rather an event in
which we experience God's gracious action towards us personally,
"God’s grace is not a quality, not his timeless kindli­
ness, and what the Gospel brings is not enlightenment 
as to God's hitherto misunderstood nature as if till 
now he had been wrongly conceived as wrathful and 
ought hencforth to be regarded as gracious. On the 
contrary! Now, as then, ’God’s wrath’ pours out 
’against all ungodliness and wickedness of men’.
(Rom.1:18)... God continues to be the Judge, and 
Christian faith in the grace of God does not consist 
in the conviction that God’s wrath does not exist or 
that there is no threateningly impending judgment, 
but the conviction of being rescued from God’s wrath."
(40.
The 'wrath of God’ must not be understood as an 
emotion, wrathfulness. ’wrath of God’ means an occurrence, 
namely, the judgment of God. Nan, under the conditions ov
-145-
inauthentic existence stands under the judgment, or ujrath of 
God. In Romans 1:18-32 the wrath of God is identified with 
fflhat factually takes place in the life of the heathen: 
abandonment to the ’lusts of their hearts’, to ’dishonourable 
passions', to a ’base mind'. And the 'day of wrath' is the 
'day of judgment'. This day in which the verdict of condemn­
ation is pronounced has, however, its counterpart in the 
gift of 'eternal life', (Romans 2:7f), or of 'salvation', (l 
Thess. 5:9).
From this Bultmann concludes that
"God's grace is not his hitherto unknown or mis­
conceived graciousness, but is his now occurring 
act of grace. This act of grace does not, as it 
might seem, take the place of God's previous 
judgeship, but is his gracious dealing precisely 
as the Judge... The grace of God... is not a mode 
of dealing which God has decided henceforth to 
adopt, but is a single deed which takes effect 
for everyone who recognises it as such and 
acknowledges it (in faith) - 'grace' is God's 
eschatological deed." (op. cit. p.289. Italics 
author's)
The grace of God therefore, is the event in which 
God both judges me and restores to me my lost possibility of 
authentic existence. It is the event in which I see my 
inauthentic life judged and condemned, my past blotted out 
in the divine forgiveness and my future seen as the gift of 
God, in which there is the possibility of authentic existence, 
But what event is the event of grace? It is the
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event constituted by the saving event which God wrought in 
Jesus Christ.
"The deed of divine grace consists in the fact that 
God gave Christ up to die on the Cross.” (op. cit.
P_».2 92).
Yet, for St Paul, the salvation-occurrence includes both the 
death and the resurrection of Jesus. He sometimes speaks of 
the death alone, e.g. Romans 3:24f.; of the resurrection, e.g. 
Romans 1:4, 10:9 ; or of both together, e.g. Romans 4:25, 1 Cor. 
15:3f. The death-and-resurrection form the decisive content 
of the salvation-occurrence.
Now the New Testament, as we have seen, speaks of the 
Cross in sacrificial terms drawn from the Jewish cult. Christ 
is seen as the sacrifice whose blood atones for sin. He bears 
the punishment of sin in place of the sinner. Hie noted at the 
end of the last chapter, however, the extraordinary difficulties 
which beset the theologian when he tries to interpret such 
statements drawn from the sacrificial cult, as matters of fact. 
All theories of atonement have run into difficulty, if not into 
sheer absurdity, when working from this assumption. Bultmann 
observes that the sacrificial categories do not contain Paul's 
characteristic view. Already, he claims, 5t Paul is bursting 
open the categories of Jewish thought.
"Christ bought us freedom from the curse of the law
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by becoming for our sake an accursed thing...so that 
uie might receive the promised Spirit through faith." 
(Galatians 3:13-14)(N.E.B.).
Here the thought of the death of Sesus as a sacrifice which 
frees from the punishment of sin is translated into the under­
standing of his death as
"the means of release from the powers of this age:
Law, Sin and Death." (op. cit. p.298).
The event of grace puts an end to our inauthentic existence
under God’s judgment, and offers forgiveness and liberation
from the powers of this world,
Now the recognition of the event of grace in the
Christ and the new understanding of oneself under that grace
is a single act. There is therefore, no initial preliminary
belief in the pre-existent Son of God followed and completed
by an act of self-surrender in faith to Christ.
"Paul can speak of Christ as ’the Son of God who 
loved me and gave himself for me’ only as the Paul 
who has waived his own righteousness and given up 
his self (his ego) to die. He knows of that Christ 
only by knowing himself anew in the same act of 
recognition. From the outset, Paul, the ’zealot' 
for the 'traditions of the fathers', understood the 
proclamation of Christ the Son of God and Lord when 
it reached him as the demand that he give up his 
former sort of 'zeal for God’ ", (op. cit. p. 301).
To believe in the cross of Christ is not to believe that an
objective event once happened - even the non-believer may
accept as historical fact the death of Gesus oi Nazerei-h - Lhk.
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to recognise in this act of God in uihich my past is 
judged and condemned, and in which I am forgiven and offered 
authentic being. In this way the Cross is present to me, 
not as a mere past event, but as an eschatological event, 
in which I understand myself in a new way, as one both 
condemned and forgiven, as one whose old life of striving 
for self-sufficiency is brought to an end and who accepts 
his true life as the gift of God.
The proclamation of the Cross confronts me with a
decision-question: how am I to understand my life? The
proclamation of the event of grace is itself a call for faith,
- a call to give up my previous self-understanding and to 
'be reconciled to God'. This decision is a constantly 
repeated decision which must be ever renewed.
"This is the decision-question which 'the word of the 
cross' thrusts upon the hearer: whether he will
acknowledge that God has made a crucified one Lord; 
whether he will thereby acknowledge the demand to 
take up the cross by the surrender of his previous 
understanding of himself, making the cross the 
determining power of his life, letting himself be 
crucified with Christ ( 1 Cor. 1:18-31; Gal. 6:14). 
The fact that this acknowledgment does take place 
demonstrates that Christ’s death is a 'cosmic' event;
i.e. that it may no longer be considered as just the 
historical event of 3esus' crucifixion on Golgotha. 
For God made this event the eschatological 
occurrence, so that, lifted out of all temporal 
limitation, it continues to take place in any 
present moment, both in the proclaiming word ano 
in the sacraments," (op. cit. p. dOd)
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Bultmann understands the resurrection in relation to 
the proclamation. The resurrection is not an historical 
happening centred around an empty tomb, which may be in­
vestigated like any historical happening and judged as 
being truth or fantasy. Nor is the resurrection to be 
thought of as the continuing influence of 3esus of Nazareth 
in the lives of his followers. UJhat takes place is that in 
the proclamation, the fate of an historical person is raised 
to the rank of the eschatological event.
"The word which makes this proclamation is itself a 
part of this event; and this word, in contrast to 
all other historical tradition, accosts the hearer 
as personal challenge. If he heeds it as the word 
spoken to him, adjudicating to him death and thereby 
life, then he believes in the risen Christ." (op. cit. 
p.306).
In summary, we may say that for Bultmann the 
salvation-occurrence, God's act, the grace of God, is to be 
understood as existential-historical. In so far, therefore, 
as the Cross and resurrection are saving events and are pro­
claimed as such, they are not past occurrences of world 
history but open to man a new self-understanding and new 
possibilities, namely, forgiveness and a new life. They are 
thus understood as existential-historical happenings. 
Interpreted from an existential point of view, cue 'word 01 
the Cross' confronts me with a decision concerning the question
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u/hich I ask out of the depths of my inauthentic existence.
Here the 'scandal' of the Cross stands revealed, for it 
demands a decision which means the repudiation of all efforts 
to justify myself or to find security in good works or 
ascetic practices, and the acceptance of God's righteousness 
in which I find reconciliation and new life.'
How does Bultmann interpret the terms 'righteous­
ness' and 'reconciliation'?
"That which was brought to light by the occurrence 
of salvation in Christ, and which is the content of 
'the gospel', is the new possibility of a 'righteous­
ness' which shall be a 'righteousness of God' (Romans 
l:16f.; 3:21)". (op. cit. p. 271).
Righteousness is primarily a forensic term, and does not mean 
the ethical quality of a person. Righteousness is therefore 
not something that a person has as his own, but rather is 
something which he has by virtue of a verdict pronounced 
upon him. Now in Oewish piety the forensic term righteous­
ness became an eschatological term. In other words, the pious 
Jew sought by his endeavours to observe the whole Law, to 
fulfil the conditions which would ensure God's verdict: 
'righteous!' For Paul also, righteousness was a forensic- 
eschatological term. But. Paul affirmed thac righteousness 
is at the same time a present reality, (l Cor. 6:11, Romans 
9:30).
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"The paradoxicality of his assertion is this: God 
already pronounces his eschatological verdict (over 
the man of faith) in the present; the 
eschatological event is already present reality, 
or, rather, is beginning in the present. Therefore, 
the righteousness which God adjudicates to man 
(the man of faith) is not 'sinlessness' in the 
sense of ethical perfection, but is 'sinlessness1 
in the sense that God does not 'count' man's sin 
against him (2 Cor. 5:19)." (op. cit. p. 276).
Bultmann thus avoids the perplexities that follow upon a
misunderstanding of righteousness as an ethical quality of
a man. The term refers to his relation to God, who has
absolved him from his sin by his gracious verdict.
Now according to Paul, man is justified or 
declared righteous.,t apart from works of the law.
"Our argument is that a man is justified by faith 
quite apart from success in keeping the law."
(Romans 3:28) (N.E .B.).
Righteousness cannot be won by human effort, nor does any
human accomplishment establish it; it is sheer gift. The
conditions of salvation have therefore been provided by God -
he has pronounced his verdict. And so Paul goes on to ask,
"UJhat room is left for boasting?" (Romans 3:27, N.E.B.). All
boasting is excluded. Now boasting in one's accomplishments
is the essence of sin and the direct opposite of faith. Faith is
"the attitude of man in which he receives the gift 
of 'God's righteousness' and in which the divine 
deed of salvation accomplishes itself with him".
( op. cit. p.314).
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Faith's attitude is therefore the radical opposite of the 
attitude of boasting. And this attitude of faith is the 
substance of our obedience to God,
"As true obedience, 'faith' is freed from the 
suspicion of being an accomplishment, a 'work'.
As an accomplishment it mould not be obedience, 
since in an accomplishment the mill does not 
surrender but asserts itself; in it, a merely 
formal renunciation takes place in that the mill 
lets the content of its accomplishment be dictated 
by an authority lying outside of itself, but pre­
cisely in so doing thinks it has a right to be proud 
of its accomplishment. 'Faith1 - the radical re­
nunciation of accomplishment, the obedient submission 
to the God-determined may of salvation, the taking 
over of the cross of Christ - is the free deed of 
obedience in mhich the nem self constitutes itself 
in place of the old. As this sort of decision, it 
is a deed in the true sense: In a true deed the doer 
himself is inseparable from it, mhile in a 'mork' 
he stands side by side rnith mhat he does." (op. cit. 
pp. 315-6).
Faith, then, is not an 'experience', nor is it 
primarily remorse or repentance. They are included in it, 
but faith is primarily the obedience mhich maives righteous­
ness of one's ornn.
The corollary of that righteousness mhich is the 
obedience of faith that maives all claim to self righteousness, 
is reconciliation. The man mhose obedience is the obedience of 
faith is reconciled. Reconciliation, therefore, does not 
primarily denote a subjective experience, as though as a
consequence of any alteration in man's attitude to Gou, ne
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might be said to be reconciled to God.
"UJhen me mere God's enemies me mere reconciled to 
him... UJe also exult in God through our Lord Jesus, 
through mhom me have nom been granted reconciliation." 
(Romans 5:10-11, N.E.B. ff!y italics).
On the other hand, the 'message of reconciliation' carries
mith it the invitation to make the subjective response, 'be
reconciled to God'. ( 2 Cor. 5: 19.20 N.E.B.).
"The 'mord of reconciliation' then, is not the 
conciliatory and reconciling mord but the pro­
clamation of the already accomplished reconciliation, 
and 'be reconciled' is the invitation to faith."
(op. cit. p. 287).
UJe must nom turn to consider the question me 
mentioned earlier, namely, the structure of authentic 
existence.
Authentic existence may be described as man's
recovery of his true being, made possible by God's act of
grace in Jesus Christ. Bultmann defines salvation as
"nothing else than the fulfilment of man's 
authentic intention to life, to his true self, 
mhich had been perverted by sin." (5).
It is a genuine life of faith, in mhich there is a steady
orientation of the self to the possibilities of existence
mhich arise out of the nem self-understanding given to man
in the act of grace • And tne preoominari c ci larai, uor j. a l,ic
of the life of faith is freedom.
In the Nem Testament man Is represented as enslaver1
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to the personified poujers of sin and death, and to the rulers 
of the cosmos. Hflan in the conditions of his inauthentic 
existence is a slave of anxiety, fear and care. His controll­
ing concern is to justify himself. The future is regarded 
without hope because the past constantly overshadows it. In 
the life of faith, however, there is true freedom in which the 
old understanding of the self as sufficient unto itself is 
given up. Concern with the world and the mastery of things, 
the quest for righteousness through observance of a legalistic 
moral code, confidence in wisdom and technological competence, 
or the resolve to live in an attitude of bold despair, all are 
abandoned. The present is affirrped as the time in which 
authentic, eschatological existence is a possibility, as the 
time in which the decision to act in faith or unfaith is 
constantly repeated. In the decision of faith, there is 
revealed the freedom which is openness for the future.
is
’’The power of the flesh binds man to the p§st, the 
power of the spirit gives the freedom which dis­
closes the future.” (6).
’’Faith is the abandonment of man's own security and 
readiness to find security only in the unseen beyond, 
in God.” (7).
Yet it is in this freedom that one is committed to 
a new servitude, the paradoxical freedom which is servitude 
and the servitude which is freedom. One becomes both the
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slave of Christ and a freedman of Christ ( ICor. 7:22-3).
In the freedom of authentic existence uue are to live by the 
Spirit; in living by the Spirit we express genuine freedom.
And above all, to live by the Spirit is to serve one another 
(Gal. 5:13), and to be a slave of all (l Cor. 9:19). This 
is the new obedience which reveals the genuineness of faith.
Here the inseparable connection between faith and love is
secured. Love is not an ideal, an emotion, or a general
attitude of benevolence towards mankind. Love is always a
particular concrete demand in a particular 'now*. It is the
demand to see in the neighbour who is at hand, one to whom 
I am responsible in the context of a relation between I and Thou. 
For it is in the other that I meet the God who is demanding.
Criticism of Bultmann's work tends to concentrate 
upon the assertion that in it the Christian faith is scarcely 
to be distinguished from a philosophy of human existence.
Faith is dissolved into self-understanding, the 'objective' 
acts of God become mere symbols of a new orientation to the 
world. Bultmann is accused of retaining mythological language 
when he speaks of God as acting. And on the other hand, it is 
questioned whether the Christian faith can be reduced to 
existential statements without a remaining transcendent element 
which can only be expressed in mythological terms.
-156-
Ule do not wish to enter upon a detailed critique 
of Bultmann's theology. But something may be said in so 
far as the criticisms relate to the Cross.
Bultmann's assertion that such a statement as that 
God offered his Son as a sacrificial victim is not legitimate 
unless understood in a purely symbolic sense may appear to 
deprive the salvation-occurrence of all objectivity. But 
the difficulty appears only because a false emphasis is 
placed upon the distinction between subject and object in the 
faith relationship. It is not possible to reduce the complex 
relationship between God and the believer which exists in 
genuinely personal and historical faith to a near subject- -b / 
object schema. The attempt to achieve such an apparently 
clear distinction leads either to a naive subjectivism in 
which faith becomes a mere sentiment or to an equally naive 
objectivism in which faith becomes the intellectual acceptance 
of the pronouncements of an 'infallible' authority, be it 
Bible, Pope, Confession or Council.
Hie may properly speak of the Cross as a redemptive 
event and as a ground of faith, but we must also emphasise 
that it is only apprehended as such within the faith 
relationship. The principle Is the same in our persons! 
relationships. Love cannot be defined or unders.-.ood o b j eu r_-
ively, but becomes a reality only uiithin the risks and 
tensions, the joys and the freedoms of the love relationship. 
We cannot prove the existence of God, nor can me observe the 
slavation-occurrence in a detached manner. Hie can speak of 
God only in terms of what he is doing to us and with us, and 
can acknowledge certain events as having redemptive signif­
icance only in so far as we participate in those events.
This is not a purely subjective experience, but carries 
with it an inescapable awareness of the Other. For in the 
decision-situation of faith we become certain both of our 
own personal identity and the reality of the One who confronts 
us with the necessity for decision. Therefore in the 
message concerning the Christ which comes to me in the 
preaching of the Uiord and in which I am offered a new 
possibility of understanding my own existence, I confess 
the real presence of the Christ as the saving event. There 
can be nothing in my experience which is more certainly 
objective, or more profoundly subjective. For in faith I 
understand myself anew, and this understanding can be main­
tained only as an ever renewed response to the Word of God 
which proclaims his action in the Christ. I do not speak of 
the saving event as an event in the distant past which some­
how secures my future beyond death, but as that which gives me
life in the present.
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£ II £
THE CROSS 
in the
THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH
Tillich pursued his theological work with the 
conviction that the task of theology is twofold: to affirm 
and to interpret. Not only must the Christian message be 
proclaimed, it must also be interpreted in a manner relevant 
to the temporal situation in which it is proclaimed. In 
other words, theology has both a kerygmatic and an apologetic 
function. Placing himself on the boundary between philosophy 
and theology, Tillich has wrestled to interpret each to the 
other in a manner unique among contemporary theologians.
Tillich establishes common ground between philosophy 
and theology in his claim that both are concerned with the 
ontological question of being.
"Philosophy and theology ask the question of being. 
But they ask it from different perspectives. 
Philosophy deals with the structure of being in 
itself; theology deals with the meaning of being 
for us." (l).
Theology deals with the question of being in so far as it
-160-
is a matter of ultimate concern. This means that theology 
must combine an ontological and an existential aspect.
Now the existentialist analysis of man describes 
a situation in which the individual is filled with anxiety 
and threatened with meaninglessness. He is aware of the 
conflicts in his life, both within and in relation to the 
world. And out of the depth of his predicament, man is 
driven to ask the question of his being. The question 
becomes a matter of ultimate concern. But is there an 
answer, and if so, where is it to be found? Here we meet 
Tillich's distinctive 'method of correlation', which is 
fundamental to his whole theological system. He affirms 
both the independence and interdependence of existential 
questions and theological answers.
"Question and answer are independent of each other, 
since it is impossible to derive the answer from 
the question or the question from the answer. The 
existential question, namely, man himself in the 
conflicts of his existential situation, is not the 
source for the revelatory answer formulated by 
theology. One cannot derive the divine self­
manifestation from an analysis of the human 
predicament." (2).
On the other hand, it is equally wrong to try to derive
the question implied in human existence from the revelatory
answer.
"The revelatory answer is meaningless if there is
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no question to which it is the answer. Iffan cannot 
receive an answer to a question he has not asked." 
(op. cit. p.15).
Yet correlation also implies that in some respects 
questions and answers are dependent. But this dependence can 
be comprehended only from within the 'theological circle' of 
commitment to the revelatory answer.
"This circle can be understood as an ellipse... and 
described in terms of two central points - the 
existential question and the theological answer.
Both are within the sphere of the religious commit­
ment, but they are not identical." (op. cit. p. 16).
From within the circle, therefore, the theologian can direct
the question of man's being and his predicament, (in which he
shares), to the revelatory answer,(by which he is grasped).
"The question implied in human finitude is directed 
toward the answer: the eternal. The question 
implied in human estrangement is directed toward 
the answer: forgiveness." (op. cit. p.17).
If the Christian message is to be understood, the 
existential questions must be allowed to influence the 
theological answer. This is the other side of correlation. 
UJhile the substance of the answer is independent of the 
question, the form must allow itself to be in large measure 
determined by the situation in which the question is asked 
and the manner in which it is expressed, only in this way 
can the message be seen to be relevant.
Although it is not our purpose to discuss the
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criticisms of Tillich's method of correlation which have
come in particular from the Barthian theologians, it will
be helpful to remind ourselves of the basic presupposition
which lies behind Tillich's whole theological enterprise.
It is the affirmation of an essential relationship between
God and man in the depth of being which survives man's
estrangement from God.
"lYlan discovers himself when he discovers God; he 
discovers something that is identical with himself 
although it transcends him infinitely, something 
from which he is estranged, but from which he 
never has been and never can be separated." (3).
A fundamental distinction in theological thought
is that between essential and existential being. The problem
is to understand the nature of the distinction and to
account for the split between essence and existence.
Tillich uses the symbol of the 'Fall' as a scheme in which
to consider the transition from essence to existence.
"It points, first, to the possibility of the Fall; 
second, to its motives; third, to the event itself; 
and fpurth, to its consequences." (4).
The Fall is possible because man is free. Here we face the
most difficult and most dialectical point in the doctrine
of creation and also the most mysterious point in human
experience. For to be a creature
"means both to be rooted in the creative ground of
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the divine life and to actualise one's self 
through freedom. Creation is fulfilled in the 
creaturely self-realisation uihich simultaneously 
is freedom and destiny. But it is fulfilled 
through separation from the creative ground 
through a break between essence and existence. 
Creaturely freedom is the point at which creation 
and fall coincide." (5).
Fully developed creatureliness is therefore fallen
creatureliness•
In discussing the motives driving to the transition
Tillich uses the concept of 'dreaming innocence'.
"Both words point to something that precedes 
actual existence." (op. cit. vol. 2 p.58).
Now the state of 'dreaming innocence' is one of non-actualised
potentiality. But the state of 'dreaming innocence' drives
beyond itself and
"the possibility of the transition to existence is 
experienced as temptation. " (op. cit. vol. 2 p.39).
Temptation is possible because the state of 'dreaming
innocence' is not one of perfection, in which there is the
conscious union of existence and essence, transcending both,
as in God. In his awareness of his finitude man is subject
to anxiety, but he is at the same time conscious of his freedom.
"One could call man's freedom 'freedom in anxiety' or 
'anxious freedom'." (op. cit. vol. 2, p.39).
Now the sense of finitude and anxious freedom give rise to
the temptation to actualise freedom. Tillich observes that in
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the Genesis story the divine prohibition already presupposes 
the element of aroused freedom, otherwise the prohibition 
would not have been necessary. The command is necessary 
because there is already a split between creator and creature. 
The tension within the state of 'dreaming innocence* occurs
"in the moment in which finite freedom becomes 
conscious of itself and tends to become actual."’
(op. cit. vol.2, p.40).
On the one hand, 'dreaming innocence1 wants to preserve Itself,
while on the other hand aroused freedom strives for actual
expression.
"Wan is caught between the desire to actualise his 
freedom and thfe demand to preserve Ills dreaming 
innocence. In the power of his finite freedom, he 
decides for actualisation." (op. cit. vol.2, p.40}.
The transition from essence to existence, says
Tillich, is the original fact. In mythological language it
is seen as an event in the past, but the meaning of the myth
is that the transition is a universal quality of finite being.
"In every individual act the estranged or fallen 
character of being actualises itself." (op. cit. 
vol.2. p.43).
lUhat then becomes of the element of moral responsibility In 
the myth? Tillich affirms that existence Is rooted both In 
ethical freedom and in tragic destiny.
"Their unity is the great problem cf the doctrine 
of man." (op. cit. p.45). Tillich refers tc the
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insights of analytic psychology and analytic sociology, which 
show how
"destiny and freedom, tragedy and responsibility, are 
interwoven in every human being from early childhood 
on and in all social and political groups in the 
history of mankind." (op. cit. p. 44).
Critics of Tillich have not been slow to point out
the ambiguity of his language in his treatment of creation and
fall. In saying that "there is a point in which creation and
the Fall coincide" (op. cit. p.50), and that "fully developed
creatureliness is fallen creatureliness" (op. cit. vol.l, p.284).
Tillich appears to suggest that sin is ontologically necessary
and not a matter of personal responsibility and guilt. Does
not his analysis make it necessary for man if he is to become
man to become sinner also? Kenneth Hamilton writes,
"His system divides sin from moral responsibility".
(6) .
Tillich himself in reply to his critics simply reaffirms that
"Creation and the Fall coincide in so far as there 
is no point in time and space in which created 
goodness was actualised and had existence...
Actualised creation and estranged existence are 
identical. Only biblical literalism has the 
theological right to deny this assertion. He who 
excludes the idea of a historical stage of essential 
goodness should not try to escape the consequences." (7).
Although the realities of experience confirm the elements of 
tragic destiny and responsible freedom in man's decisions, tne
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unity of the elements remains an enigma.
The result of the transition from essence to 
existence is a situation of universal estrangement. The term 
is intended to convey the fact that man belongs essentially 
to that from which he is estranged. Yet it also expresses 
the characteristic mark of sin as described in the biblical 
literature. Hostility, strife, alienation, division and 
suspicion are the features of the classical description of 
man against himself and his world. Tillich would retain the 
term 'sin' in order to emphasise the personal character of 
estrangement.
"It expresses personal freedom and guilt in contrast 
to tragic guilt and the universal destiny of 
estrangement... The word has a sharpness which 
accusingly points to the element of personal 
responsibility in one's estrangement. Man's 
predicament is estrangement, but his estrangement 
is sin." (op. cit. vol. 2,p.53).
Sin must be distinguished from 'sins' understood
as deviations from moral laws.
"It is not the disobedience to a law which makes an 
act sinful but the fact that it is an expression of 
man's estrangement from God, from men, and from 
himself." (op. cit. p. 53).
Estrangement manifests itself in unbelief,
"the disruption of man's cognitive participation 
in God", and "the separation of man's will from 
the will of God... Gian's unbelief is his estrange­
ment from God in the centre of his being... The
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disruption of the essential unity with God is 
the innermost character of sin... Sin is a matter 
of our relation to God and not to ecclesiastical, 
moral, or social authorities." (Op. cit. vol. 2,pp54-6).
Estrangement is also understood as 1 hubris1, the desire for
potential infinity. It is the other side of unbelief.
"It is the turning towards one’s self as the 
centre of one's self and one's world." (op. cit. p.58).
'Hubris' manifests itself in the tendency to identify the
limited with the absolute, the partial with the ultimate.
F urthermore,
"no one is willing to acknowledge, in concrete terms, 
his finitude, his weakness and his errors, his 
ignorance and his insecurity, his loneliness and 
his anxiety. And if he is ready to acknowledge 
them, he makes another instrument of 'hubris* out 
of his readiness." (op. cit. pp.58-9).
A third aspect of estrangement is 'concupiscence', which
manifests itself in the desire for unlimited abundance, and
in the endless striving for sex and power, (op. cit. p.60).
This must of course be distinguished from proper self-
affirmation. It is rather the distortion of self-affirmation
into lust and selfishness.
Tillich distinguishes estrangement as fact and
as act.
"Sin is a universal fact before it becomes an 
individual act, or more precisely, sin as an 
individual act actualises the universal fact of 
estrangement... The destiny of estrangement is
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actualised by all free acts." (op. cit. p.64). 
Estrangement, however, cannot be explained in deterministic 
terms, by physical, biological, psychological or sociological 
methods.
"None of these explanations accounts for the 
feeling of personal responsibility that man 
has for his acts in the state of estrangement."
(op. cit. p. 65).
In the predicament of estrangement man is still aware of his
individual responsibility, yet is also liberated from
"the unrealistic assumption that in every moment 
he has the undetermined freedom to decide... for 
good or bad, for God or against him." (op. cit. p.65).
The consequence of estrangement is contradiction of
man's essential being, manifesting itself in what Tillich calls
■structures of destruction" (op. cit. p. 69). Disorder and
chaos, self-loss and u/orld-loss are characteristics of man's
predicament. The disruption of the self by drives that
cannot be brought into unity describes a self-loss which
also involves a disordered relation to the world. The
extreme manifestation of disintegration is in psychopatho-
logical disorders, in which there is a profound loss of
meaningful relation within the self and to the world.
"Such experiences are extreme, but extreme 
situations reveal possibilities in the ordinary 
situation." (op. cit. p.71).
In all men such disruption is present in some degree.
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Tillich relates all this to a conflict in the 
ontological polarities.
"Freedom is distorted into arbitrariness, destiny 
is distorted into mechanical necessity." (op. cit. 
P.73).
The polarity of dynamics and form is disrupted, so that 
creative drives degenerate into a frantic search for new 
experience, and form becomes an uncreative legalism. 
Individualisation and participation are separated, so that 
subjectivity tends towards isolation and loneliness and 
participation merges into a loss of identity in a depersonal­
ised collective, (op. cit. p.75-6).
Under the conditions of estrangement, finitude 
appears as the horror of death. The relation of this to the 
popular image of immortality and the description of the 
sacramental food of the Lord's Supper by the early Church 
teachers as the 'medicine of immortality' is obvious. Yet 
there is also the awareness that death as the loss of 
potential eternity is
"something for which one is responsible in spite of 
its tragic universality." (op. cit. p. 78).
Sin gives death its sting. Furthermore, in estrangement,
time is experienced without the 'eternal now' and becomes
a demonic power, destructive of man's strivings and
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producing despair. And finally, the insecurity and 
uncertainty which belong to man's essential finitude, but 
which are accepted in the power of the dimension of the 
eternal, become in the state of estrangement, the source 
of anxiety, doubt and meaninglessness.
"Doubt becomes absolute and drives toward a 
despairing refusal to accept any finite truth."
(op. cit. p. 84).
A destructive reaction to existential doubt and insecurity
is the attempt to make absolute a finite security or a
finite certainty. This is manifest in fanaticism, brutality
and dishonesty.
The final index of man's predicament is the state
of despair, the state of inescapable conflict. In despair
man has already come to the end of his possibilities, except
for suicide. Tillich relates the experience of despair to
the symbol of the 'wrath of God'. The satisfaction of God's
wrath has frequently been the foundation for descriptions of
the atoning work of Christ. In the death of Christ the
wrath of God finds its satisfaction and enables God to forgive
what has aroused his wrath. This crude interpretation
violates the majesty and integrity of God; yet the symbol
is not without meaning. Apart from reconciliation man
perceives God negatively, so to speak, as a threat to his
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being.
"He perceives God as the God of wrath, rightly so 
in preliminary terms, wrongly so in ultimate terms. 
But the theoretical knowledge that his experience 
of God as the God of wrath is not the final
experience of God does not remove the reality
of God as a threat to his being and nothing 
but a threat. Only the acceptance of forgiveness 
can transform the image of the wrathful God into
the ultimately valid image of the God of love."
(op. cit. p.89).
Following his analysis of the human predicament 
Tillich proceeds to discuss efforts toward self-salvation. 
Although religion is frequently identified with man's 
attempts at self-salvation, this ignores the ambiguity which 
religion shares with the whole of life in the situation of 
estrangement. Religion is also
"the place where life receives the conqueror of the 
ambiguities of life, the divine Spirit. Therefore, 
it is the sphere in which the quest for the New 
Being appears over against the split between 
essential and existential being... The quest for 
the New Being presupposes the presence of the New 
Being, as the search for truth presupposes the 
presence of truth." (op. cit. p. 93).
The tragedy of religion is that it distorts what it has
received and fails in what it tries to achieve. Nevertheless
it remains the sphere in which the quest for the Christ appears.
Tillich discusses six ways of self-salvation which
may be observed in the history of religion. The most 
conspicuous is the legalistic. Although, as in Judaism, tne 
law may be cherished as a divine gift, yet in the situation
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of estrangement laui becomes commandment, and its fulfilment 
becomes an impossibility. It leads to despair or to com­
promise - or the quest for a New Being. The attempt to restrict 
the libidinous drives and the will to power is found in 
asceticism as a way of self-salvation. Yet although 
conscious acts of self-abnegation may repress concupiscent 
tendencies, they are unable to overcome them. The disruptive 
power of repression is a commonplace of depth psychology.
Another form in which the ascetic tendency is manifested is 
in the puritan attitude to work, pleasure and business enter­
prise. This 'worldly asceticism1 is made the ground for the 
expectation of the divine blessing. A third method of self­
salvation is by way of mysticism. Tillich affirms that
"the mystical is the heart of every religion 
as religion." (op. cit. p.96).
It characterises the presence of the divine. But when
mysticism becomes a method of overcoming estrangement through
physical and mental exercises, it has become an attempt to
achieve self-salvation .
In addition to the legalistic, ascetic and mystical
ways of self-salvation, Tillich mentions the doctrinal, the
sacramental and the emotional. In doctrinal self-salvation
faith becomes belief in verbal formulations. But this
inevitably arouses further questions.
"The terrible inner struggles between the will it® 
be honest and the will to be sawed show the ffajULtuJir© 
of doctrinal self-salvation." (op. cit.
Closely linked is the sacramental approach, in which
salvation becomes dependent on a work of maim, in tlhiis case
the sacramental act performed by the priest and participated
in by the believer. The emotional form of self-salwatiam
represents the personal encounter with Sod which is fiiimdanetirtalL
to genuine religion. But the temptation to self-salwaticm is
present in all efforts to seek for a stereotyped conwsrsiem
experience. And in its distorted for®, piety represents a
striving which produces anxiety and amoves toward fanaticism.
Although ultimately ineffectual, attempts tm
achieve self-salvation represent the quest for a neut reality
which appears in all religions* Herein lies the tragic
predicament of man in the condition of estrangement. SSecauns®
he belongs essentially to that froa which he is estranged,, mam
is driven to seek reconciliation. But the attempts t® awertEarmffi
estrangement within the condition of estrangement lead cmly
to hard toil and bitter failure.
"Only a New Being can produce © msiuj action."’
(op. cit. p. 92)
Christianity affirms that the Christ is
"the bearer of the »ss Being in its final imam!
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Cop. cit. p. 102).
This affirmation expresses the inescapable paradox 
at the heart of Christianity. It is important to understand 
how Tillich uses the term.
"The Christian paradox contradicts the opinion 
derived from man’s existential predicament and 
all expectations imaginable on the basis of this 
predicament. The 'offence' given by the paradoxical 
character of the Christian message... is against 
man's ordinary interpretation of his predicament 
with respect to himself, his world, and the 
ultimate underlying both of them . It is an 
offence against man’s unshaken reliance upon him­
self, his self-saving attempts, and his resignation 
to despair... The appearance of the New Being under 
the conditions of existence, yet judging and 
conquering them, is the paradox of the Christian 
message. This is the only paradox and the source 
of all paradoxical statements in Christianity 
(op. cit. p. 106-7).
How then are we to understand the Christ in 
relation to God and man? In orthodox Christianity he is 
spoken of as the 'Mediator1 between God and man, Christianity 
has always rejected the concept of the Christ as a third 
reality between God and man, but in doing so its Christo- 
logical affirmations have tended towards doeetism and mono— 
physitism. Tillich finds the terra not to be without difficulty, 
since it can appear to suggest that God is dependent on the 
Mediator to perform his saving acts. (op. cit. p.195). The. 
essential function of the Mediator is to represent God to sen,
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This is to be understood in terms of the paradox
"that in one personal life essential manhood has 
appeared under the conditions of existence without 
being conquered by them." (op. cit. p.108).
The Christ represents to those who live in the condition of
estrangement what man essentially is and ought to be. It is
in this sense that he mediates God to man. He manifests the
eternal relation of God to man. He is the bearer of the New
Being.
UJe now turn to consider Tillich's treatment of the 
event which according to the Christian message fulfilled the 
expectations for a new reality, the historical event 
concerning the man of Nazareth, called 'the Christ'.
Christian theology cannot ignore the fact to which 
the name of Jesus of Nazareth points. For theology affirms 
that the expectation of a new reality has been fulfilled 
under the conditions of existence. The New Being is not an 
idea but a reality in time and space. Yet theology at the 
same time affirms that this historical life, lived under the 
conditions of estrangement, manifests the conquest of these 
conditions. This man Jesus is the Christ. Christian theology 
affirms
"the actual fact to which the name of Jesus of 
Nazareth refers...and...the believing reception 
of Jesus as the Christ." (op. cit. p.114).
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But how much can we know of Desus of iazaretfi?
Tillich recognises that the attempt to discover a ■iniflua
of reliable facts about Jesus in order to provide a safe
foundation for the Christian faith has been a failure.
"There is no picture behind the biblical one 
which (can) be made scientifically probable."
(op. cit. p.118).
Ule cannot even be certain that he who came to be known as
the Christ was in fact named 'Jesus*, (op. cit. p.125).
In his radical scepticism regarding shat can be kmoum of
the Jesus of history Tillich goes so far as to take issue
with Bultmann. He accuses Bultifianm of 'existentialist
liberalism* in seeking a foundation for the Christian faith
in the message of Jesus with its call to decide for or
against the Kingdom of God. (op. cit. p.122).
"The situation of hawing to decide remains one 
of being under the Iasi. It does not transcend! 
the Old Testament situation, the situation of the 
quest for the Christ.1* (loc. cit.)
This, however, is a serious misunderstanding of Bultuiainiiri"s
position. As we have seen In a previous chapter, Bultimararn
does not try to establish by historical research a irainiiimiBin 
of historical facts upon which the Christian faith may he built. 
And it is precisely on account of his scepticism that 
Bultmann has been criticised for paying too little regexd! 
to history. In emphasising the aschstciogical call of lesus
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to decide for or against the Kingdom, Bultmann is looking 
to the kerygmatic proclamation of the primitive Church.
Although Tillich refuses to establish the Christian 
faith on the uncertainties of historical research, he does 
insist upon 'the factual element1 in the Christian event.
This is
"the factual transformation of reality in that 
personal life which the New Testament expresses 
in its picture of Jesus as the Christ." (op. cit. 
p.123).
But what are the features of that picture? Tillich refers 
to the words, deeds and sufferings which express the being 
of Jesus as the Christ, (op. cit. pp.139-42). Now this is 
not to suggest that Jesus is to be seen as a religious and 
moral teacher. Tillich insists that the words, deeds and 
sufferings are the expressions of the New Being in the Christ.
"Not his actions, but the being out of which his 
actions come makes him the Christ." (op. cit. p.141).
But Tillich also goes on to say,
"Our records do not give a psychological 
description of his development, piety, or 
inner conflicts. They show only the presence 
of the New Being in him under the conditions 
of existence." (op. cit. p. 143).
But he then proceeds to outline a picture of Jesus as the
Christ which looks very like a picture drawn from history.
"There are, in spite of all tensions, no traces of 
estrangement between him and God and consequently
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between him and himself and between him and his 
u/orld (in its essential nature)."(op. cit. pp.144-5).
"He experiences the anxiety of having to die... his 
finitude is manifested in his loneliness... he is 
deeply affected by the misery of the masses... we 
do not find symptoms of repression of doubt in the
picture of Jesus as the Christ... no traces of
fanaticism are present in the biblical picture."
(op. cit. pp.150-54).
Now what is all this if not considerable biographical detail?
It seems that in order to convince us that the New Being is
present in the Christ Tillich has described a mature and
integrated personality.
Is the Gospel then the handing on of this picture
for the admiration and inspiration of all who will but ponder
over it? It looks very like it, in which case we are back
with the old style liberal portraits of Jesus.
But how do we recognise from this picture the
reality of the New Being? Tillich says that the picture
itself mediates the transforming power of the Neui Being.
"The picture has this creative power, because the 
power of the New Being is expressed in and through 
it." (op. cit. p. 132-5).
Faith is an "immediate awareness" that arises in "those who
find themselves transformed into the state of faith." (op. cit.
p.131). Now although this would appear to suggest a reduction 
of the element of individual, existential decision, Tillich 
also holds that faith is a decision, (op. cit. p. 154j.
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One feels that Tillich is ambiguous and even contradictory 
in his discussion at this point. On the one hand, we are 
asked to contemplate the biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ which
"is guaranteed as an adequate expression of the 
transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as 
the Christ"(op. cit. p.132) - it is guaranteed
because the New leing itself transformed the first 
witnesses and enabled them to recognise in Jesus 
the New Being and to produce an adequate picture 
of him as the Christ-
but on the other hand we are told that faith cannot find a
foundation in certain unassailable historical facts. It
would appear that while we cannot speak of indubitable
historical facts, the ’picture of Jesus' is to be regarded
as having unquestionable accuracy. Furthermore, faith is
described as a decision, "an act of courage" (op. cit.p.134),
yet it is also an immediate awareness in those who find
themselves transformed into the state of faith. The words
'who find themselves transformed' suggests something rather
less than 'a daring act of courage'.
Tillich's concern is to show that the situation of
estrangement, which is man's predicament, has been overcome
in one personal life. Under the power of the New Being,
which is present in a fragmentary way in the disciples as
the drive within their quest for a new reality, the disciples
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themselves recognised in Jesus the New Being. The New Being
is new in Jesus in so far as it is the
"undistorted manifestation of essential being 
within and under the conditions of existence."
(op. cit. p.137).
In this sense Jesus as the Christ is unique, and normative
for all other manifestations of the New Being.
"Nothing qualitatively new in the dimension of the 
ultimate can be produced by history which is not
implicitly present in the New Being in Jesus as
the Christ." (op. cit. p.138).
And in this sense we may say that history has come to an end.
"In the sense of 'aim1 history has come to an 
intrinsic end qualitatively, namely, in the 
appearance of the New Being as a historical 
reality." (op. cit. p. 138).
In Jesus as the New ^eing the tensions within
estrangement are overcome, and the conflict in the
ontological polarities is reconciled. There are no traces
of unbelief, hubris or concupiscence in the picture of Jesus.
Yet, since, like every other man, Jesus as the Christ is
finite freedom, his temptations were real. (op. cit. p. 146).
Uie may ask, however, how the New Being can experience the
reality of temptation. Tillich answers first by distinguishing
between desire and concupiscence.
"The difference between the natural self-transcendence 
which includes the desire for reunion with every­
thing, and the distorted concupiscence, which does
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not want reunion with anything but the exploitation 
of everything through power and pleasure, is one 
which is decisive for the evaluation of desire in 
the state of temptation. Without desire, there is 
no temptation, but the temptation is that desire 
will become changed into concupiscence." (op. cit. 
p.147).
In the paradise story, the desire is not in itself bad,
"but the conditions of its lawful fulfilment are 
not kept, and so the act of eating becomes an act 
of concupiscence." (op. cit. p. 148).
Jesus overcame his temptations by refusing to fulfil his
desires apart from God. Secondly, the state of unbroken
unity with God is not without the risk implied in the
ontological polarities. But in Jesus as the Christ the
finite is not desired at the cost of unity with God, but
within that unity. Thirdly, the resistance to temptation
was a matter of both freedom and destiny.
"The decision of the Christ against succumbing to 
the temptations is an act of his finite freedom 
and... as a free decision it is an act of his total 
personality and of the centre of his own self."
(op. cit. p. 149).
Yet freedom without destiny is mere contingency. In his
finite freedom he stands with all men
"under the directing creativity of God,(providence)".
(op. cit. p.150).
The biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ does 
not hesitate to express the marks of finitude.
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"As a finite being, he is subject to the contingency 
of everything that is not by itself, but is 'thrown' 
into existence. He has to die, and he experiences 
the anxiety of having to die... He experiences the 
lack of a definite place...(and) his finitude is 
manifest in his loneliness." (op. cit. p. 15D).
In his efforts to communicate with others, even with his
disciples,
"he experiences all the tensions which follow from the 
self-relatedness of every finite person and proves 
the impossibility of penetrating into the centre of 
anyone else." (op. cit. p.151).
Jesus is also involved in the tragic ambiguity of relationships
with others and with groups. In his relation with the Jews for
example, he is involved in the tragic element of guilt
"in so far as he made his enemies inescapably 
guilty." (op. cit. p. 152).
"The innocent one becomes tragically guilty in 
respect to the very one (Judas) who contributes 
to his own death," (op. cit. p. 153).
Although Jesus participated in the tragic ambiguities
of existence these did not separate him from God. On the
contrary as the bearer of the New Being he took these very
negativities of existence into unbroken unity with God.
"This is the picture of the New Being in Jesus as the 
Christ. It is not the picture of a divine-human 
automaton without serious temptation, real struggle, 
or tragic involvement in the ambiguities of life. 
Instead of that, it is the picture of a personal 
life which is subjected to all the consequences of 
existential estrangement but wherein the estrangement 
is conquered in himself and a permanent unity is 
kept with God." (op. cit. pp. 154-5.).
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Tillich notes different and to some extent contrasting 
elements in the biblical picture. In the Synoptic picture the 
dominant feature is the participation of the ieu Being in the 
conditions of existence, while in John the emphasis is on the 
victory of the New Being over these conditions. Another 
contrast is seen in the Kingdom-centred sayings in the Synoptics 
and the Christ-centred sayings in John. A third contrast 
concerns the eschatological significance of Jesus. These 
differences are apparent within both the Synoptics and John.
"In the Synoptics, Jesus sometimes appears siarely as 
the prophetic announcer of the Kingdom to coiiae and 
sometimes as the central figure within the eschato­
logical drama." (op. cit.pp.157-8).
As the latter he has to die for the sins of the people and to
fulfil the eschatological prophecies of the Cld Testament.
And he is to return to judge the world. In John this aspect Is
also found, but there is alongside It a transformation of such .
statements into references to
"eschatological processes which happen In his 
presence in judgment and salvation.5" (op. cit. p.ISBj.
Tillich does not regard these contrasts as exclusive, yet
recognises that they demand systematic consideration. IHte
resolves the difficulty by distinguishing betmesm
"the symbolic frame in which the picture of jesus as 
the Christ appears and the substance in which the 
power of the few Being Is present.:r lop. cit. p.151,;.
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The symbolic frame includes such symbols as 'the Christ', the 
'Son of Man', the 'Messiah', the 'Logos'. Yet within this 
symbolic framework the substance is untouched. The power of 
the New Being shines through in Jesus as
"the undisrupted unity of the centre of his being 
with God;... as the serenity and majesty of him who 
preserves this unity against all the attacks coming 
from estranged existence;., as the self-surrendering 
love which represents and actualises the divine love
in taking the existential self-destruction upon 
himself." (op. cit. pp.158-9).
Before proceeding to consider Tillich's understanding 
of the relation of the Cross to the New Being as the Christ, we 
shall briefly summarise the position we have now reached. The 
existential analysis of the human situation reveals a state of 
anxiety, tension, conflict and despair. Seen from the stand­
point of participation in the New ^eing, this predicament is 
the consequence of man's estrangement from God, or the 'ground 
of his being'. Aware of disintegrating tendencies within his
life, man seeks for a way of overcoming them, and pursues a
variety of methods aimed at achieving self-salvation. But from 
within the condition of estrangement, these efforts are futile, 
leading either towards fanaticism or despair.
"Only a New Being can produce a new action."
(op. cit. p.92).
The answer which Christian theology gives is the affirmation
of the fundamental and inescapable,paradox, that the New Being 
has appeared in the Christ under the conditions of existence 
without being conquered by them. In the biblical picture of 
the Christ we see in one personal life the conquest of the 
condition of estrangement from within the ambiguities of 
existence.
"In Jesus as the Christ the eternal unity of God and 
man has become historical reality." (op. cit.p.170).
The threat of existential disruption which is a possibility
in the condition of finite freedom and finitude, did not in
Jesus as the Christ break the essential God-man unity. In
Jesus as the New Being there is the undistorted manifestation
of essential being within and under the conditions of existence
This is the biblical picture, which
"reveals what can be described best by the phrase 
'continuous communion with God'- no interruption 
of this." (8).
Now how is all this related to the Cross? OJe return 
for a moment to what Tillich regards as an expression of the 
New Being in Besus as the Christ, namely, his suffering.
Jesus' death is seen as
"a consequence of the inescapable conflict between
the forces of existential estrangement and the bearer 
of that by which existence is conquered." (op. cit. v 
p.141).
Only by his total participation in the conditions of existence
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could he
"conquer every force of estrangement which tried 
to dissolve his unity with God." (op. cit. p.141).
His suffering and death are therefore inescapable and at the
same time inseparable from his being as the Christ. His
suffering and death is "an inescapable implication of this
appearance", namely the appearance of essential God-manhood
under the conditions of existence, (op. cit. p. 142).
It is therefore a mistake to separate the suffering
of Jesus from his being, and regard it as an additional ’work'
which effects redemption. Because theology has commonly made
this separation, the life and deeds and words of Jesus have
tended to be regarded as of secondary significance in
comparison with his sufferings. The significant factor is the
appearance of the New Being, not any particular expression of
it in the Christ.
Nevertheless, there is a certain justification for
regarding the suffering of Jesus as having a decisive
function. It confirms his character as the Christ in that it
is the expression of the continuous sacrifice of himself as
a particular individual to himself as the bearer of the New
Being, the Christ. Without this, "he could not have been the
Christ", (op. cit. p.142). In ’Ultimate Concern' (9), Tillich
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says
"In the moment Jesus went the way of the cross, he 
could become the Christ, and not before.”
It is important that we should understand the way 
in which Tillich speaks of sacrifice in relation to the suffer­
ing and death of Jesus. The suffering is in no sense 
substitutional, but participation in the suffering of exist­
ential estrangement.
"The suffering of God... in the Christ, is the power 
which overcomes creaturely self-destruction by 
participation and transformation. Hot substitution, 
but free participation is the character of the 
divine suffering." (10).
Now the suffering of Jesus was an essential and inescapable
expression of the New Being, fls the bearer of the ultimate,
he had to sacrifice his individual character,
"The acceptance of the cross, both during his life 
and at the end of it, Is the decisive test of his 
unity with God, of his complete transparency to the 
ground of being... Only through his acceptance of 
the cross has he become the 'Spirit1 who has 
surrendered himself as flesh, namely, as a historical 
individual. This sacrifice is the end of all 
attempts to impose him, as a finite being, on other 
finite beings. It is the end of Jesusology. Jesus 
of Nazareth is the medium of the final revelation 
because he sacrifices himself completely to Jesus 
as the Christ. He not only sacrifices his life, as 
many martyrs and many ordinary people have done, but 
he also sacrifices everything in hio and of him which 
could bring people to him as an {overwhelming 
personality' instead of bringing them to that in hio 
which is greater than he and they. This Is the 
meaning of the symbol 'Son of God1," (llj.
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Tillich confesses in 'Ultimate Concern' (12), that 
this paradoxical idea has often been misunderstood. Nonetheless 
he adheres to it. The Cross is therefore a symbol of Jesus' 
Victory over the temptation to 'save himself'.
"In Christianity, in the symbol of the cross, there 
is the fundamental revelation that he who was 
supposed to bring the new aeon, the new reality, the 
new being, the eschatological fulfilment, the Kingdom 
of God- all this- in order to achieve it had to 
sacrifice himself, in his individual character, as a 
bearer of the ultimate." (op. cit. p.76).
One of the most revealing episodes in the synoptic record, for
Tillich, is the rejection of Peter's demonic suggestion that
Jesus should not suffer. (Matthew 16:21-23). If he had not
sacrificed his finitude on the cross he could not have been the
Christ. He refused to make himself in his finitude, ultimate.
Now the unique and universal significance of the
event of Jesus of Nazareth has been expressed in symbol and
myth. Some of the christological symbols used in the New
Testament are: Son of David, Son of God, Son of Man, Messiah,
Lord, Logos.
"Christological symbols are the way in which the 
historical fact, called Jesus of Nazareth, has been 
received by those who consider him to be the Christ." 
(13).
These symbols must not be demythologised, but 'deliteralised'
(op. cit. p.175). Tillich insists that it is not the use of
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symbolic and mythological language which is the problem but 
the literalistic distortions of such language. He strongly 
rejects the attempt to remove myth as a vehicle of religious 
expression.
"Symbols and myths cannot be criticised simply because 
they are symbols. They must be criticised on the basis 
of their power to express what they are supposed to 
express, namely, in this instance, the New Being in 
Jesus as the Christ." (op. cit. p. 176).
Two central symbols stand out in the New Testament -
the 'Cross of the Christ' and the 'Resurrection of the Christ'.
The first expresses the Christ's subjection to existence while
the second expresses his conquest of existence. The two symbols
are of course interdependent.
"The Cross of the Christ is the Cross of the one who 
has conquered the death of existential estrangement...
And the Resurrection of the Christ is the Resurrection
of the one who, as the Christ, subjected himself to
the death of existential estrangement." (op. cit.pp.176-7).
The subjection of the Christ to the conditions of existence is
further emphasised in corroborating symbols, such as his
assuming the form of a servant and dying the death of a slave.
Similarly the threat to his life in infancy, his subjection to
hunger, homelessness, misunderstanding, all come to a climax and
are summed up in the symbol of the Cross.
"They are important in their power to show the 
subjection of him who is the bearer of the New Being 
to the destructive structures of the old being. They
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are symbols of the divine paradox of the appearance 
of the eternal God-man unity within existential 
estrangement." (op. cit. p. 183).
But the vital question is how the manifestation of
the New Being in the Christ affects the human predicament. In
what sense is the manifestation a 'salvation-event1?
Salvation is understood in relation to the character
of man's predicament. Man is estranged from his true being,
threatened by non-being and
"ultimate negativity... the loss of the inner telos 
of one's being." (op. cit. p. 191).
The meaning of salvation is therefore inseparable from our
understanding of that from which or into which we must be saved
In the early Greek church,
"death and error were the things from which one 
needed and wanted to be saved. In the Roman Catholic 
Church salvation is from guilt and its consequences.. 
In classical Protestantism salvation is from the law, 
its anxiety-producing and its condemning power. In 
pietism and revivalism salvation is the conquest of 
the godless state through conversion and transform­
ation for those who are converted. In ascetic and 
liberal Protestantism salvation is the conquest of 
special sins and progress towards moral perfection." 
(op. cit. pp. 190-1).
Tillich finds in the term 'healing' the most 
adequate expression of the meaning of salvation. It signifies 
the reuniting of that which is estranged, the overcoming of 
disruption, the healing of the split between sod and man, man 
and man, man and himself.
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"Out of this interpretation of salvation, the concept 
of the New Being has grown.’1 (op. cit. p.192).
In 'Ultimate Concern1, he says,
"the 'sin-forgiveness structure1 or 'justification- 
by-grace structure'.... is not the only important 
thing in Christianity.... perhaps in Paul himself 
the central problem was the divine Spirit and not 
justification by grace." (p.114).
The problem of man's predicament in our culture raises the
question
"Is there a new reality on which we can rely as the 
power of reconciliation?, rather than the Lutheran 
question 'How do we experience a merciful God'?" (14).
Now it is obvious that this has a bearing on any theory of 
atonement. The plea for divine forgiveness remains psycho­
logically true as an expression of man's need, but It is 
liberated from semi-mechanistic theories which regard the 
Cross as a work of Christ which enabled God to forgive.
The concept of the New Being avoids the unsatis­
factory theological scheme which divided the person and work 
of Christ, and interpreted the atonement as
"a kind of priestly technique undertaken for the 
purpose of salvation. " (15).
Christ is Saviour because his work is his being and his being
is his work. In Christ, as the bearer of the Neui Being, there 
is no inner disruption or inconsistency. His work and his 
being are in unbroken harmony.
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But we have still to answer the question how the New 
Being changes or transforms my situation. Here it is necessary 
to refer to Tillich's understanding of revelation.
"Revelation is the manifestation of what concerns 
us ultimately." (16).
It is the mystery of our being experienced as ultimate concern
which appears in revelation. Revelation is only revelation
with respect to a concrete situation.
"Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the 
mystery; this is the subjective side of the event. 
Something occurs through which the mystery of 
revelation grasps someone; this Is the objective 
side." (op. cit. p.123).
But the two sides are inseparable and the one does not exist
without the other. Tillich uses the term 'ecstasy' to describe
the experience of revelation. This is not to be confused
with a destruction of reason.
"Ecstasy is the form in which that which concerns us 
unconditionally manifests itself within the whole 
of our psychological conditions. It appears through 
them, but it cannot be derived from them." (op. cit. 
pp.125-6).
Revelation is therefore not information about divine things, 
but the
"ecstatic manifestation of the Ground of Being in 
events, persons, and things." (op. cit. vol.2. p.192).
There is a knowledge in revelation, but it is not a
knowledge which can be added to technical knowledge. Rather
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is it a wisdom, an insight, a new self-understanding in which 
the mystery of being is manifested without being removed. It is 
existential knowledge, inseparable from our experience of 
ultimate concern.
Now according to Tillich’s method of correlation to 
which we have referred (supra p,160ff.), the question of being 
and the quest for the new being finds its answer in the Christ. 
He is the manifestation of the New Being, which the christo­
logical symbols seek to express. IJJhen we speak of 'atonement' 
we are endeavouring to describe
"the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ
on those who are grasped by it in their state of
estrangement." (op. cit. vol.2, p.196).
It embodies revelation and an ecstatic insight into the mystery
of being. As with revelation, it has an objective and a
subjective side: there is both a divine act and a human
reaction. It is also an ecstatic experience in which the
negativities of life are fragmentarily replaced by awareness
of unity with the Ground of Being. This is the experience of
the healing event, of salvation. The source of this ecstatic
experience is the power of the New Being itself. The saving
power of the New Being (or the Spiritual Presence, see
Systematic Theology, vol.3, ppl40f), creates faith, which
Tillich defines as
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"the state of being grasped by the Spiritual 
Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of 
unambiguous life." (op. cit. vol. 3. p.139).
Now as we noted earlier (supra p.l78f.), the saving
power of the New Being is mediated by the biblical picture of
the Christ. In a concrete situation in which we are
ultimately concerned about the question of being, the picture
of the Christ as the New Being may have revelatory power and
give rise to an ecstatic insight in which
"the ontological shock is preserved and overcome 
at the same time. It is preserved in the 
annihilating power of the divine presence 
(mysterium tremendum) and is overcome in the 
elevating power of the divine presence (mysterium 
fascinosum). Ecstasy unites the experience of the 
abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven 
with the experience of the ground in which reason 
is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the 
depth of being generally." (op. cit. vol.l, p.126).
Tillich describes the experience of salvation as
participation in the New Being, acceptance of the New Being
and transformation by the New Being, corresponding to the
traditional theological terms regeneration, justification and
sanctification, (op. cit. vol.2, pp.203-7).
The New Being as an objective reality precedes
subjective participation in it.
"Regeneration is a state of things universally. It is 
the new state of things, the new eon, which the Christ 
brought; the individual 'enters it', and in so doing 
he himself participates in it and is reborn through 
participation." (op. cit. vol.2. p.204).
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The message of the Gospel is therefore twofold; first, a message 
of a new reality to which one is asked to turn, and secondly, 
a call to turn away from the old reality, the state of exist­
ential estrangement in which one has lived. The subjective 
consequences of regeneration are fragmentary and ambiguous and 
cannot be made the basis for claiming participation in the New 
Being. The basis of such a claim is the faith which accepts 
Jesus as the bearer of the New Being.
It will be observed that Tillich gives priority to 
regeneration. For it is participation in the New ^eing, 
(regeneration), which gives rise to acceptance of the New 
Being,(justification). Faith, or the state of being grasped by 
the divine presence, precedes justification. Faith is thus 
preserved from becoming an intellectual work prior to 
regeneration on the basis of which one is justified.
"Justification brings the element of 'in spite of' 
into the process of salvation. It is the immediate 
consequence of the doctrine of atonement, and is the 
heart and centre of salvation." In the objective 
sense, "justification is the eternal act of God by 
which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed 
estranged from him by guilt and the act by which he 
takes them into the unity with him which is manifest 
in the New Being in Christ." (op. cit. p.205).
This 'in spite of' enables man to overcome the anxiety of guilt,
for it emphasises not only man's estrangement but also, and more
particularly, God's justifying act.
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Participation and acceptance describe the reunion of 
what is estranged, the healing, the reconciliation, which is 
salvation. Sanctification is the process of transformation by 
the New Being which follows upon the event of regeneration and 
justification.
"Sanctification is the process in which the power of 
the New Being transforms personality and community, 
inside and outside the church." (op. cit. p.207).
In the third volume of his 'Systematic Theology', 
Tillich elaborates upon these three aspects of salvation. (17). 
Regeneration is described as the experience of the New Being as 
creation. The New Being creates faith. Seen in any other light 
faith is degraded into a belief, an intellectual act produced by 
will and emotion. It is a complete distortion when the gift of the 
divine Spirit is said to follow faith in the divine forgiveness.
The question may arise, "lUhat can I do to experience the New Being?" 
If the question is asked with existential seriousness by one who 
is ultimately concerned about his state of estrangement and about 
the possibility of its being overcome, then he is already in the 
grip of the Spiritual Presence, and the question becomes meaning­
less .
Justification is described as the experience of the
New Being as paradox. It is important to escape the devastat­
ing confusion" which surrounds the doctrine of justification oy
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faith. Faith is not the cause of God's justifying act.
"Not faith but grace is the cause of justification, 
because God alone is the cause. Faith is the 
receiving act, and this act is itself a gift of 
grace." (op. cit. vol.3, p. 238).
We may ask, "Horn can man accept that he is accepted; how can 
he reconcile his feeling of guilt and his desire for punish­
ment with the prayer of forgiveness; and what gives him the 
certainty that he is forgiven?" The answer is in
"the unconditional character of the divine act in 
uuhich God declares him who is unjust to be just...
The impact of this message., turns the eyes of man 
amay from the bad and the good in himself to the 
infinite divine goodness, which is beyond good and 
bad and which gives itself without conditions and 
ambiguities. The moral demand for justice and the 
fearful desire for punishment are valid in the realm 
of the ambiguity of goodness... But within the New 
Being they are overcome by a justice which makes him 
who is unjust just, by acceptance. This transcendent 
justice does not negate but fulfils the ambiguous 
human justice." (op. cit. p.240).
Yet there is in man, in his condition of estrangement, 
a strong resistance to the acceptance of acceptance. It stems 
from the hubris which drives man to try to conquer estrange­
ment and to achieve reunion with God by his own efforts.
"Such hubris avoids the pain of surrender to God's 
sole activity in our reunion with him, a pain which 
infinitely surpasses the pain of moral toil and 
ascetic self-torture... The courage to surrender 
one's own goodness to God is the central element in 
the courage of faith." (op. cit. pp.240-1).
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In the situation of radical doubt concerning the weaning of
life it may appear that the only thing left is
"the ultimate honesty of doubt and the unconditional 
seriousness of the despair about meaning.8* (op. cit. 
p.242).
Yet in the very seriousness of existential despair Sod is
present, although unrecognised. To accept God*s paradoxical
acceptance is to affirm the meaning in life in spite of the
doubt and meaninglessness which surround it. This is the
courage of faith.
Tillich observes three distinct attitudes in
Protestantism towards sanctification and the transformation
of the Christian life.
"In Calvinism sanctification proceeds in a slowly 
upward-turning line; both faith and love are 
progressively actualised." lop, cit. p. 244).
The law retained a function in guiding the Christian who
is not yet completely surrendered to the divine Spirit. This
type of Protestant ethics in which progressive sanctification
is the aim of life had a tremendous effect in shaping
powerful, self-controlled personalities, dedicated to a
worldly asceticism of work, self-control and the repression
of libidinal energy.
In Lutheranism, sanctification
"was seen instead as an up-and-down of ecstasy and
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anxiety, of being grasped by agape and being thrown 
back into estrangement and ambiguity." (op. cit.p.245).;
Although this revealed a deeper understanding of the demonic 
elements in life it also tended towards a disintegration of 
morality and practical religion.
A third attitude towards sanctification is to be 
found in radical evangelical and pietist sects in which the 
paradoxical character of the Christian life is overshadowed 
by the assurance of unambiguous progress towards perfection 
among those who are elected as bearers of the divine Spirit.
Tillich believes that under the impact of secular 
criticism, these ways of interpreting the process of sanctifi­
cation are of diminishing significance. He sets down four 
criteria of life under the Spiritual Presence - increasing 
awareness, increasing freedom, increasing relatedness, and 
increasing transcendence.
The principle of awareness is found in the process of 
sanctification as an increasing
"sensitivity toward the demands of one's own growth, 
toward the hidden hopes and disappointments within 
others, toward the voiceless voice of a concrete 
situation, toward the grades of authenticity in the 
life of the spirit in others and oneself." (op. cit.
P.246).
It is a growing awareness of the ambiguities within one's self 
and at the same time an awareness of the answers to the
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questions implied in this situation.
The second principle is that of increasing freedom 
from slavery to objects and from the compulsions u/hich impede 
one's development toward mature freedom. This is, of course, 
most difficult and in particular in relation to external law 
is susceptible of dangerous distortion.
"The fact that reunion is fragmentary implies that 
freedom from the law is always fragmentary... Freedom 
from the law in the process of sanctification is the 
increasing freedom from the commanding form of the 
law. But it is also freedom from its particular 
content. Specific laws... are not only helpful, 
they are also oppressive, because they cannot meet 
the ever concrete, ever new, ever unique situation." 
(op. cit. p.247).
A third principle is that of increasing relatedness, 
both with others and within oneself. It overcomes self­
seclusion, loneliness and hostility. But this relatedness is 
not mere 'togetherness'. It involves also the power to sustain 
solitude, for a symptom of mature self-relatedness is that 
reunion with one's self which overcomes both self-elevation 
and self-contempt.
"The process of sanctification runs toward a state 
in which 'the search for identity' reaches its goal, 
which is the identity of the essential self shining 
through the contingencies of the existing self."
(op. cit. p.250).
The fourth principle is that of increasing self­
transcendence, or "participation in the holy". This may or
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may not be related to the formal ecclesiastical structures.
"In the mature life, determined by the Spiritual 
Presence, participation in the devotional life of 
the congregation may be restricted or refused, 
prayer may be subordinated to meditation, religion 
in the narrower sense of the word may be denied in 
the name of religion in the larger sense of the word; 
but all this does not contradict the principle of 
self-transcendence." (op. cit. p.250).
Tillich goes on to say that self-transcendence
"is actual in every act in which the impact of the 
Spiritual Presence is experienced." (op. cit.p.251).
Uiith increasing maturity in the process of sanctification,
"participation in communal devotion may decrease and 
the religious symbols connected with it may become 
less important, while the state of being ultimately 
concerned may become more manifest and the devotion 
to the ground and aim of our being more intensive." 
(op. cit. p.251).
Tillich's description of the manifestation of the New 
Being or Spiritual Presence reflects his description of the 
New Being in Jesus as the Christ which we have before us in the 
biblical picture. This is thoroughly consistent, but we must 
raise again the question mentioned earlier (supra pp.l77f.), 
concerning the historical status of the picture. Notwithstand­
ing Tillich's judgment of the historical quest as a failure, 
the conclusion seems inescapable that the biblical picture 
bears a close relationship in Tillich's thought to the 
conception of the mature personality held by a twentieth
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century psychologist. Is not Tillich therefore simply 
avoiding the historical problem by creating an ideal picture 
from the gospels of a man whom any mature and enlightened 
person of this century would regard as admirable? And 
although Tillich expressly rejects the attempts to imitate 
Christ, he is nevertheless prepared to say,
11 If the word ’imitation1 is used at all... it should 
indicate that we, in. our concreteness, are asked to 
participate in the New Being and to be transformed 
by it, not beyond, but within, the contingencies of 
our life," (op. cit. vol.2, p.141).
But the conclusion seems inescapable that we are in fact to model 
our life on the picture of the New Being in the Christ.
Van Buren speaks of Jesus as the free man the contagion of 
whose freedom sets other men free.(18). Tillich speaks of the 
transforming power of the picture of the New Being in the 
Christ in those who confront it in a concrete situation of 
ultimate concern. (19). And does there not lie behind both 
'pictures’ the projection of an idealised man into the first 
century? It may well be that faith must have a grounding in 
history, but it is most unhistorical to replace the uncertain­
ties of ancient history with a contemporary projection. One 5 
cannot avoid the suspicion that the alleged response of the 
first believers is also in some degree a projection of the 
response which van Buren and Tillich would make to their own
idealised 'pictures'.
To return to the Cross of the Christ. It will be 
clear that for Tillich the suffering and death of Jesus are 
the supreme manifestations of the reality of the New Being in 
him and the ultimate proof that he was the bearer of the 
divine Spirit. This has been expressed in a variety of symbols 
and mythological constructions which must be 1deliteralised'.
The finite symbols should never become absolute, for then they 
become demonic threats to the New Being. Instead of pointing 
to the New Being and participating in the power and freedom 
of the divine Spirit, they contradict it. Similarly, theories 
of atonement are but halting attempts to give cognitive 
expression to the reality of the New Being in the Christ and 
its relation to man's predicament of estrangement. Of what 
value then, is a doctrine of atonement? Certainly it can 
have no definitive significance. It must be an unceasing 
attempt to convey in meaningful contemporary terms the 
response of God to the realities of man's predicament. Are there 
any affirmations which must find a place in the development 
of such a doctrine? Tillich names six. First of all,
"the atoning processes are created by God and God 
alone." (op. cit. vol.2, p.200).
That is to say, God is not dependent on a particular work of
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Christ, but that the Christ in the totality of his being,
"mediates the reconciling act of God to man."
(Op. cit. vol.2. p.200).
In view of Tillich's hesitancy about the use of the term
'mediator' (op. cit. pp.l94f.), would it not be adequate to
say that the Christ as the bearer of the New Being jus, in the
totality of .his conquest of estrangement, the reconciling act
of God?.
The second affirmation is that
"there are no conflicts in God between his reconciling 
love and his retributive justice." (op. cit. p.2Q0).
As the justice and love of God are not in conflict it is not
possible to speak of the work of Christ on the Cross as
something which enabled God's love to be reconciled with his
justice.
"The justice of God is the act through which he lets 
the self-destructive consequences of existential 
estrangement go their way." (op. cit. p.201).
These belong to the structure of being itself. Justice which
resists what is against love, is itself an aspect of love.
A third affirmation is that
"the divine removal of guilt and punishment is not an 
act of overlooking the reality and depth of 
existential estrangement." (op. cit. p.20l).
This terminology with its implicit objectifying of God is,
of course, symbolic and the analogy of forgiveness is limited.
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But in the experience of being grasped by the New Being, one 
is made more deeply aware of one's responsibility for 
separation from God and for resistance to reunion.
The fourth principle which must be affirmed is that
"God's atoning activity must be understood as his 
participation in existential estrangement and its 
self-destructive consequences." (op. cit. p.201).
This implies that
"God takes the suffering of the world upon himself 
by participating in existential estrangement."
(op.- cit. p.202).
Through his participation in the self-destructive consequences
of estrangement God is able to transform them
"for those who participate in his participation".
(op. cit p. 201).
Tillich recognises that to speak thus is to use highly
symbolic language, for it appears to contradict the
affirmation that God is beyond freedom and destiny. He refers
to the element of non-being which is eternally conquered in
the divine life.
"This element of non-being, seen from inside, is the 
suffering that God takes upon himself by participating 
in existential estrangement or the state of 
unconquered negativity. Here the doctrine of the 
living God and the doctrine of atonement coincide." 
(op. cit. p.202).
The fifth principle to be affirmed is that
"in the Cross of the Christ the divine participation in
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existential estrangement becomes manifest.... It is 
a manifestation by being actualisation. It is not 
the only actualisation, but it is the central one, 
the criterion of all other manifestations of God’s 
participation in the suffering of the world."
(op* cit. p.202).
Now it must be emphasised again that
"the Cross is not the cause but the effective 
manifestation of God's taking the consequences of 
human guilt upon himself." (op. cit. p.203).
That is to say, although in the language of devotion it may
sometimes appear that there is a causal relation between the
death of Jesus and the experience of release from guilt,
theological language must affirm that the Cross is supremely
the manifestation of God's participation in the destructive
consequences of estrangement.
This leads to the sixth principle which affirms
that
"through participation in the New Being, which is 
the being of Jesus as the Christ, men also participate 
in the manifestation of the atoning act of God."
(op. cit. P. 203).
The divine suffering is not to be thought of as a substitute
for the suffering of man, but as participation in the
situation of estrangement. In being grasped by the New Being
men also participate in that suffering which was also the
manifestation of Christ's triumph over estrangement. And
they likewise participate in that triumph.
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It noui remains to make some general comments on
Tillich's christology, and then to dram attention to what
appear to be tujo serious defects in Tillich's uihole treatment 
of the Cross and the meaning of salvation.
It is quite clear that the christological dogmas of
Chalcedon are radically transformed in Tillich's system. He 
recognises that it was necessary for the Church fathers to 
formulate the dogma in order to protect the Christian message 
against distortions. But their conceptualisation of the 
symbols expressing the Christian message mas not entirely 
successful.
"The christological dogma saved the Church, but tuith 
very inadequate conceptual tools." (op. cit. vol.2.
P.161).
The formula of Chalcedon sought to establish the genuine 
meaning of the Christian message, but theology is not forever 
bound to the philosophical concepts which were then used.
It must constantly strive to express its substance
"with every tool which proves to be more adequate 
than those given by the ecclesiastical tradition."
(op. cit. p.163).
The doctrine of the two natures in the Christ is 
concerned with a fundamental issue of the Gospel.
"Any diminution of the human nature would deprive 
the Christ of his total participation in the conditions 
of existence. And any diminution of the divine
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nature would deprive the Christ of his total 
victory over existential estrangement." (op. cit. 
p.164).
How then, can the christological substance of the 
ancient dogmas be expressed? Tillich replaces the ancient 
concept of static essence by the concept of dynamic relation.
He finds the concept 'nature' as used in the terms 'human 
nature' and 'divine nature', ambiguous and inadequate.
"The assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the personal 
unity of a divine and a human nature must be 
replaced by the assertion that in Jesus as the 
Christ the eternal unity of God and man has become 
historical reality. In his being, the New Being is 
real, and the New Being is the re-established unity 
between God and man." (op. cit. p.170).
Tillich creates the term 'Eternal God-manhood' to express
the dynamic quality of the relation. 'Eternal' points to the
general presupposition of the unique event Jesus as the Christ.
"This event could not have taken place if there had 
not been an eternal unity of God and man within the 
divine life... This unity... in the unique event of 
Jesus as the Christ, became actualised against 
existential disruption." (op. cit. p.171).
Tillich goes on to affirm that both incarnational
and adoptionist christologies have biblical roots and that
neither should be ignored.
"Incarnational christology was needed to explain the 
adoptionist christology... incarnational christology 
needs adoptionist christology for its fulfilment."
(op. cit. p.171).
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"The incarnation of the Logos is not metamorphosis 
but his total manifestation in a personal life.
But manifestation in a personal life is a dynamic 
process involving tensions, risks, dangers, and 
determination by freedom as well as by destiny."
(op. cit. p.172).
One is left wondering whether Tillich has really 
thrown more light on the christological paradox. The dynamic- 
relational concept is certainly more meaningful, but upon 
reflection one begins to suspect that his christology is 
inadequate. For we seem to be left with a Jesus who is 
neither God nor man. Jesus as the Christ actualises the 
ontological structure of the essential unity between God and 
man. It is neither God nor man, but the 'ontological unity' 
which is manifest in the Christ. To be sure, this unity 
is manifested in a personal life, but Tillich regards Jesus 
as the Christ as the bearer of the Mew Being (op. cit. p.139). 
Here we seem to be moving towards a purely adoptionist 
christology. UJe may be in sympathy with Tillich's dynamic- 
relational concept which certainly does greater justice to 
psychological structures, but his attempt to formulate a 
christology ends in confusion rather than clarity.
ilie have already mentioned a certain ambiguity in 
Tillich's references to faith.(supra p.l78f.j He speaks of 
it in general terms as
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"the state of being grasped by that toward which 
self-transcendence aspires, the ultimate in being 
and meaning. In a short formula one can say that 
faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate 
concern." (op. cit. vol.3, p.138).
There is a risk involved in faith since it may affirm a wrong
symbol of ultimate concern, "a symbol which does not really
express ultimacy (as, e.g. Dionysus or one's nation)" (op. cit
vol. 2. p.134). This can lead to idolatry or demonization.
For Tillich the Cross symbolises the conquest of the demonic
temptation of that which is finite to claim ultimacy for itself.
(Jesus sacrificed himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ).
It follows that none of the symbols in and through which the
Christian message is expressed may claim ultimacy. If as
finite and partial elements they claim ultimacy they cease
to be transparent to the genuinely ultimate and hence become
idolatrous.
But in the Christian sense faith is
"the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is 
manifest in Jesus as the Christ." (op. cit. vol.3, p. 
139).
Yet in volume 2, p.134, Tillich says that
"the affirmation that Jesus is the Christ is an act of 
faith and consequently of daring courage."
Now it is understandable that initially, when confronted with
the picture of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, the
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affirmation that he is the Christ would be a daring act of 
courage. But having made the affirmation, and having begun 
to be transformed by the New Being, it would appear that 
faith would give way to certainty and assurance. It is hard 
to see how Tillich can speak at one and the same time of risk 
in faith and of the reality of personal transformation in the 
power of the New Being. Such transformation may indeed be 
partial and fragmentary and not unmixed with doubt, yet how 
can we speak of the reality of the transformation unless there 
is a degree of certainty that the Christ is the genuine 
fulfilment of our truly ultimate concern? In the process of 
transformation under the power of the New Being faith loses its 
radical quality of personal historical decision. And the Cross 
becomes not the constantly recurring challenge to my self- 
understanding and the decisions which flow from it, but a kind 
of ideal external principle of judgment, by means of which my 
concerns and those of others may be judged. The Cross 
becomes the 'criterion' within the life of faith. (20).
A second point at which Tillich's interpretation 
of the Cross appears to be deficient relates to the meaning 
of forgiveness. It is true that Tillich came to express the 
view that the "sin-forgiveness structure is not the only
-212-
important thing in Christianity”.(21). On the other hand, 
in Systematic Theology* vol. 2, he recognised the value of 
Anselm's doctrine of atonement in that it did justice to the 
psychological situation created by the consciousness of guilt, 
(op. cit. p.199). And his fifth principle of a doctrine of 
atonement affirms that the Cross is the
"effective manifestation of God's taking the 
consequences of human guilt upon himself."
(op. cit. p. 203).
The question tue mould raise homever, is mhether 
Tillich's description of the paradox of salvation as 'the 
acceptance that one is accepted' retains the essentially 
personal quality of the experience of forgiveness. Tillich's 
terminology avoids the danger of making the Cross the cause 
of God's forgiveness, but at the cost of an apparent weakening 
of the essentially personal relationship which is basic to 
the reality of forgiveness. Tillich's argument can easily 
be interpreted to mean that salvation is a matter of becoming 
aware of one's unity with the ground' of one's being, of 
participating in the essential God-man unity. The Cross then 
becomes the symbol of a general state of existence rather than 
the point at which I experience the paradox of being both 
judged and forgiven, condemned and renewed, in the daily
c
decisions of life. It may well be that the symbol of
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substitu.tional suffering is 'more or less dead' because of 
our 'fully developed individualism' (22). li/e have no wish 
to revive it. But Tillich's symbolism with regard to the Cross 
becomes less than transparent when we try to express the 
sense of the costliness to God of forgiveness, or of the 
act which overcomes estrangement and effects reunion.
There is here something more than the inseparable unity of 
justice and love in the divine life.
It is not u/ithin the scope of our purpose to pass 
a comprehensive judgment on Tillich's theological system.
UJhile competent critics have expressed doubts concerning 
Tillich's method and its effectiveness as an instrument, few can 
question the predominantly evangelical concern which runs 
through the whole system, the power of his conceptions and 
the stimulation of his arguments. Whether or not we agree 
with Kenneth Hamilton that
"to see Tillich's system as a whole is to see that it 
is incompatible with the Christian gospel" (23),
it is important to remember that Tillich claims no finality
for his system. The task of theology is never ending. It is a
matter of only partial and fragmentary insights, a slow
advance from vantage point to vantage point. With respect to
the Cross, Tillich himself recognised that in the present
situation in which traditional symbolism has lost its 
power, he could do no more than offer criteria for the 
development of another atonement doctrine. (24). 
Nevertheless our final word must be a question. Is it in 
fact possible within the framework of Tillich's idealist 
metaphysical approach to express the utterly historical, 
individual and personal character of the decision regarding 
the Easter faith?
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THE WORD OF THE CROSS 
AND HUMAN EXISTENCE
The Life of Faith in the Shadoui of Death
In this final chapter ujb must summarise the 
discussion of the previous chapters and try to indicate 
certain emphases which may. enable the word of the Cross 
to be recognised and understood as a relevant and liberating 
word to man.
UJe began with the question of God, and concluded 
that although the question remains problematical - as 
problematical as the question of our existence - it is a 
question which is not resolved by logical analysis of language 
or the simple equating of the reality of God with the Man of 
Nazareth. UJe cannot escape the question, but theology is 
committed to the task of defining it and of striving to 
discover fruitful lines towards an understanding of it. UJe 
noted in our earlier discussion that one such line of 
approach which appears to be helpful is that provided by the
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existentialist analysis of existence. Arising from our 
discussion me set down the following affirmations:
1. The question of God and the question of our existence are 
inseparable.
2. The question of God is not primarily a matter of
theoretical thought but of personal existence.
3. The question of our existence is aroused in acute form
in the proclamation of the message concerning Jesus as
the Christ.
4. The proclamation carries with it the affirmation of God's 
being-for-us in the historical reality of Jesus Christ.
5. The decision in response to the proclamation involves 
a new self-understanding which is inseparable from the 
affirmation of the reality of God.
It is clear that in approaching the question of God 
in this may, it is no longer possible to think of him as a 
kind of autocratic monarch, a "Louis XIV of the heavens".(l).
For this reason it is doubtful whether the idea of the 
sovereignty of God, with its lingering autocratic overtones 
is adequate to express the reality of the transcendent otherness 
of God over against his creation. Mor can we think of God as 
a Being whose existence can be either proved or disproved. 
Speaking of the hiddenness of God as one of his properties
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Barth writes,
"UJe lack the capacity both to establish His existence 
and to define His being."
"The being apprehended by us in thoughts and words 
is always either not yet or else no longer the 
being of God."
"God is inapprehensible." (2).
Our speaking of God must always be a confession, a confession 
marked by a sensitive reticence. Yet we do confess that God 
has made himself accessible in terms of his revelation, his 
action in history, in which we encounter him in his being-for-us 
in the historical reality of the Christ. Barth goes on to 
say,
"In His revelation, in Jesus Christ, the hidden God 
has indeed made Himself apprehensible. Not 
directly, but indirectly. Not to sight, but to 
faith." (op. cit. p.199).
In discussing what we mean by an act of God,
R.Gregor Smith writes,
"UJhen we speak of what happens to us, in the relation 
of faith, we are speaking of God's act. And when we 
speak of God's act we speak of what he is. The basic 
utterance of faith is that God is true: what he does 
to us is what he is." (3).
Can we speak of God apart from our experience of his action in
making himself accessible to us in the relation of faith?
Gregor Smith goes on to affirm,
"UJe cannot speak of God in himself, 'die cannot speak 
of God as he is. UJe cannot put any content into the 
concept of God's being... All that we can say of the
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absolutely Other, of God, is that in his 
paradoxical giving of himself to us, uihich we 
receive in faith, the faith that we are forgiven 
and reconciled, we do indeed believe that it is 
not simply of ourselves and of the human other 
that we are speaking, but of God." (op. cit. p.123).
For those who have responded in faith to the proclamation
concerning the Christ,
"God is not anything else than temporal and 
historical."
"UJe cannot get nearer to God than this: he is not 
accessible in isolation or in abstraction, as a 
being, or as being itself, hie is known only as he 
gives himself, and in this giving he expresses 
himself as entirely historical." (op. cit. p.124).
The revelatory encounter does not dissolve mystery into
knowledge, but reveals the mystery - the mystery of God's
being-for-us, to which the appropriate response is not the
confident assertion of knowledge, but worship and the
obedience which expresses itself in love, in being for others.
Referring to the words 'sin' and 'guilt1 we noted
the justifiable humanist condemnation of an understanding
of the terms which relates them exclusively to the fact and
consequence of a self-negating obedience to a heteronomous
authority. The evidence of psychological analysis revealing
the unwholesome and often disastrous consequences of certain
moralistic emphases on rewards and punishments cannot be
ignored. Yet the condition of man is not to be explained
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simply as the expression of a pathological sense of sin, 
nor is it caused by the arousal of false guilt feelings.
Here again the existential analysis of the human situation 
provides insights which give renewed significance to the 
terms 'sin' and 'guilt'. When shorn of a moralistic 
connotation the words refer to an inescapable and universal 
sense of estrangement and alienation - from oneself and from 
the world. The reality of anxiety, care, fear, hostility and 
despair is the expression of a disorder which cannot be 
explained as a superficial blemish or put right by some 
clever psychological engineering. For notwithstanding his 
truly astonishing mastery of his environment, man remains in 
bondage to a variety of political, moral, religious and 
cultural ideologies. He is willing to trade his freedom in 
responsibility for the promise of political or religious 
security. 'Sin' and 'guilt' are not to be confused with the 
transgression of particular moral prescriptions and external 
authoritarian commands. We speak of sin because man's 
alienation from his true being makes commandments necessary.
Sin must be understood in relation to the universal predicament 
of man in which the ambiguities and contradictions of his 
life reflect an estrangement from his true being which he is 
powerless to overcome.
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This led us to an examination of the Cross in New 
Testament history and faith. Houj did Jesus regard his death? 
Our conclusion mas that by their very nature as faith-documents 
the Gospels provided no indubitable factual information about 
the mind of Jesus in respect of the Cross, lile have no certain 
means of knowing whether Jesus died with a sense of accomplish­
ment or whether his death meant the shattering of all his 
expectations.
The resurrection faith, affirming the unique 
presence of Sod in the life and death of Jesus, was bound 
to find that the death demanded explanation and interpretation, 
llihereas Peter at Pentecost made no attempt to give a rationale 
of the Cross, but concentrated on resurrection, Paul relates 
the Cross and resurrection to the total human situation and 
the judgment of God, employing categories derived from both 
Jewish and Hellenistic religious thought and expectations to 
express the meaning of the Cross. A scandal to the Jews and 
folly to the Greeks, the Cross was interpreted in the early 
Church in terms of release from bondage to Sin and the Law, a 
victory over cosmic forces of evil, as a sacrificial offering, 
and a manifestation of God’s love.
It is immediately apparent to a modern critical 
reader that the supernatural view of the universe, with its
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redeemer myths, its cosmic drama of redemption and its 
eschatological expectation of an imminent end to history 
through divine intervention, is quite alien to his understanding 
of the universe. Is the meaning of the Cross bound to the 
mythological framework in which it was originally understood 
and expressed? Is the proclamation of the word of the Cross 
inseparable from the sacrificial categories with which it has 
traditionally been associated? And in what sense is it possible 
to speak of a 'manifestation of God's love'? How can the word 
of the Cross be recognised as a liberating word to man in his 
predicament?
These are the questions which press upon us in a 
time when to speak of the Cross in traditional categories and 
with the use of images belonging to a pre-scientific understanding 
of the universe, demands a sacrificium intellectus or an 
obscurantist dependence on ancient formulae which is a 
disgrace to faith and indeed a contradiction of the power of 
the Cross to liberate man from petrified attitudes and forms 
of thought.
UJe are in full agreement with Paul Tillich when he 
says that in its analysis of the predicament of man and his 
world in the state of estrangement, existentialism is ''a 
natural ally of Christianity1' (4) It provides a conceptual
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framework within which the Christian message may be proclaimed 
in this age, with renewed relevance and power. In the 
judgment of John ftlacquarrie,
"a Christian existentialism looks like one of the 
most promising ways of presenting the New Testament 
message in our time.1 (5).
In Bultmann's view, existentialist philosophy provides a
method of putting the right questions to the New Testament. (6).
Now it is clear that the existentialist approach
is fundamentally different from that which regards the
proper religious attitude to be one of submission to external,
authoritarian claims, be they of biblical or of papal
infallibility. The existentialist attitude is one in which
one's personal existence and history are discovered to be
meaningful in themselves, and not merely the shadow of deeper
and more significant realities. Furthermore, religious
beliefs and moral codes cease to be regarded as secure,
protective shields against the vicissitudes of the world, or
as guarantees of heavenly rewards. Faith emerges as the
power in which we find the 'courage to be' in the midst of
insecurity, uncertainty, doubt, and the constant necessity
for responsible decision.
How then, shall we declare the word of the Cross
in terms meaningful to the present age? In the Cirst place,
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we must place the utmost emphasis on the complete historicity 
of the Cross and of our own existence. By this I mean that 
to speak in terms of a legal act in some cosmic law court, or 
of a military victory on some cosmic battlefield, or of a 
sacrificial offering on some cosmic altar is to remove the 
Cross from our present existence. It becomes a super-historical 
wonder before which man can only fall on his knees in adoration. 
In speaking of the historicity of the Cross it is essential to 
realise that this refers not merely to the crucifixid'h of a 
man of Nazareth under'Pontius Pilate, but also, and just as 
importantly, to the Cross as a factor^in my own experience of 
life and my understanding of what life is. In fact, as Gregor 
Smith has argued (7), the two aspects of what we mean by 
'history1 cannot be separated.
"Historie without Geschichte would remain simply an 
abstract construct. Geschichte without Historie is 
likewise an abstraction. The two meet as a unity 
in the present." (op. cit. p.85).
The Cross becomes a reality only in so far as it ceases to be 
a mere occurrence, or even an occurrence to which an orthodox 
or traditional interpretation has been given, and is acknowl­
edged as a constant element in the present, an inescapable 
factor in every decision which in any way expresses my 
understanding of my life and its relationships.
Confronted in his predicament of estrangement,
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in his inauthentic existence, with the message of the Christ, 
man finds that his urgent questions about the meaning of life 
are overshadowed by the question which is implicit in the 
message itself. How do you understand your life and will you 
let your present self-understanding be crucified in order that 
a new self-understanding may come to life? For the word of 
the Cross does not offer an answer; it challenges to decision.
The word of the Cross thus becomes a word both of 
judgment and release, of condemnation and forgiveness. For 
in the decision of faith we discover that the self-understanding 
within which we are driven compulsively to justify ourselves, 
to boast of our accomplishments, to withdraw from human 
relationships behind a protective facade, to adopt hostile and 
defensive attitudes, to demand spiritual, intellectual and 
moral security, is the manifestation of inauthentic existence. 
The word of the Cross accomplishes both an end and a beginning, 
for while we are judged and condemned, and our previous self- 
understanding is ended, we are at the same time forgiven and 
the possibility of a new existence, a new self-understanding 
is offered to us. And the characteristic of the new self- 
understanding is the realisation that our history, our 
existence is a gift, permeated with grace.
But what proof is there of all this? There is none.
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I cannot point to any observable facts, to objective knowledge, 
to works of piety or to particular moral actions. In response 
to the word of the Cross concerning God's being-for-us in 
the Christ, I confess that this is henceforth how I under­
stand my life. Hfly faith therefore is utterly historical, for 
it means that my decisions and actions are determined by the 
daily experience of grace in which the word of the Cross 
with its judgment and its promise, becomes an existential 
reality.
The immediate question which arises is how this 
understanding of the Cross is to be distinguished from mere 
subjectivism. In common with all religion, Christianity is 
constantly threatened by an absorption with feeling states 
or by mystical flights into the ineffable. Is the alternative, 
however, the affirmation of a firm and unquestioning belief 
in a body of objective dogmatic certainties? Unless we 
affirm in a fundamentalist way the absolute verbal authority 
of the biblical record this is quite impossible. UL/e are back 
with a radically depersonalized faith based on submission to 
an external authority. And a depersonalized faith ceases 
to be a genuinely historical faith. For resting on authority, 
it takes the Cross out of history and places it at the centre 
of an idealised picture of history and its purpose. I he
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consequence is that the Cross is related only in a tangential 
manner to one's present existence.
Ule affirm, therefore, that while our interpretation 
of the word of the Cross is both profoundly personal and 
firmly historical, it is certainly not subjective in the 
pejorative sense. For what is it but the experience of 
decision concerning our very existence which makes us both 
ineluctably aware of our personal significance and at the 
same time aware of the 'objective' reality of others, the 
world and of that which demands and waits upon our decision?
The word of the Cross presents what Bultmann calls a 'decision- 
question'. (8). The question whether we are willing to 
give up our old self-understanding and to acknowledge 3esus 
as the Christ is one and the same question, and the 
decision involves an answer to both. The love and grace 
by which the hearer is grasped in the preaching of the word 
of the Cross are understood not as subjective states but as 
a participation in something which one can only confess to be 
of God. And if someone should choose to dismiss all this as 
subjective opinion, then one can only reply, "So be it, but 
this is how I understand my personal existence".
Clothing more specific can be said concerning the 
life of faith which the word of the Cross brings into being.
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It does not involve acceptance of a corpus of truth, or 
obedience of a set of moral principles, or the.furtherance 
of a scheme for world reformation. Rather does it mean that 
we are thrown into genuine eschatological existence, in which 
the distinctive feature is a 'careless' readiness for the 
future, and an openness to the immediate situation which is 
grounded in our participation in the presence of the Living Lord.
"The theology of faith", writes Professor Gregor 
Smith, "is a theology of the cross, and thus a 
theoloqia viatorum. It is a theology of a 
pilgrim journey which makes its own map as it 
goes". (9).
liihat is the word of the Cross in the shadow of 
death? Ule are familiar with the evidence that for man 
death is not merely a physiological phenomenon but is seen 
as a threat to being. In the philosophy of Heidegger man's 
being is described as "being-unto-death" (10), and in his 
inauthentic existence man tries desperately to conceal the 
inevitability of this uttermost certainty and to cloak his 
mind from its stark reality. Heidegger sees one of the 
characteristics of authentic existence as freedom for death.
Death can become an integrative rather than a destructive 
power in life, imparting a new seriousness and resolution.
The word of the Cross to man in his anxiety in the 
face of death is not the presentation of a fantasy concerning
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a heavenly world but the affirmation that in this life,
death is not merely negation but carries within it the
potentiality of positive meaning. The Cross of the Christ
marked the end of his life, but it was in giving himself up
to destruction that he "broke the power of death" (2 Tim. 1:10,
N.E.B) and became the one who "led the way to life" (Acts 3:15,
N.E.B.). Yet to the man of faith the death of Oesus is not
simply an inspiring example of the triumph of courage and
resolution, or an illustration of the way in which victory
may sometimes emerge from apparent defeat. It is not any
moral which may be drawn from the example of Oesus which
helps to ease the sharpness of death. For one who has
responded in faith to the word of the Cross and has accepted
its condemnation and its renewal, death is also overcome in
that same judgment which has put an end to his former
existence with its inauthentic striving towards self-justification.
Death remains, but dying has lost its sting. It is no
longer the final absurdity in a cruel, meaningless farce,
nor is it the doorway to judgment, to be approached with
fear and trembling. Because of his acceptance of the judgment
of the Cross upon his history, the man of faith nay be said
to have died with Christ. And because Christ "led the way
to life" Christ may be called "the first to return from
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the dead'1 ( Col. 1:18, N.E.B.) Therefore the man of faith 
already participates in the life of Christ, as he expresses 
the obedience of faith in works of love. Sharing in the 
life of Christ is always being on the move, it is a 
constant reaching forward to its goal. (Phil.3:9-14). Over 
the man of faith death no longer has dominion.
Yet sharing in the life of Christ is also a daily 
dying with Christ, the rejection of all illusory security 
based on moral, intellectual or pious achievements. It is 
a daily sacrificing of oneself in love for the neighbour and 
a readiness in the Spirit for any future. This is the 
genuine imitatio Christi, a life in which love alone is the 
absolute obligation and which is a participation in that 
liberty which is the gift of the Spirit.
But it is precisely here that the Cross stands forth 
in all its offensiveness. For it holds man, and the man of 
faith, at a distance from unambiguous truths, unchallengeable 
merits and unassailable certainties. It demolishes comforting 
ideological illusions and mythical world views. It places 
the man of faith in the midst of the world and history and 
while freeing him from the ''cosmic powers and authorities" 
(Col.2:15), simultaneously places him under the obligation to 
live responsibly in the world as a fellow-heir with Christ.
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(Rom.8:17 ,N.E.B).
"For the created universe tuaits with eager 
expectation for God's sons to be revealed"
(Rom.8:19, N.E.B.).
In the 1 de-divinized1 world in which the gods and powers
of the world have been dethroned, (ll), the man of faith is
called to accept responsibility for the world as a son and heir.
The Cross is not, therefore, an event in the past to which
he may look with sentimental wonder and pious adoration. It
is the ever present point from which he moves responsibly
into the future and which shapes his decisions and gives
meaning to his actions. But it is also the point from which
he may sometimes cry, "ffiy God, my God, why hast thou forsaken
me?".
U/e turn to one final question. It concerns the 
power of the traditional imagery and symbolism to express 
the word of the Cross. Tillich's warning about the demonic 
tendency of religion to absolutize both its visible and 
conceptual forms must be heeded. (12). The very Cross which 
is the universal symbol of Christianity is at the same time 
the symbol of the action and decision of one who refused 
to make his continued finite existence an ultimate necessity. 
j!e must therefore recognise that our attempts to conceptualise 
the meaning of the Cross are not more than symbolic expressions
of that which lies beyond the symbols. They are not the 
ultimate. Hie should not be disturbed, therefore, if some 
symbols become less expressive and die. Symbols ujhich 
derived their power from the ancient concepts of sacrifice 
may already be such as can be kept alive only artificially 
in the cultural situation of today. But fresh symbols 
cannot be created at will. They must emerge from the union 
of an awareness of the event of grace with the cultural 
environment in which.the event occurs. It may well be that 
new insights into the structure of personality provided by 
depth psychology, for example, will produce the material 
out of which vital and culturally relevant symbols may arise. 
And perhaps the Church under the Cross, rediscovering its 
shape as a prophetic fellowship will express in its life 
of obedience in freedom, the most effective and powerful 
symbol of the revelation from which it derives its life.
Yet the word of the Cross remains paradoxical and 
the halting expression of a mystery. For it speaks at one 
and the same time of the God who destroys and makes alive, 
of justification in spite of guilt, of acceptance in the 
midst of despair, of life from the grave.
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